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Abstract 
This research critically examines the Iranian petroleum contractual system from its birth to the 
present, and considers its future evolution. Initially, it reviews the development of oil contracts, 
from the early concessions until the annulment of all obligations as the result of two major 
events; the Nationalisation Movement and the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The constant policy 
struggle between the need for foreign funding and technology in the oil industry on one hand and 
the desire to avoid foreign exploitation on the other is analysed in terms of its impact on the 
current stance towards foreign investment and the formation of the present contractual model. 
The embodiment of this complex struggle is the buy-back contractual model that has found 
widespread use in Iranian petroleum transactions since 1989. This scheme is best described as a 
short term risk service agreement, whereby the foreign investor provides the funds for petroleum 
Exploration and Exploitation in exchange for a pre-defined, volume-based quantum of 
remuneration in case of successful production that serves to both compensate and reward the 
contractor. The adoption of this system is a compromise solution between the need for foreign 
capital, expertise and services on one hand and wariness of foreign involvement in natural 
resources on the other, as evident from the Constitutional limitations discussed later in this study. 
A crucial element of this arrangement is the transfer of the field's operation back to the National 
Iranian Oil Company following conclusion of the contract; a legal step which distinguishes buy-
back contracts from alternative systems that may be contrary to the Constitution. 
Both the structure and the comparative advantages of the buy-back have been discussed at 
length, with particular attention to the enabling laws and their flaws. Detailed analysis is devoted 
to the other major international contractual models, including a comparative evaluation of these 
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alternative systems and their suitability for the Iranian oil industry, given the limitations of the 
Constitution. 
The buy-back system is scrutinised from both the foreign and the domestic perspective and the 
issue of whether revision of its terms or an alternative model would be more appropriate 
considering the grievances of all the participants. The extent to which the Iranian oil industry 
was and will be affected by increasing international pressure, particularly as the result of US 
Sanctions, was considered extensively. It appears that Iran is not yielding to such pressure but 
rather orienting itself towards alternative allies and continuing to sign contracts based on the 
buy-back. Particularly stringent examination of specific terms and conditions of buy-back has 
been conducted through a review of various oil fields so as to determine if the model's perceived 
flaws manifest themselves in reality. 
The finding of the analysis described above is that the buy-back contract as implemented in Iran 
is flawed on basis of the limiting nature of its provisions rather than by virtue of the model itself. 
A number of provisions, such as maximum contract length and method of remuneration, which 
are needlessly restrictive, are highlighted and the importance of modernising them in light of the 
current economic environment is noted. Based on the facts and findings throughout the study, the 
conclusion arises that evolutionary rather than revolutionary reforms are both required and 
viable, without undermining the current legal framework. Lastly, the study yields a practical 
recommendation as to the reforms most crucial to the preservation of Iran's attractiveness to 
investors, in light ofthe current economic, political and legal environment. 
12 
Part One: Origin and Background of the Iranian Petroleum Contractual 
System 
Introduction 
The Iranian oil industry is currently preparing to celebrate its second century of life.' Iran's oil 
industry holds a prominent position in the region, as Iran was the first country in the Middle East 
to discover oil, granted the first oil concession to a foreign country2 and to nationalise its oil 
sector. Iran occupies the position of a leader in the oil industry, with the second-greatest oil 
output within the OPEC.3 Iran's oil production relative to the world in general occupies the 
fourth place, outputting 132.4 billion barrels,4 and containing 11 percent of the world's proven 
oil reserves. 
The oil industry has been a vital part of Iran's economic life since the early years of the 20th 
century and this has had a significant impact on the social and political development of the 
country. The oil revenues provide between eighty and ninety percent of Iran's annual income in 
foreign currencies and forms up to fifty percent of the government's budget.5 This data illustrates 
the crucial role of the Iranian oil industry for its economy, as well as its prominent position in the 
global energy community. 
1 Oil was discovered by the British as early as 1908 and Iran would celebrate its IOOth birthday in 2008/9 
2The first Concession in the Middle East was granted in 1901 to the British engineer William D' Arcy. A Concession 
is the grant of access to specified areas for a period of time during which certain rights to hydrocarbons that are 
discovered will be transferred from the host ·country to an enterprise. The rights transferred will usually be for the 
exploration, development, production and sale of the hydrocarbons. The rights are typically granted in return for 
taxes, fees and/or royalties on profits earned from the exploitation of the rights. 
3 The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a prominent organisation, agreed upon at the 
Baghdad Conference on September 10-14, 1960, by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. The Founding 
states were later joined by eight other Members. OPEC's goal is to provide common petroleum policies among 
Member Countries so as to ensure stable prices for producers; an efficient, dependable supply of petroleum to 
consuming nations; and a decent return on capital to those investing in the industry. 
4 In July 2004, Iran's oil minister announced that the country's proven oil reserves have increased to 132 billion 
barrels following discoveries in the Kushk and Hosseineih fields ofKhuzestan province. 
5 Energy Information Administration's Iran Country Analysis Brief, August 2006 [www.eai.doe.gov] 
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Table 1: Iran's Relative Oil Production in OPEC 
OPEC Total Crude Oil Production (Million bblid) 
Saudi Arabia 
Iran 
Kuwait 
Venezuela 
United Arab Emirates 
Nigeria 
Iraq 
Libya 
Algeria 
Indonesia 
Qatar 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
~ 
p 
I 
I 
0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 
Source: EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook (0812006) 
As mentioned above, the method commonly utilised for the development of Iran's oil and gas 
resources is the buy-back. The attractiveness of this model for the domestic party stems from the 
distribution of risk, which is squarely placed on the contractors' shoulders, as they are obligated 
to fund all technical, exploration, engineering and personnel costs in exchange for the prospect of 
compensation and even profit where a commercially viable resource is discovered and exploited. 
Rather than the percentage-based remuneration prevalent in other contractual systems, buy-back 
contracts prescribe a specific amount of remuneration in-kind, in terms of volume rather than 
production share. 
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Even though other systems also use a Rate of Return to calculate remuneration, the payment 
takes place in monetary value rather than in product itself. It is notable that buy-back contracts 
are not widely used by petroleum producers around the world and, therefore, have not been the 
subject of extensive analysis that this study offers. Consequently, the aim of this study is to fill 
the vacuum of comprehensive analysis of buy-back contracts that is evident in academic and 
commercial literature, by deploying a multi-disciplinary approach in order to assess the 
economic, political and legal issues affecting this contractual scheme. 
Although the issue of buy-back contracts is principally a legal one, this study recognises that 
laws and regulations do not exist independently of society, history and the economy, particularly 
as the transformation potential of Iran's legal constraints on petroleum is closely linked to the 
political and economic situation. 
In the first part of this work, the history of foreign investment in the Iranian petroleum industry 
will be elucidated, the historical development of oil contracts in Iran since their inception will be 
analysed and the industry's expansion will be reviewed. Emphasis will be placed on the key 
developments in this area, so as to provide historical background for the country's embracing of 
a new scheme for its oil contracts, known as the buy-back. 
There are some important events which act as milestones when discussing the history of the 
Iranian oil industry. These are the D' Arcy Concession Agreement of 1901, the discovery of oil 
from the first well drilled at Masjid-e Soleiman in 1908 and the failed attempt to revise the 1933 
Concession. Also, one must consider the impact of the two World Wars on the oil industry, 
eventually leading up to the Nationalisation Movement in 1951 as well as the 1954 Consortium. 
The victory of the Islamic Revolution changed the Iranian oil industry in many aspects, as it 
caused the annulment of all previous rules and regulations and the country had to face a 
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completely different policy and situation. This situation was further exacerbated by the war with 
Iraq, beginning just a year after the Revolution and lasting for an exhausting 8 years. 
Heavy damage was inflicted on the industry during the war, and so the efforts to repair the oil 
infrastructure required significant time and financial investment, especially from foreign 
companies. All of these events had a permanent impact upon the type and terms of the contracts 
which are currently being agreed between Iran and the foreign parties. 
Among the most disruptive challenges for the oil industry at the time was the insufficient number 
of technical staff for the number of active projects, which had difficulty reaching production 
targets in the short periods called for, as well as the inadequate funds for the financing of the 
projects, with the government unable to provide sufficient funds without compromising other 
areas of the budget. The number of these domestically insurmountable issues was what led Iran 
to open its oil industry to foreign investment from the early 1990s, through the medium of the 
buy-back contracts, which was compatible with the prohibitive articles of the Iranian 
Constitution.6 
While Iran's legal restrictions on foreign investment may be puzzling in light of the global and 
unrestrained nature of commerce, they cannot be dismissed out of hand as arbitrary due to the 
economic and historical background preceding their rise. 
Without studying the historical reasons for Iran's adoption of the restrictive current model, it is 
impossible to fully understand either the current difficulties faced in the course of oil transactions 
or predict future trends in its development. Consequently, the two Chapters that follow will deal 
with these historical factors and the means by which they shaped the currently used model of 
6 Takin Manouchehr, Working with Sanctions, Trade Controls &Political Risk 03, Case Study: Iran, Centre for 
Global Energy Studies [www.cges.eo.uk/pdf-lib/confpresentationsSanctionsContNov031ran.pdt] 
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buy-back. Such an analysis serves as a representative introduction the wider aims and objectives 
of this study, namely to provide a realistic rather than a purely academic analysis of both the 
advisability of buy-back oil contracts as they stand today and propose reforms that are in line 
with immutable constitutional limitations. In recognition of the subjective nature of Iran's 
position on oil transactions, the history chapters seeks to provide an understanding of the reasons 
and gravity of opposition to oil transactions' reform, particularly as such an understanding is 
necessary for making realistic recommendations on contractual reform. In addition to such a 
subjective analysis, it is recognised that a comparative analysis of the existing system with both 
radical international alternatives advocated by buy-back's critics and the international model 
adds an objective element to the study. A detailed analysis not only of buy-back's basis and legal 
limitations but also of the procedural implausibility of altering these arrangements provides a 
realistic viewpoint that is alternative to the uninformed calls for revolutionary and plainly illegal 
reforms by some critics. The analysis is not grounded solely in theory, as an extensive case study 
of recent transactions furthers the study's aim of being practically applicable, while the various 
factors influencing buy-back and compelling reform are highlighted. A further means of 
improving the realistic applicability of the findings is the consideration of future developments 
within international oil transactions, with the effect of sanctions and the changing oil-supply 
situation in the Middle East specifically examined. As any positive reform will have to stem 
from mutual agreement and understanding by foreign investors and the Iranian government, 
particularly careful analysis is devoted to outlining their respective positions on this contentious 
matter while suggesting likely areas of reconciliation. Lastly, the various aspects of the analysis 
are brought together within the final chapter in order to provide a set of findings and 
recommendations that incorporate all relevant aspects of the issue, rather than maintaining a 
narrow viewpoint that is prevalent in other studies into buy-back. 
17 
Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to critically analyse the existing contractual scheme used in Iranian 
petroleum transactions, so as to determine whether it is the optimal scheme available within the 
constraints of Iranian law and historical background, as well as to propose remedies for its 
existing flaws. In order to accomplish the goal of proposing reforms, it is necessary to 
understand the grievances of the parties involved and this also is a corollary goal of the study, 
using an extensive examination of influential historical factors to gain such an understanding. As 
a means of considering various improvements to the status quo, international and domestic buy-
back schemes are also comparatively analysed in order to determine whether and where room for 
improvement exists. A further element of this work which is of crucial importance is the 
overview and analysis of legal and political constraints placed on any future reform or alteration 
of the scheme being used; as a merely theoretical conclusion made without consideration to the 
practical realities and limitations will be of little analytical or practical value. 
18 
Review of Literature 
Issues related to the energy sector, particularly those of oil production and contracts, are 
increasingly topical in an economy which places greater reliance on these resources' 
consumption every year. Despite the growing focus on issues of oil generally, one area has not 
been sufficiently analysed by academic commentators. This aspect of the oil economy are buy-
back transactions, which are becoming increasingly important as extensive petroleum reserves 
are being discovered in Iran and the structure of its petroleum transactions are continuing to 
influence both the Iranian and the global energy markets. 
In the context of the buy-back's growmg importance, an objective and comprehensive 
assessment of the contracts' nature and legal framework, as well as the advantages, 
disadvantages and avenues for modernisation in the scheme are needed in order to provide 
greater foreseeability to foreign investors. Such an analysis would further provide enhanced 
understanding of such contractual framework in the academic context. One of the direct benefits 
of this study would therefore be the investors' ability to foresee the future developments in the 
Iranian petroleum industry, as well as its current state by accessing a single analytical study, in 
English, rather than the scattered, less detailed resources, available mostly in Farsi. The study 
also serves the interest of the domestic Iranian oil parties, by providing a comprehensive, 
analytical overview of the flaws within the current framework and, therefore, enabling reform of 
certain aspects without infringing on the legal limitations placed by national law. 
This study aims to fulfil these goals by approaching the issue with a view of its historical origins 
as well as predictions of future development, which is not an approach that has been taken in any 
sufficiently detailed English-language publication or academic work on this issue. The 
reasoning for the inclusion of a historical analysis of legally significant events that were 
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formative of Iran's current oil policy is that such an approach permits greater understanding of 
future development, which is continuously affected by factors from the past. Extensive material 
is available on the historical background of the Iranian oil industry, but in order to provide 
sufficient space for analytical material within this study, only those historical events that have 
significant legal aspects have been highlighted. 
This gap in the coverage of the subject results in uncertainty regarding many aspects of buy-back 
transactions, such as the direction in which the Iranian government's policies are heading and 
whether an alternative system may be adopted, in the context of Iranian legislation. An 
illustration of other studies' narrow focus, often concentrating on the immediate state of the 
system rather than its prospects or origins, can be found in the work by Dr. Ule and Dr. 
Brexendorff. 7 Despite providing a satisfactory overview of the current state of the rbuy-back 
system, in particular with reference to the foreign companies' concerns, it nonetheless fails to 
provide sufficient historical context to enable an accurate assessment of the present situation 
within the oil industry as well as its future development, as past events determine both of these 
aspects. 
Furthermore, a careful examination of the authors' analysis of the present system's drawbacks 
reveals an apparent bias. Whereas the foreign investors' concerns are extensively detailed and 
supported, mentions of the government's concerns are only provided when such a reference is 
useful for illustrating the IOC's grievances. In practical terms, whereas the description of 
government grievances occupies half a page, the contrary perspective occupies three. Such an 
unequal emphasis is perhaps motivated by the status of the study's authors as legal advisers to oil 
firms, and the consequent target audience ofthe study. As any prediction ofthe government's 
policy changes regarding buy-back requires an objective assessment of the authorities' 
7 Ule, C. and A. Brexendrorff, Investing in the Oil and Gas Industry. 2005: Mena. 
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grievances as well as the foreign companies', it is therefore arguable that only an even-handed 
analysis, such as the one provided within this author's study, will enable accurate prognosis to be 
made. 
Unlike Ule's and Brexendorffs work, this analysis is a product of academic effort and, as the 
result of not having to cater to either of the interested parties within the dispute over buy-back, is 
therefore able to provide a more even-handed analysis of the situation. 
A further limitation of Ule's and Brexendorff's study is the superficial level of analysis applied 
to the legal context and limitations of buy-back contracts. Although general information is 
provided on the subject of Constitutional limitations and the various enabling legislation, 
insufficient analysis is conducted of these laws' procedural and formative aspects. The failure to 
thoroughly address the process by which laws are passed in Iran, for instance, prevents the 
authors from deducing the probability of constitutional or legal reform being enacted to enable 
alternative contractual frameworks; as the interplay between the various legislative authorities is 
necessary for such an analysis. 
Furthermore, instead of simply stating that an alternative system would be preferable for 
purposes of commerce, this study recognises and carefully catalogues the various impediments 
preventing an alternative system from being adopted, such as the restrictive laws and the 
unfavourable political situation in Iran. Consequently, the perspective presented here is based on 
the realistic situation rather than a theoretical conclusion regarding the superiority of a different 
model, which would have no practical utility when the realities of the present legal situation are 
taken into account, or where such reform attempts have previously been shown to be flawed. 
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A further area in which Ule's and Brexendorffs study is deficient is its lack of appropriate 
consideration for the effect of US sanctions on the Iranian economy generally and petroleum 
contracts in particular. As will be shown later in this study, major oil companies are concerned 
about the current level of sanctions and several have even stated that if further sanctions are 
imposed as the result of the current international tension, they will cease their activities within 
the country. A study on the state of the buy-back scheme and its future development cannot be 
said to be complete unless this serious influence is considered. This study, on the other hand, 
extensively examines the past effect of sanctions so as to be able to predict the sanctions' future 
economic influence on petroleum contracts. In addition, the economic influence on the American 
economy is analysed in order to predict the likelihood of further sanctions being imposed, 
considering the already present negative consequences on the US economy. All the information 
highlighted above subsequently allows the formation of a prediction regarding future effects of 
sanctions, therefore providing a greater degree of information and, therefore, certainty, for the 
parties involved in buy-back transactions. 
A source offering a different perspective to the one reviewed above is the collection of primary 
sources, published in Farsi by a collective of writers, edited by Dariush Mobaser, titled "Autopsy 
of the Oil Contract (Buy-Back)".8 The book is unique in its publication not only of articles 
published in academic and popular media regarding buy-back agreements, but also in that it 
offers the replies provided by the NIOC in reference to the published concerns. The advantage of 
this book is its holistic approach to analysing oil contracts, as the result of the authors' 
professional qualifications as lawyers, journalists, politicians and other educated professionals. 
The book's target audience is not limited to academic circles but rather is aimed at the population 
8 Mobaser, D. Autopsy ofthe Oil Contract (Buy-Back) collection of articles, 2000 
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interested in the topical issues of oil in Iran, generally. As a result, the book is accessible and 
provides sufficient context. 
In order to assess the complexity of the perspectives offered within this book, the authors' 
opinions may be divided into three general categories. The first group of contributors argue that 
the current levels of productions must be maintained in view of preserving Iranian national 
heritage, with any expansion of production capability having the irreversible effect of depriving 
future generations of this strategic national resource. As part of their position, this group reject 
the formation of buy-back contracts, but such rejection is interpreted by the NIOC as indicating 
their underlying opposition to any type of contract at all, including production sharing and other 
types. 
The second group of contributors are characterised by a nationalistic outlook on the issue of oil 
production. While accepting the economic need for expansion of oil production, it is their 
argument that maximum benefit for Iran is to be extracted through the use of domestic investors, 
contractors and expertise; therefore keeping all the money involved in oil within the Iranian 
economy. In response to such arguments, the NIOC points out that insufficient domestic 
expertise and technology exists at this time to optimise oil production; and the failure to utilise 
foreign investments, capital, know-how and technology would lead to a decline in production. 
Reference is particularly made to increased production levels associated with foreign 
technological and investment input, and emphasis is made on Iran's continuing absorption of 
technological know-how and expertise, as aided by contractual provisions within buy-back 
contracts. The argument is further bolstered by the statistical support provided by the NIOC, 
highlighting that only an insignificant percentage of 1.5% is eventually contributed to the foreign 
investor in some cases, which is a reasonable figure in comparison to the investment provided by 
the foreign parties. 
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The third and last group are proponents of a more balanced approach to oil production, 
highlighting the need for expansion of oil revenues but also recognising the foreign role in oil 
production. Commentators in this group do not believe that the buy-back framework is 
sufficiently attractive to foreign investors and that its replacement with production-sharing or 
other scheme would ultimately boost Iranian oil revenue. Members of this more liberal 
subsection of the third group believe that an analysis of foreign concerns is required in order to 
improve the situation. The NIOC's response to these arguments is a very critical one, with 
domestic authorities' commentators claiming that the third group acts as lobbyists promoting 
foreign interests at the expense of Iran. Contrary to this assertion, however, a sub-section of this 
group believes that buy-back is, in fact, too liberal towards the foreign oil firms and that a 
harsher scheme should be imposed. The NIOC's reply to such concerns is the emphasis that the 
world oil market contains other potential investment zones which would attract foreign 
investment if Iranian terms became overly unfavourable; therefore buy-back must be maintained 
as the optimal balance between foreign and domestic interests. 
An illustrative sample of media outlets and articles where the above perspectives are outlined is 
included below: 
Shoma Weekly, Neshat Newspaper,9 Ariya Newspaper, Resalat Newspaper, Gozaresh Magazine, 
Entekhab Newspaper, Global Economy Newspaper (Jahane Eghtesad), Jomhouri Islami 
Newspaper, Ettella'at Newspaper, Hayate No Newspaper, Iran Newspaper, Magazine of 
Transportation and Industry, Khorasan Newspaper etc. 
It is noteworthy that these media outlets represent the entire media spectrum, including 
conservative and reformist publications with the corresponding perspectives. 
9 A refonnist newspaper that was subsequently prohibited in Iran in 2000. 
24 
Although the compilation of articles does provide a useful starting point of a comparative 
analysis, as it is aimed at the general public and therefore only limited academic analysis may be 
extracted. In addition, as the articles are composed by a variety of authors who advocate a wide 
variety of often radical perspectives, the publications tend to be partisan in tone, which is an 
unhelpful attribute within the academic context as the authors' bias must be deduced on many 
instances throughout the book to extract useful meaning. Furthermore, a certain lack of 
impartiality towards buy-back may be observed in that the NIOC's perspective is given especial 
prominence in both emphasis and text volume, in comparison to any one of the groups described 
above. Additionally, the fact that the book's contributors are of Iranian origin means that very 
little attention is given to the foreign grievances and concerns, outside the context of reform in 
the interest of economic self-promotion. Such a perspective therefore requires extensive and 
thorough analysis of the authors' arguments to determine whether they correspond to reality or 
are merely the result of their bias. 
As opposed to the extensive, if slanted, critical analysis within the above sources, several other 
publications on the topic of Iranian oil contracts fail to provide sufficient analytical content but 
rather concentrate on summarising of the history and present law regarding buy-back contracts 
without paying any heed to foreign concerns. Two such books are "A Survey on Iran's Oil 
Agreements" 10 and "Contract Laws" 11 , which are general summaries of the relevant laws and 
historical background. Although these sources were valuable in providing historical information, 
such background is not subsequently used to illustrate the present concerns and criticisms of buy-
back transactions, therefore providing little analytical value to the material. Such a deficiency is 
unsurprising as the target audience are law students, rather than academics or other critics of the 
10 Farshadgohar, N., A Survey on Iran's Oil Agreements. 2002, Economic Research Institute, Tehran. 
11 Rabiee, F, Hoghoogh-e-Gharardadha (Contract Laws) 1381, Tehran, Behnami 
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system. Purely factual and explanatory elements have however proven helpful, in particular a 
model contract included within and clarification of Iranian statutes on matters of oil. 
In addition to written compilations and sources, the author has consulted a number of interviews 
with prominent decision-makers within the Iranian oil industry in order to obtain a perspective 
closer to the practical aspects of the formation of buy-back agreements. Among the individuals 
whose interviews have been consulted is Mehdi Hosseini, the former Deputy Minister for 
International Affairs better known as the' Architect of Buy-Back Agreements' or even 'Mr. Buy-
Back' for his formative role in initiating the use of such agreements in Iran within the 1990's. 
The interview offered insights into the NIOC concerns regarding buy-back transactions' benefit 
to the Iranian side and offered supporting arguments for its continued use. Such arguments are of 
particular credence as Mr. Hosseini was successful at attracting foreign investment during his 
direct participation in the program. Within the interview itself, however, Mr. Hosseini was 
understandably partisan as he was discussing a subject to which he has particular loyalty and 
therefore little merit was provided to foreign concerns regarding buy-back. As an accurate 
perception of the competing perspectives may be formed by reviewing pro-buy-back and anti-
buy-back in a measured and holistic manner, the interview was nonetheless of clear value. 
A further source by an authoritative figure personally involved in the oil industry is by Mr. 
Hossein Kazempour Ardebili, a former Deputy Oil Minister, who provided historical overview 
of oil contractual development in Iran. Such a summary was of great value as the Iranian oil 
authorities' interpretation of previous versions of oil contracts is essential for an understanding 
of the NIOC's concerns. 
The author has also approached an instrumental figure in the study of Iranian oil contracts, senior 
analyst at the Centre for Global Energy Studies in London, Dr. Manouchehr Takin. This 
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academic's comments were of extensive use in highlighting the uncertainty in the Iranian oil 
industry prevalent at the moment, but also the ongoing and potential reform within the industry. 
This perspective was of especial importance in this thesis, the emphasis of which lies in the need 
for continuous reform of the contractual provisions; a view apparently shared by Dr. Takin based 
on his publications. 
A further source of information located close to the workings of the oil industry has been 
provided by Mr. Bijan Khajehpour, the Chairman of the Atieh Bahar Group, within a 
commercial analysis of the prospects for foreign investment within the Iranian oil industry. The 
target audience for his study, as specified within its introductory paragraph, is the enhancement 
of IOC's opportunities within Iran through providing information on its legal, political and 
economic situation in the context of oil. Although the report provides extensive valuable 
information, it is limited in its academic value due to the emphasis on commercial information 
rather than historical background or a comprehensive analysis of the concerns on both sides. 
Although the information provided is especially valuable in its risk assessment for IOC's, the 
lack of sufficient evaluative material undermines this source's value in an academic context. 
Various industry and general interest journals have been used to provide an up-to-date 
assessment of the relevant issues. One such journal article utilised pertains to the interaction 
between foreign and domestic oil interest, and was published within the Journal of Iranian 
Research and Analysis. 12 The focus of this article was on the nationalisation period oflranian oil 
history, with special attention paid to the interaction between the foreign investors and Iranian 
interest. Through such an analysis, the foreign academic author of this article highlights her 
opposition to the nationalisation and its legal implications. An additional implication found 
12 Heiss, M.A. National Interests and International Concerns. Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis. Vol. 16, 
No.2 November 2000. 
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within this article is the examination of nationalisation 's effect on relations between UK and US 
and Iran, which proved of significant use as a means of assessing the current tense situation. 
Nonetheless, due to the concentration on the international diplomatic aspects of the situation, 
insufficient attention is provided to the current balance of oil interests within Iran. 
An additional article is from the 2007 edition of the Geopolitical Affairs Magazine, 13 which 
examines in extensive detail the interplay between American influence and the Iranian oil 
industry, as well as the future effects of American sanctions on Iran. Although the overview of 
the situation provided was of value, the perspective taken throughout the article of the 
examination of oil issue through the lens of continuing availability of Iranian supplies to the 
world market, with a distinctively political emphasis that ties nuclear issues with those of oil. 
Consequently, the examination of the relevant issues was not as impartial and measured as could 
be expected of a purely academic work. 
Although an extensive number of sources has been consulted from various perspectives, some 
desirable materials could not reasonably be accessed due to practical restrictions. Amongst such 
resources were particular oil contracts with prices and numbers included, which have been 
requested from the participating oil companies and other sources, but the provision of which was 
refused due to issues of commercial secrecy. Instead, model oil contracts have been utilised in 
order to provide a reasonable replacement for the more specific oil contracts. 
A further unavailable source was a report regarding the Iranian oil industry by 'Alexander's Gas 
and Oil Connections', which, despite appearing to be quite complete from its table of contents, 
was not reasonably accessible due to the 14,000 Euro cost of purchase. Attempts to access this 
report through academic databases and sources have also been unsuccessful. 
13 Howard, R., The Politics oflranian Oil: Posing a Challenge to America. Geopolitical Affairs, 2007. 1(1): p. 216-
232. 
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An analysis of academic work that has been reviewed within this thesis clearly shows that 
objectivity is lacking within both primary and secondary sources; with the origin of the author 
often determining their perspective. In several instances, either the NIOC or the IOC concerns 
are minimised or ignored altogether, which is a fatal flaw for any academic work aiming to 
propose objective solutions to current issues. 
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Research Methodology 
As the quality of a study's conclusions inevitably correlate with the procedure and method used 
within the work, a thorough analysis of these procedural factors is required in order to ensure 
valid conclusions. This is particularly the case in qualitative, social research, where the intent is 
to create a "decision rule"14, a systematic means of assessment, in order to analyse the various 
theories and explanations in an effort to decide which optimally fits the facts at hand. This 
section aims to clarify the process by which this standard was created and applied to issues of 
buy-back transactions, as well as to illustrate the extent to which the research method was valid 
and objective, despite the numerous factors that influence the outcome of social research. The 
variation of research method used within this study is further elucidated, while also being placed 
in the context of comparable techniques, and shown to be the maximally compatible means of 
conducting this analysis when the various influential factors are taken into account. 
Commonly Accepted Standards of Research Methods 
As alluded above, a set of principles exists amongst those utilising qualitative research, which 
governs their behaviour and ensures its conformity and ethics. In order to illustrate that this study 
remained within the boundaries of this Code, it is necessary to outline where these boundaries 
lie. 
One benefit of qualitative research in comparison to more numerically centred studies is its 
flexibility, particularly when concerning the choice of research tools to be used, as well as 
procedures involved. As the methods are not firmly set and come in the form of guidelines rather 
than requirements, they may be changed in the course of the research in response to alterations in 
circumstances. This study followed this suggestion as no initial, unchangeable hypothesis was 
14 Dooley, D. 'Social Research Methods', Prentice-Hall Inc. Englewood CliftS, 1984,USA, pg. 9 
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selected nor was the research methods limited to the types of sources or methods originally 
outlined. 
A further element of the standard research guidelines is the need for openness of the research, 
which ensures that studies are not limited by rigid hypotheses or requirements which would limit 
their scope and subsequently, utility as a method of study. This particular research follows these 
criteria by not attempting to follow the evidence to a specific conclusion but rather examining 
whichever conclusion the evidence may result in. 
An additional recommendation of the Code is that the analysis and subject of the study be 
reflective in nature, meaning that the impact of context on the subject of study must be examined 
in detail. Therefore, this guideline suggests that full understanding of the subject matter cannot 
be attained without a detailed study of the context. This study implemented this recommendation 
through the inclusion of extensive information on the historical and socioeconomic context of 
buy-back. 
A final guideline is that analysis be conducted in terms of interactions, on the principle that 
reality is formed as the result of interaction and can be understood through comprehending such 
interactions. Consequently, the purpose of research is to identify the patterns that form the type 
of reality being studied and thus be able to predict the outcome of future patterns of behaviour. 
The study in question abided by this recommendation as buy-back was not studied only in its 
present form but rather as the sum of events and influences leading up to its current state, with 
analysis as to the effect of various historical and political influences on the final product. 
Consequently, all the essential elements of the Code have been abided by in order to fulfil the 
guidelines of qualitative research method and maximise the quality of the study. 
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Overview of Possible Methodologies 
As the range of subjects and issues studied through qualitative method, especially in the context 
of social science, is extensive, the number of methodologies available is similarly large. 
Although the listing of the various methodologies within the confmes of this work would be 
impractical, it is nonetheless important to outline the general types of research methodologies 
being used within this field. The counterpart of qualitative research, the study of a phenomenon 
based on non-numeric elements, is quantitative research, focusing on statistics, data and figures 
which are then analysed to come to a conclusion. On the other hand, Basic Research is the 
process of investigating an existing theory in order to either verify or discard it, usually on a 
more theoretical level. In contrast, Applied Research is of more pragmatic nature as it utilises 
general theories to solve specific issues, be they policy, social or economic related, usually 
resulting in the formation of a consistent programme of action. 
These methodologies are further subdivided according to the time frame in which they take 
place, with Longitudinal Research involving extensive time periods between initial and 
subsequent observations of the subject matter. The level of detail involved in the study is often a 
distinguishing factor, with Descriptive Research often being used to preliminarily examine a 
topic in order to determine the viability of a more extensive study. 
Types of research most relevant to investigations of petroleum transactions include Comparative 
Research, a method which compares various units along a similar set of parameters to determine 
the extent of difference and similarities, especially within a historical, economic or legal context. 
Elements of this method are utilised within this study when comparing and contrasting Iranian 
and international buy-back. 
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The remainder of the study, however, is based around the qualitative method, which must now be 
examined in greater detail. A concise and encompassing description of this type of research, 
which shows its relevance to the material being studied within this thesis, is provided by 
Sarantakos: 
This type of research refers to a number of methodological approaches, based on diverse 
theoretical principles (phenomenology, hermeneutics and social interactionism) 
employing methods of data collection and analysis that are non quantitative, and aiming 
towards exploration of social interactions ... for instance l) exploration, which helps to 
analyse research objects, identify indicators, and establish classifications and typologies 
2) discovery of relationships between variables, enabling comparisons and conclusion to 
be made about the significance of certain factors for the relationship; 3) establishing 
integrated constructs and 4) testing hypotheses. 15 
As can be seen from the broad definition of qualitative research stated above, it encompasses a 
number of approaches. Nonetheless, alternative methodologies are almost always used within an 
extensive study of a subject as, for instance, comparative analysis is better suited for comparing 
two sets of phenomena than qualitative analysis is. Therefore, qualitative analysis is utilised 
throughout the study to determine the causality of various factors, such as historical precedent, 
political opinions and economic conditions, in reference to the formation of buy-back 
transactions in their current form. However, the analysis of the comparative strengths and 
weaknesses of international and domestic contracts, as well as between various types of 
contractual arrangements, are an issue that is clearly more closely related to the Comparative 
Research method and therefore it was applied appropriately in the analysis of this extensive and 
multi-sided issue. The viability of this practice is confirmed by Sarantakos, who states that as 
15 Sarantakos, Sotirios, 'Social Research', the MacMillan Press Ltd, London 1994. p. 6-7 
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many as four or five methodologies may be used to address a multi-disciplinary issue, an 
example of such a complex issue may be said to be buy-back. 
These types of social research are not mutually exclusive. Researchers usually employ more than 
one type of research in a project. It is, for instance, possible that descriptive research is used in 
an investigation together with classification research, theory building research and comparative 
research. The investigator has to decide about the types and combinations of research forms that, 
in his or her opinion, best serve the goals of the study. 16 Consequently, although elements of 
descriptive research are of relevance to the procedure used within this study, such as descriptions 
of existing oil transactions, such descriptive methods cannot alone constitute an analytical 
study17 as further methods aimed at providing explanations are required. 
Such a combined approach, utilising descriptive, interpretative and quantitative elements has 
been described by Bryman as 'the mixed method approach'. 18 He specifically notes that 27% of 
research papers fail to mention that this is the approach being used and, in order to avoid 
repeating this mistake, this study is prepared to identify the approach as 'mixed'. As has been 
mentioned above, while the vast majority of the study utilises the interpretative method, the 
History sections are descriptive in nature, while quantitative elements are also present 
throughout. It is submitted, however, that the common mistake of those utilising this mixed 
method, namely failing to integrate the various elements but instead using them in parallel, is 
avoided within this study. The rare elements of quantitative analysis are closely interconnected to 
the analytical/interpretative elements to form a more holistic analysis, while the descriptive 
History sections are linked strongly to the analysis rather than being included for the sake of 
comprehensiveness. 
16 Sarantakos, op.cit .. , p.8 
17 Ibid., pg. 9 
18 Dale, A. Mixed Methods Workshop. 
[www.ccsr.ac.uk/methods/events/Mixed/documents/mixedmethodssummary.doc] Accessed 18th March 2008 
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Furthermore, no undue emphasis is placed on the distinction between qualitative and quantitative 
elements both structurally and in terms of content as, according to Bryman, this creates 
unnecessary internal barriers within mixed-research. Finally, although a recent Conference19 on 
the issue of Mixed Methods did not yield a clear set of criteria for assessing the quality of mixed 
methods research, it is submitted that as the interpretative and descriptive elements follow the 
discrete standards for these methodologies and are integrated within the larger work, the general 
standards of the mixed method are fulfilled within this study. 
Interpretative Method: Data Analysis Method 
Interpretative method found to be optimal for the subject of buy-back analysis is the 
interpretative method and, in order to illustrate its appropriateness, it is necessary to address its 
nature, procedures, advantages and flaws. Interpretive method emphases the complexity of the 
subject-matter being studied and recognises that an accurate analysis of contentious phenomena 
is only possible when integrating the various parties' unique social constructions within the 
context of the issue. Robson particularly highlights that politically and economically complex 
issues cannot be reduced to quantitative data without losing all sense of meaning, while an 
examination of only one constituent perspective results in a limited understanding of the issue in 
question; with such issues rarely being shaped by rational and objective calculation. 20 
Considering the diverse nature of the buy-back issues, incorporating not simply various opposing 
perspectives but also economic, social, historical and political elements, this method has the 
prima facie appearance of appropriateness that merits further investigation. 
191bid., 
20 Robson, C. Real world research: a resource for social scientists and practitioner-researchers. 2002, .Blackwell 
Publishing, Oxford. Pg.l35 
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The practical manifestation of such openness to various perspectives is the flexibility prescribed 
by this method. If new issues are revealed in the course of research or additional scrutiny is 
required in a specific area, they can be addressed in due course. The practical implications ofthis 
method in this particular study is that when initial research revealed the diversity of viewpoints 
on the issue by the various relevant parties, it was possible to modify the method to place greater 
reliance on sources, particularly interviews, elucidating the respective stances. Bryman terms 
such interpretation of the issue through the individual perspectives of the participants 'double 
interpretation' and considers the successful use of this method to be crucial to a successful 
interpretative study within the Social Sciences. 21 In particular, the perspectives are predicated 
upon the social interactions of the participants and a successful study must utilise the full breadth 
of interpretative methods to holistically assess the situation with regard to all the pertinent 
elements of which such 'social interactions' are composed, rather than being limited to the core 
subject (be it economic, political etc.) When applied to this study, it is evident that even though 
the core issue is the legal viability of buy-back contractual schemes, the study recognises the 
complexity of the social interactions involved which go beyond simple economic and legal 
considerations. The study offers an insight into the formation and nature of these social 
interactions with reference to the political situation as well as through a detailed analysis of 
historical elements which shaped the nature of such social interactions; illustrating the flexible 
application ofthis research method. 
The flexibility of interpretative method extends to the data collection methods used, which must, 
ideally, incorporate interviews, observations and secondary sources. This study fulfils the 
method's requirement for diversity of data collection methods by using this entire range of 
sources. Denzin and Lincoln specifically note the importance of interviews when investigating 
21 Bryman, A. Social research methods. Oxford University Press, 2004. pg. 48 
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topical and contentious issues, as interviews enable participants' direct expression of their points 
of view-particularly significant where they are significant contributors to the state of affairs 
being investigated?2 This study utilises a number of interviews with significant functionaries 
from the NIOC as well as with individuals involved in the foreign companies' activities, while 
also evaluating the relative validity of such opinions. 
As a consequence of this perspective's recognition of the multitude of factors and perspectives 
impacting the subject matter, special attention is given to the involvement of the researcher 
himself with the topic and the effect on both his knowledge and objectivity. Bryman particularly 
highlights the potential for observer bias, whereby expectations based on personal experiences 
tend to shape the research findings. 23 However, such general bias can be mitigated through a 
conscious and deliberate effort to maintain objectivity by recognising the potential sources of 
bias prior to conducting the research. In this case, the researcher's personal involvement with the 
topic was limited and the remaining potential sources of bias were addressed by constant 
awareness of the various sources' subjective leanings, with a correspondingly objective analysis 
by the researcher himself. 
All in all, the methodological framework within which the quality of an interpretive study can be 
assessed is based on the extent to which various perspectives are incorporated, data collection 
methods are used, potential problems of trustworthiness and source validity are addressed, as 
well as a cumulative conclusion is reached despite the diversity of opinions. 24 It is believed that 
this study fulfils the above criteria by incorporating the divergent perspectives of foreign and 
domestic parties in oil transactions, based on a number of pertinent sources. The analysis, 
constantly controlled for observer bias, is based on the entire range of factors studied and a 
22 Denzin, A. and Yvonna, S. Collecting and interpreting qualitative materials. 2003, Sage Publishing, London. 
23 Op.cit. Bryman. pg. 49 
24 ibid., 
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definitive conclusion is reached as the result. Consequently, the relevance of interpretative 
method to the study in question and the fulfilment of this approach's quality standards are 
evident from the specific efforts to ensure such appropriateness and compliance. 
Methodology Chosen and Related Rationale 
A study of an economic phenomenon may appear to be more suggestive of a quantitative, 
statistical-based approach rather than the combination of qualitative method with comparative 
analysis, hermeneutics and phenomenology used in this thesis. However, such a presumption 
should be overturned in view of the specialised nature of the subject matter being studied, 
namely buy-back contracts, as their understanding and analysis is critically dependant on 
understanding of human elements of the environment such as politics, law and historical 
influences. Consequently, a number-based study of this phenomenon would yield scant 
understanding of its nature or its future development as numbers alone would have difficulty 
providing an understanding of the complex factors affecting the subject. As a result of these 
considerations, qualitative method was used both in the initial analysis of historical context and 
in the assessment of purely contractual elements of the issue in the latter parts of the study. 
Whereas the first part of the work is largely theoretical, the latter part includes more practical 
and 'hands-on' elements such as case studies of relevant contracts, therefore providing an 
appropriate balance between theory and practice. 
Another important requirement of qualitative research, which also served as the reason for 
choosing this method is that the scope of the material studied must be narrowly stated so as to 
allow the making of specific rather than generic conclusions. The importance of this element is 
emphasised by Silverman: 
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For instance, it is important to find causes of social problems like homelessness, but 
such a problem is beyond the scope of a single researcher with limited time and 
resources. Moreover, by defining the problem so widely, one is usually unable to 
say anything in great depth about it... [the aim] should be to say 'a lot about a little 
(problem)'. 25 
In accordance with this principle, several conscious limitations on the scope of the study 
have been made so as to maintain the optimal quality of analysis within the length limitations 
imposed by the format. An example of such intentional narrowing is the decision to narrow 
the scope ofthe study of Petroleum Buy-Back to include mostly material related to oil, rather 
than gas, while addressing gas only as a means of contrasting its status to that of oil. 
Petroleum, literally "rock oil", is generally defined as geologically extracted hydrocarbons 
and can be present either in liquid (oil) or gaseous (natural gas) form, mostly found within 
sedimentary basins, oil shale and tar sands.26 Clearly, Iran's natural gas deposits, second in 
the world in size only to Russia's, fall within the definition of petroleum but will not be 
examined extensively for a number of additional reasons. Firstly, there are far more 
accessible sources available for Iran's oil buy-back than for its gas counterpart, making the 
objective study of gas issues specifically extremely difficult due to the absence of sufficient 
information from both the domestic and foreign perspectives. Secondly, the study of 
historical influences on the current buy-back position is a vital element of this work but such 
study is impossible in reference to gas, as the first export agreement of gas occurred only in 
the 1960s. Thirdly, and most importantly, the terms and conditions pertinent to oil 
agreements apply almost identically to gas agreements, with only minor differences due to 
technical details. Consequently, the study of oil also enables an understanding of gas to be 
25 Silverman, David. 'Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction'. Sage 
Publications, London, 1993, p. I 
26 McMurry, J. Organic Chemistry 5th ed. Brooks/Cole: Thomson Learning 2000. pg.3 
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gained due to this similarity of terms. Some references to gas agreements are nonetheless 
included either to show how similar these agreements are or, alternatively, to highlight 
contrasts between the two, where such differences exist. 
Process of Attaining Conclusions 
Having discussed the method chosen for this study, it is important to review the structure 
through which this method will manifest itself, and eventually produce conclusions. Given 
the initial theoretical question, it is the task of the method to come to a definitive conclusion 
to this question; but the conclusion arrived at by the study may vary depending on its precise 
structure. As the subject matter of this work is one which causes great controversy and 
disagreement between various parties, and is, in tum, shaped by these disagreements, it is 
appropriate to utilise a structure which illustrates these clashes. Therefore through much of 
the work, the scheme of providing arguments and counter-arguments from both perspectives 
was used, with additional adversarial, side-by-side analysis of various contractual 
frameworks also being provided. As well as displaying the context of the subject matter, this 
has the additional advantage of providing objectivity as the result of an even-handed 
examination of both sides of an issue. Such an analysis also allows for the revision of 
premises and assumptions if one of the sides to this internal dialogue shows the necessity of 
doing so. This advantage of point-counterpoint structure is highlighted below: 
Theories are conceptual systems, that is, statements of the relationships among 
concepts ... The possibility that concepts are unrelated or are related in unexpected 
ways reminds us of the most important thing about the theories-they are tentative 
and preliminary. We are not sure about them, and that is why we call them theories 
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instead of laws or facts. Theories are preliminary to laws in that they are working 
models subject to change and improvement. 27 
Dooley further notes that structure is a crucial element of research, as solid theories are only 
likely to arise out of internally consistent studies that integrated up to date information in a 
logical manner. Such elements then allow the theory to approach the status of a persuasive 
argument rather than a "wild guess". 28 
In reference to the order in which the information required for analysis was presented within 
this work, it must be highlighted that an approach consistent with the emphasis on contextual 
analysis was used. This approach manifested itself in the decision to place the section on 
history oflranian petroleum at the head of the study, so as to provide a context in the light of 
which the remainder of the work, focusing on the present situation, may be analysed. The 
inclusion of an initial and extensive historical section also averts the danger of the thesis 
being overly narrowly focused, by addressing only the present state of buy-back. The 
remainder of the work is structured in a way which permits general information related to the 
subject of study to be processed before analysis commences, to ensure that the reader is 
equipped with all the relevant facts. This logical structure is followed further when the 
Critical Analysis chapter is located before the comparative section pertaining to International 
Model Buy-Back, so that flaws of the existing model are pointed out before the alternative, 
international terms are proposed. 
Although chronological sequence is not an emphasis of this study, it is nonetheless 
appropriate to include the section pertaining to US Sanctions and their potential impact on 
the Iranian economy before the main conclusion of the work. This adds to the logical nature 
27 Dooley., op.cit, pg. 29 
28 Ibid., pg. 32 
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of the structure as the work opened with a review of history and a view of the possible 
developments in the future is relevant after the study of flaws and possible alternatives. 
Finally, in order to show the practical application of the various historical, economic, legal 
and political factors affecting buy-back, the Case Study section provides examples of the 
terms and conditions used in buy-back contracts in proximity to the main conclusion. 
Informational Sources and Problematic Areas of the Research 
As one of the goals of this study was to assess the controversial issue of buy-back from 
both the foreign and the domestic perspectives, numerous sources from each side, both in 
English and in Farsi, have been consulted. As the researcher's native language is Farsi 
and his experience and education is that of a First Class Attorney, no issues were 
encountered with analysing the various legal sources in Farsi. In addition to general 
academic literature on the issue in both languages, additional information was gleaned 
from sources closer to the buy-back transactions themselves, namely the National Iranian 
Oil Company's executives and various foreign oil company officials. These sources were 
further complemented by first-hand material such as Model Contracts released by various 
organisations and interviews with such functionaries. 
Amongst the difficulties encountered in the course of research, the primary one was the 
veil of secrecy drawn by both parties to oil transactions over the exact details of their 
contracts. Therefore, it was difficult to procure either first-hand interviews or numeric 
information pertinent to signed contracts, such as contractual costs, remuneration 
amounts etc., as the parties involved were worried about commercial secrecy. 
Nonetheless, the details that were eventually disclosed have been included in the relevant 
sections. 
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An additional area of increased sensitivity that must be considered is that of political 
issues surrounding a study such as this one and the potential influence on the researcher. 
A great deal of controversy surrounds buy-back contracts in Iran, primarily as the result 
of historical precedents which are discussed in further detail in the part one of this study 
devoted to history. Some segments of public opinion view such arrangements as being 
contrary to the interests of Iran, as the arrangement is balanced in favour of the foreign 
contractors. Other segments, however, believe that if buy-back was more attractive for 
foreign investors, the ramifications of the additional profits would be positive for the rest 
of society and therefore oppose buy-back's restrictive arrangements. As well as the topic 
being politically charged amidst the general populace, there are also extensive 
disagreements in the political sphere. Although the buy-back scheme was originally 
introduced by the Islamic government and given the state's support, following President 
Ahmadinejad's election, the scheme has been heavily criticised and threatened with 
cancellation. However, such sentiments appear to have been calmed and the 
government's approval of buy-back has returned. The political controversy of the topic 
must be considered when assessing the methodology of this issue as these circumstances 
affect the material published about it, as well as the stance of the media and the foreign 
partners. In particular, this tends to radicalise the opinions for both sides when it comes 
to analysing buy-back, therefore suggesting that an easier compromise between the 
parties may be achieved if political factors were not considered. 
The Relevant Ethical and Moral Issues 
This work attempts to critically analyse an essential element of the Iranian economic system 
which affects all its citizens and deals with issues of the redistribution of wealth amongst 
domestic and foreign entities. Consequentially, a number of interests may be adversely affected 
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through alterations to the current contractual system and, therefore, an assessment of the moral 
and ethical implications in the context of research method is required. 
In order to understand the relevance of ethical and moral issues to the study of a subject that is 
legal to a greater extent than it is social, where such issues would be more clearly discemable, it 
is important to clarify the scope of these terms as applied to research methods. 
Although various attempts have been made to distinguish the characterisations of ethical 
problems in various types of applied research, such as social experiments, evaluation research, 
social intervention, and prevention research, consensus appears to be lacking among social 
researchers as to what actually constitutes an ethical or moral issue in their investigations. A 
common confusion apparently involves the distinction between 'ethical' problems and 'moral' 
problems and the point at which either constitutes research 'diversity'. The sheer diversity of 
ethical problems that one might encounter during the various stages of social research seems to 
have precluded the emergence of a clear typology or set of classifying characteristics by which to 
describe and contrast particular studies. 29 
As noted by Kimmel, morality and ethics do not necessarily correspond to 'good' and 'bad' 
when determining whether a study's benefits outweigh its negative effects, but the guiding 
principle should rather be whether the method of the study is in conformity to generally accepted 
principles of conduct. Consequently, a researcher's conduct may be ethical through its 
conformity to a professional organisation's code of conduct, yet immoral in terms of being 
disquieting or ambiguous by society's standards, generally.30 An important element of Kimmel's 
argument is also that those researchers who are examining a group or phenomenon in relation to 
29 Kimmel, Allan J. Ethics and Values in Applied Social Research, Sage Publications, London p. 26 
30 Ibid., p. 27 
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which they can be considered 'outsiders', must strive to provide additional supporting basis for 
their conclusions as they are, by default, less authoritative on the subject. 
The classification of this researcher within the framework set out by Kimmel is not entirely clear, 
as the author of this study is, on one hand, an Iranian citizen who is fluent in Farsi and who has 
ample legal experience in the capacity of a lawyer, in the contractual negotiating and litigating 
environment but, on the other, has not been directly involved in petroleum transactions or the 
relevant industry. Additional factors that shift the scales of the analysis towards greater 
objectivity and an 'outsider' status is the researcher's additional British citizenship and 
prolonged experience of life abroad, including research and academic activities. 
It is therefore suggested that even though the researcher may be best classified as an 'outsider', 
as seen from the numerous unsuccessful attempts to procure primary material from those directly 
involved in Iranian buy-back, he nonetheless is closer to the median of such a scale due to his 
proximity to the context of Iranian oil. Consequently, following the guidelines set out by 
Kimmel, the extent of required defensibility of the work is higher than that of an insider but 
lower than that applicable to complete 'outsiders'. 
In reference to the researcher's relative lack of involvement in the subject matter of study, this 
can be said to minimise the possible effects of bias arising from particular closeness to the 
material issue. Objectivity and lack thereof are widely interpreted terms which vary from context 
to context, but it is nonetheless argued that when an analysis of the sources used and their 
correspondence to the final study is able to show a distortion of their meaning to suit a 
prejudiced mindset, the criteria for a biased approach would have been met. In the case of this 
study, the material studied was assessed with the application of the general code of research 
behaviour, and objectivity through balance of sources from both the domestic and the foreign 
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sides of the issue was sought. Consequently, statistical and empirical evidence was followed 
wherever it led, without artificially altering the course of analysis to accommodate pre-set 
beliefs. 
Kimmel further notes that ethical questions are relevant not only in assessing a researcher's 
methods but also the subject matter itself, the "actual nature of the programs researched". 31 
However, as this concern is mainly relevant where the conduct of the study itself may disrupt the 
natural operations of the subject being studied, this issue is not of significant import in the case 
of this study. The researcher did not interact with the subject of the study by any means which 
could directly influence its natural processes, with the exception of interviewing the decision-
makers in the area. However, as the questions posed within were of a neutral nature, little 
influence on their behaviour is to be expected. 
31 Ibid., pg. 32 
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Organisation of the Thesis 
The issue of the Iranian stance on oil contracts is more important than ever at a time when the oil 
market fluctuates due to instability in some of the world's major producers. Indeed, in its 
capacity as a leading oil producer, the Islamic Republic of Iran has the power to make or break 
the global market. This thesis intends to provide a detailed and thorough examination of its oil 
contracts from both the present and future perspectives. The study focuses on buy-back 
transactions and consists of nine chapters, analysing all the historical, social and commercial 
elements affecting the current type of contractual relationship used in the Iranian oil industry. 
Such a comprehensive analysis of the past and present also allows suggestions to be made as to 
the means of improving and modernising the current model so as to be in sync with the global 
contractual framework related to oil. 
In order to ensure the comprehensive and objective analysis of this complex issue, a number of 
sources, from both the domestic and the foreign perspectives have been consulted, as well as a 
significant quantity of raw data. Among these sources are statistics, as well as other information 
provided by both the Iranian government and the foreign participants in the oil industry, 
including statements by the Oil Ministry of Iran, various industry magazines in both Farsi and 
English and a multitude of other sources. The sources mentioned were referred to accurately in 
the footnotes, including where direct quotations were involved. 
The study is divided into three similarly sized portions, addressing the three most important 
general areas within which the component issues are grouped. Part One initiates the analysis 
through reference to historical factors, permitting a more in-depth and contextually aware 
analysis in the subsequent sections. Part Two of the study addresses, in a critical manner, the 
general issues of buy-back as a system, as compared to other alternatives, while analysing the 
relative validity of criticisms levelled by both domestic and foreign parties. Part Three concludes 
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the analysis by examining, through juxtaposition, the relative potential for advantageous reforms 
as opposed to the increasing pressure barring Iranian involvement. The chapter by chapter 
distribution below provides greater detail regarding each ofthe components. 
Chapter one is devoted to the examination of the historical factors which shaped the oil industry 
as it is today. In particular, the unbalanced contractual terms of the early 191h century concessions 
are reviewed as a source of public and government discontent with foreign involvement in the oil 
industry. The cumulative effect of these perceived inequities, along with the British, American 
and Soviet meddling in internal Iranian affairs during and after World War 2, with the aim of 
acquiring oil concessions, are shown to be the key causal factors in the 1951 Nationalisation. 
Chapter Two concentrates on the consequences of the exploitative 1933 Concession and the 
failed attempts to renegotiate the deal in order to avoid disruption in the industry. Following 
these unsuccessful attempts, the consequences of Nationalisation are analysed at length, 
including the subsequent efforts to prevent further annulments by altering the terms and structure 
in the agreements, as seen in the 1954 Consortium. Of especial interest are the resulting changes 
in the legal framework of oil agreements and their effect on the commercial landscape in an 
attempt to reconcile the opposing interests, particularly as the indispensability of oil to the 
ambitious economic reforms became clear. The failure to satisfy the grievances of the domestic 
authorities and the public, resulting in the 1979 Revolution and a complete cancellation of all 
contracts is reviewed, particularly in the context of the subsequent, destructive Iran-Iraq War and 
its causal relationship with the increased desire for foreign investment. 
Chapter Three, the first section of Part Two, provides a wider context to the buy-back contract by 
cataloguing and investigating the alternatives to the current model, used globally, such as 
Pro~llc!_io_!!_~l!_aripg Agreem~nt_s and CQnce~ionary __ Models, as_well_as_Revenue_Sharing and 
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Joint Venture Agreements. Their function and legal bases are examined to determine their 
compatibility and legality in the light of the Iranian contractual system and the restrictive laws. 
Chapter Four involves a thorough overview of the legal basis and nature of buy-back contracts 
since their inception in the early 1990s, with particular reference to the Constitutional and 
Statutory restrictions imposed on the formation of oil contracts. The Five Year Development 
Plans and the new Foreign Investment Law have been examined in terms of their limiting effect 
on the extent of foreign involvement in the oil industry and the buy-back model itself. 
Chapter Five contains the crucial overview of the grievances from both parties involved in oil 
transactions and highlights the areas where reform and modernisation is required in order to suit 
the realities of the global market. Several areas of particular concern, such as contract length and 
lack of improvement incentives, are noted as part of an integration process of elements from 
alternative models and it is proposed that alterations to the existing model can satisfy the 
demands for a mutually profitable and legal system without resorting to an anti-constitutional 
alternative model. 
Chapter Six is case study of contemporary Iranian oil transactions, providing practical 
specifications of buy-back contracts implemented within the industry. Using the specific 
arrangements for contracts pertaining to major oil fields, the practical application of the buy-back 
is examined and the persisting foreign involvement, despite the perceived flaws in the current 
system, is shown. 
Chapter Seven, the first section of Part Three, examines in extensive detail both the International 
and the Iranian buy-back models to determine their comparative advantages and to analyse the 
extent to which the International scheme was implemented in domestic contracts. The practical 
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implementation of some controversial provisions is examined in detail to determine the extent to 
which they undermine or boost the attractiveness of Iranian buy-back schemes. 
Chapter Eight reviews the extent of US sanctions on Iranian oil contracts, as well as their 
effectiveness in deterring foreign involvement. The various complex effects of these trade 
measures, on a multitude of societal and economic aspects in both the US and Iran, are measured 
in the context of the US purpose of imposing such sanctions. An overall assessment of the 
sanctions' success is included as well as a prediction for their future development. 
Chapter Nine is the concluding part of the work that summarises the various areas of analysis 
and suggests a number of modernised improvements that should allay the concerns of the 
domestic and the foreign participants without crossing the line, drawn by statute and the 
Constitution, into illegality. The ability to adopt useful elements of alternative models without 
causing a political and legal crisis is emphasised as there is significant leeway in the precise 
terms used in the buy-back system. 
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Chapter 1: Formation of the Iranian Oil Industry in the Pre-Nationalisation 
Period (1908-1951) 
1.1 Introduction 
Iran, previously one of the most advanced countries in the region, lost this status by the 19th 
century. The locations of its cities, once allowing Iran to sit on the world's major trade routes, no 
longer had that advantage. It was a sparsely populated area, with only 5 million inhabitants, 
which put it at a disadvantage compared to major world powers.32 Iran, economically, could not, 
even remotely, be a competitor in a field where the more developed European countries were 
involved, particularly as it did not possess any contemporarily valuable upon which it could draw 
in order to bridge this gap. In the early 191h century, Iran encountered the two great 
expansionistic powers, Britain and Russia. Only occasionally acting in a concerted manner, these 
powers were mostly wary of one another. As the result, Iran had been drawn in, against its will, 
into the struggle for influence in Asia, referred to as 'the Great Game'. Alongside the power 
struggle, there was a race for economic influence as competition between financiers and 
businessmen originating from European countries, all attempting to enter the Iranian market 
while also securing economic benefits from the Iranian government, was increasing in 
intensity. 33 
A further barrier to Iran's progress was its frail governmental system, particularly when 
considering its structural flaws, stemming from the country's constant, post-Imperial 
degradation. 
32 For instance France with 27 million, or ~ritain_ wi-thjt~ mpidly t:XP3J!ding J>PP_I.llatio_ll_of 8 million. 
33
-Muhiberger:Steve',-Historyof Isiamiitcivilization,NiplsSing-University 1999 
[http:/ /www.nipissingu.ca/departmentlhistory!MUHLBERGER/2805/LEADUP .HTM] pg. 1 
51 
On a more microscopic level, the leadership of the country was also lacking, with the shahs not 
willing to attempt modernisation of Iran, particularly in matters of the school system. These 
vulnerabilities in Iran's policy made it even more susceptible to European pressure. Significant 
territorial acquisitions/4 for instance, were made by Russia at Iran's expanse, and were followed 
by an 1828 treaty legitim ising these changes, 35 which also induced Iran into making economic 
concessions. The extent of the import duty on Russian products was limited to 5 percent, with a 
prohibition on all internal taxes for such goods. Such concessions resulted in a disadvantage for 
Iranian merchants when juxtaposed against the situation of the European traders. Just as 
European countries were beginning the Industrial Revolution, the Iranian domestic market was 
broken open by these developments. 
Furthermore, special immunities were granted to foreigners by treaties such as the Russian-
Iranian Treaty of 1828. The rationalisation used to justify these immunities was that the courts of 
Iran were corrupt and the country itself was an arbitrarily ruled Islamic country which 
necessitated the utilisation of consular courts when trying Europeans. Iranians employed at 
embassies and consulates were also granted this privilege, and subsequently the granting of this 
privilege to any Iranian favoured by foreign representatives became discretionary.36 
The granting of various concessions was occurring with increasing frequency in the second half 
of the nineteenth century. Such concessions amounted to the right to develop some form of 
modem facility, a right that could be purchased from the government for cash or in exchange for 
other consideration. The initial concession, followed by many others, was the permission to the 
34 Russian ownership was established over the Nakhchivan Khanate, Talysh Khanate and Erivan khanate, making 
the Aras River the boundary between the two empires. 
35 Persia had little choice in the matter as the Russian government threatened to invade Tehran within five days of a 
refusal. 
36 The Circle of Ancient Iranian Studies, "Kanoon-e-Pazl!oo1Jesh_hay-e-Ira11~-Bastan ", affjljajed with tbe Scl!Qol of _ 
Oriental and~Africari'Studies:--Entryori Ti.irimlancllalTreaty:lhlipJ 1\VwW:CaiS-- - -
soas.com/CAIS/lran/torkmanchai.htm) 
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British for the construction of a telegraph network. They had done so in order to establish a quick 
link for communication with India. A circumstance that was not given sufficient consideration 
during the decision-making process pertaining to the above concession, however, was the 
effective yielding of control over such a technologically advanced area to a foreign entity. 37 
The authority and power of the Iranian government degraded throughout the 19th century, until, 
at its end, it was merely a formality throughout the country. The government was undergoing 
financial crises and was in debt, chiefly to Russians and the British. The chaotic state of the 
government provoked the foreign nations to seize the moment and further expand their demands 
on Iran for more concessions. The British, in particular, exploited the turmoil and the foreign 
penetration with great efficiency, leading to the acquisition of a monopoly over the production, 
sale and export oflranian natural resources.38 
Some of the most vital concessions that were granted as the result of Iran's internal weakness 
pertained to the oil industry. Several notable concessions were made in the 19th century. 
1.2 Analysis ofPre-1900 Concessions 
The concessions made to foreign powers during this period were characterised by their breadth 
of scope and were often acquired through the application of direct political pressure39 from one 
of the Great Powers with whom Iran could not compete either economically or politically. The 
terms and conditions of the concessions were weighted heavily in favour of the foreign party 
and, due to their wide scope, had great potential for unjust exploitation of Iran's national 
resources. The 19th Century scheme of granting concessions was especially untenable due to the 
quick refutations of any granted concessions, therefore prohibiting any further commercial 
37 Muhlberger, op.cit., p.2 
38 Farsha~gohar,N.,"A_Surv~y on lr~·~ QU Agreements_:. 20Q~, Tehr_at}. P._20~22 _ _ _ . - -
39 Such0 pressuie was particularly effectiveaSinm was Tocated in a geographical crossfire between areas controlled 
by the British Empire and those of Russia 
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interaction between the parties, while still creating the domestic feeling of resentment at being 
unjustly exploited as the concessions were granted in the first place. 40 
1.2.1 The Reuter Concession 
The Middle East's first petroleum agreement, between the British Baron Julius de Reuter and the 
Persian Shah Nasr-ed-Din, was signed on the 251h July 1872. Reuter, of German-Jewish origin, 
had as a result of the power of his agency41 acquired considerable influence over the government 
and financial circles throughout Europe, Britain and especially in Iran. He is likely to be 
remembered by Iranians mostly for his accomplishment of securing a concession which, despite 
the context of extensively exploitative concessions, was the broadest and most demanding of 
all.42 In 1870 the Persian minister in London, Mohsen Khan, met de Reuter and was successful in 
persuading him to fund ventures in Persia. At this time Naser-ed-Din Shah, was planning a tour 
of Europe, the first time that a Persian sovereign would have visited a foreign state since Nader 
Shah invaded India in 1738. Consequently, the appearance in Tehran in 1872 of Baron de 
Reuter's agent, M. Cotte, with a proposal of cash for a concession, was well timed. In 1872 no 
doubt the Baron was not thinking particularly of oil; his concession nevertheless was worded 
broadly enough to cover all possible contingencies. In addition to a monopoly of the construction 
of railway and tramways, canals and irrigation works, the exploitation of forests and all 
uncultivated land, and the operation of a bank and public works of every description, the 
concession handed over the exclusive rights of all Persian mineral resources for a period of 
seventy years, with the exception of silver, gold and precious stones.43 According to comments 
40 ibid. 
41 He is better known outside Persia as the founder of the famous news agency. 
42 Elwell-Sutton, L.P, Persian Oil. 1976 ed. 1955, London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd, p. 11 
43 ibid. 
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made by Lord Curzon, 44 this concession was the most complete and "extraordinary surrender" 45 
by Persia to foreign interests. He stated that "this is the most complete concession which a nation 
can ever grant, giving up all its possession to foreigners.'.46 This concession, however, only 
existed for 15 month before it was withdrawn due to internal public pressure and Russian 
objections. Even the British government, scared by the hornet's nest it had allowed to be stirred 
up, withdrew its support from the Baron, and the Shah soon found an excuse to cancel his rash 
undertaking,47 with the effect of confiscation Reuter's deposit of £40,000 by the Persian 
government, from the Bank of England, where it was being held in trust.48 This concession, 
however short-lived, may be seen as the epitome of Iranian fears of foreign exploitation of 
national resources. 49 
1.2.2 Hotz Concession 
One ofthe earliest concessions granted to foreigners in the 19th century, was given toM. A. Hotz 
(Albert Hotz), an English company. The Hotz Company was an export and important firm, 
operating throughout the Persian Gulf, based in Booshehr. The concession granted to it in 1884 
gave the company the right to extract oil from Dalky and Qeshm Island. Drilling was 
commenced by the company, but no oil was found. In 1890, the company transferred their rights 
pertaining to oil to the Persian Bank Mining Rights Corporation50 and this corporation, between 
1891-1893 drilled for oil but found nothing in the region. In an 1899 announcement, the Persian 
Government annulled all mining concessions, including the Hotz Concession. The Persian Bank 
Mining Rights Corporation, to whom the concession was awarded, was dissolved in 1901. No 
44 George Curzon, the eldest son of Baron Curzon, was born on II th January 1859 in Derbyshire of the UK. He was 
afpointed foreign secretary in 1919 and died on 20th March 1925. 
4 Curzon, George N., Persia and Persian Question, London 1892, Vol!, p. 480 
46 Rabiee, F., op.cit., p.20 
47 Elwell-Sutton, op.cit., p. 12 
48 Alavi, S. A. History of Oil Industry in Iran, California Institute of Asian Studies, 1978. p.26 
49 Mahdavi, A.H. 'Tarikhe Ravabete Kharejiye Iran,' (History of the Iranian Foreign Relations), Tehran, 1985, 
p307-314 
5° Fateh, Mostafa, Panjah Sal Naft dar Iran, (50 years Oil in Iran), Tehran, Payam,1358. p.248 
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major considerations requiring discussion exist in relation to this concession, as no oil was 
discovered and the concession died away.51 Dr. Lawrence Lockhart,52 in an article published in 
1938 titled "History of Oil in Iran", commented that Hotz earned the Dalky and Salakh oil 
concession in Qeshm Island and drilled a number of wells, 270 mitres deep. As they did not find 
any oil they did not persist with their activities and their consortium was abolished in 1901.53 
1.2.3 The Imperial Bank of Persia Concession 
Following the annulment of the Reuter Concession, for seventeen years the company attempted 
to breathe new life into their Iranian investment. The British Authorised Minister, Sir Henry 
Drummondolf, decided in 1889 to use his affable relationship with Amin al Soltan Atabak, the 
Iranian Chief Minister, in order to enact parts of the Reuter Concession.54 Following a long 
negotiation by the parties, the terms of a new concession agreement were agreed on, dictating the 
establishment of the 'Imperial Bank of Persia'. According to the agreement's terms, Reuter 
pledged to pay one million Francs, the equivalent of £40,000, at an annual interest of 16%, in the 
form of a loan to Naser-Aidin-Shah. The Iranian government, for their part, agreed to release the 
confiscated £40,000 deposit, and the money was used as the starting capital for the Imperial 
Bank.55 The Concession consisted of fourteen articles and extended many rights to the 
foreigners, including the monopoly over minting banknotes. A section was devoted to the 
exploitation of minerals, including oil. 
Under Article 11: 
51 Zoghi lraj , Masael Eghtesadi va Siyasi Naft Iran, (Economic and Political Issues oflran's Oii),Tehran, Pazhang 
1381, p. 43-44 
52 Laurence Lockhart was born in London, 1890, and worked for the Foreign Office during the First World War and 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in Mexico, 1919-26, and Persia, 1926-30. He returned to the London office of the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company during 1935-9 and 1946-8. [http://www.oriental.cam.ac.uk/archive/lockhart.html] 
53 Mousavi, Mir Tayeb, Alireza Amini, Naft Siasat Eghtesad (Oil, Politics, Economy) Tehran, Bahram, 1379, p.30 
54 Specifically Article 20 of the Concession, which dealt with the establishment of a bank, with the hope of 
preventing the dissolution of the Reuter Company. 
55 Rabiee, op.cit., p.21 
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Minerals 
As the Imperial Bank declares that they are ready to exploit all of the natural 
minerals, everywhere in the country, immediately, the government will give a 
concession to this bank to exploit all minerals, including iron, copper, lead, coal, oil, 
and manganese; provided that the government had not granted this to others in the 
past. If the bank does not start to exploit any particular resources within ten years 
from the time that the bank was established, the government would assume that they 
had abandoned their title to those minerals. 56 
After seventeen years, Reuter resolved its conflict with the Iranian government over the 
concession, and additionally, obtained a new advantage in relation to oil deposits. 57 
1.3 Overview of Pre-Nationalisation Oil Contracts 
This section is devoted to a discussion of the D' Arcy concession of 1901 and other important oil 
transactions during this period, for example the 1933 Concession. It emphasises the importance 
and exclusive privileges of these agreements from the perspective of the foreign participants and 
the attempts to renegotiate these unbalanced contracts due to domestic public pressure. 
1.3.1 D' Arcy Concession 
Multiple explanations exist as to the means by which D' Arcy acquired his surprising 
concessions. The most probable cause for this occurrence is that a French archaeologist, by the 
name of De Morgan, published an article in Les Annates de Mines, 58 in 1892, stating that oil is 
present in the Qasr-e-Shirin area. This revelation provoked interest among many, including 
William Knox D 'Arcy. He then sent his agent to Persia, to represent him while trying to secure 
an oil concession. Mozaffar Ed-Din Shah, with the cooperation of the Persian authorities, granted 
56 Zoghi, op.cit., p.59 
51 Farshadgohar, op.cit., p.39 
58 A French magazine concerned with geology and other natural and earth sciences. 
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the concession to D'Arcy on 28th May 1901.59 £50,000 worth of fully-paid shares was granted to 
the Shah and the other notables. A.K. Khan60 was given an annual salary of£ I ,000 and his three 
sons were recruited with similarly generous pay. The Persian Grand Vazier had also aided 
D' Arcy, and without him, the acquisition of the concession would have been impossible. Five 
major Northern Provinces were excluded from the concession (Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, 
Khorasan and Astarabad) in order to recognise the Russian influence. 61 The foundation of the 
oil industry in Iran, then celebrating its first centennial, was initiated by the signing of this 
infamous concession. 
Several oil extraction concessions were granted in Iran in the second half of the 19th century, 
when the US oil industry was born in 1859. Several parts of the country were drilled for oil, but 
no attempts resulted in successful results. Following this pattern, the first phase of the D' Arcy 
concession's drilling operations in Ghasr-e-shirin and Chah-sorkh also did not bear fruit. The 
presence of oil was proven through drilling, but the output ratio of the discovered wells was not 
sufficiently high to warrant further operations in those areas. This finding resulted in the transfer 
of the drilling rigs further south, to the Shooshtar area. Despite the optimistic prognoses of 
experts regarding the results of the drilling operations in this region, the inadequacy ofD'Arcy's 
financial support amounted to a critical obstacle. D' Arcy was personally unprepared for the 
heavier investment required for related projects. A huge sum62 was spent by 1904, a sum of 
significant value at the time. A Scottish oil company, which was given a concession in Burma 
and constructed a refinery in Rangoon, offered D' Arcy funds to aid in resolving his dire financial 
situation, which he accepted. 63 
59 Alavi, op.cit., p.29 
60 Acted as the Director General of the Persian Customs agency prior to helping D'arcy and de Morgan secure the 
concession by means of using his influence with the Shah's government.. 
61 ibid., p.30 
62 Over two hundred and twenty thousand pounds. 
63 Finnegan, Sean, "Middle Eastern Oil: An Historical Perspective and Outlook" , 
[http://blog.lege.net/content/oil/all_about_oil.htm] 
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In accordance with Articles 4 and 16 of the D' Arcy Concession, the first oil exploitation 
company was founded in May 1903, with a capital of £600.000 and the price of £1 per share, 
with the Persian government receiving 20,000 shares.64 Moreover, due to internal instability and 
lack of central authority, D' Arcy founded the Bakhtiari Oil Company Ltd., with 400,000 shares 
at the price of £I per share, and distributed 3 percent of the shares among the local Bakhtiari 
Khans, as well as £2,000 annually, in order to ensure the safeguarding of the drilling equipment 
and supplies, in addition to £1,000 paid for the safeguarding of the pipeline. Subsequently, 
however, financial difficulties had arisen for the company due to oil exploration, and this 
occurred before the production of oil in previously discovered fields was sufficiently high. This 
caused an almost complete exhaustion of D' Arcy' s original investment, and a plea for financial 
assistance. Due to British fears that the concession might end up in American or Dutch oil trusts' 
hands, the British government asked D' Arcy to delay his negotiations with foreigners, and 
instead advised Lord Strathcona of the Burma Oil Company to aid D 'Arcy. 
These events occurred at a time when the British Admiralty made the decision to substitute coal 
with oil, as the means of fuelling their warships. 65 
The Scottish entity, the Burma Oil Company, was used by the British government to secure the 
required amount of oil. The company's reserves were not adequate for the task of providing such 
a long-term commitment, and further expansions of oil procurement operations in the Burmese 
concessionary area were not recommended by technical experts. The D' Arcy concession was 
much more suitable for the task of providing these supplies for the British Admiralty, provided 
that the financial capabilities of the Burma Oil Company were to be diverted to D' Arcy's areas 
for further investment. 66 
64 History of Mount Morgan, "Twice a Millionaire" (http://www.mountmorgan.com/dArcy.html] 
65 This project required fifty thousand tons of oil annually. 
66 These funds were needed due to the financial inadequacies ofD' Arcy's own financial backing of the project. 
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Negotiations between the two companies had resulted in the establishment of Concessions 
Syndicate Ltd.,67 with headquarters in Glasgow, in May 1905. This syndicate was to continue 
drilling operations in the Masjid-e-Solaiman area, with the financial backing of the Burma Oil 
Company. The contract for protection with the Bakhtiari was never affirmed by the Iranian 
government, as it was negotiated by the British consul, in the absence of government officials, 
and Reza Shah cancelled it officially in 1924. Drilling operations proceeded in several locations 
while this was occurring. Two wells, drilled north of Ahwas, did not show promising results; 
however, wells drilled in Masjid- e -Solaiman struck oil on 26th May 1908. Tests have shown 
that the find was what the experts have been looking for. Further proof of a huge oil reserve was 
found when second and third wells were drilled and consequently, Masjid- e -Solaiman became 
the Middle East's first oilfield. 
Such a tum of events was unexpected, since Reynolds, the head of drilling operations, on his way 
back to Ahwaz, received a letter dated 14th May from the company's headquarters in Scotland, 
which, written less than two weeks before the Masjid-e-Solaiman success, expressed the company 
authorities' dissatisfaction with the operations. 
Several months after the Masjid-e-Solaiman discovery, the Burma Oil Company, the Concessions 
Ltd syndicate and Lord Strathcona, the aforementioned British financier, founded the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company. All ofthe concession rights previously held by D'Arcy were transferred to 
the new company and D' Arcy became a member of its board of directors.68 Construction 
operations at the newly discovered oil site began in October 1909.69 The same year, the 
company's aeroplane first landed in Iran and the first Iranian cargo of crude oil was lifted for 
67 The Syndicate was to control the shares of the First Exploitation Company and to be under the trusteeship of 
D' Arcy, with the newly created organisation providing the capital needed for further oil operations. 
68 NIOC, Brief History of Iran's Oil. p.3 
69 These operations involVed the hiring of personnel other than the previously employed drillers, as specialists were 
required to actually exploit the deposits, resulting in total employment of2500 individuals by 1911. 
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export a year later, in 1912. Thirty oil wells were drilled in the Masjid-e-Solaiman area by 1914. 
An agreement was reached between the company and the British government in 1914, whereby 
the government became the majority shareholder of the company. Following this development, 
the British government acquired a strong presence in the company's board of directors, numbering 
two members, who had the special power to veto board decisions which contradicted the British 
government's interests. Britain's House of Commons approved this arrangement on 17 June 1914, 
on the eve of the First World War. As per a confidential agreement negotiated with the British 
Admiralty, the company pledged to satisfy all of the British Navy's fuel needs, at a lowered 
price.70 
The land required for the refinery was placed at the company's disposal by Sheikh Khazal, the 
ruler of Khorramshahr, who had close ties with Britain's diplomat in the Persian Gulf. The 
agreement dictated that, in addition to an annual lease, the Sheikh would receive a ten thousand 
pound loan. The Sheikh was also told by the diplomat that the British government would support 
and protect him and his family. Clearly, the company was using British diplomatic officials' 
influence to reinforce its position, while ignoring Iran's central government. The arrangements 
with Bakhtiari tribal heads and Sheikh Khazal were obvious and brazen examples of such 
undermining behaviour, resulting in Reza Shah's government decision to suppress the sheikhs and 
the tribal heads, and to take full control. 71 
70 Such an arrangement was especially fortuitous for the British as, due to the strength of the German navy, naval 
operations were a significant part of World War I and a ready supply oflranian oil gave it a significant advantage 
over the blockaded Germans, whose navy was cut off from such supplies. 
71 Zoghi, op.cit., p.68-7l 
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1.3.2 Impact of D' Arcy Concession on Stance towards Foreign Involvement 
The aforementioned decision by the Shah's government to reaffirm their control and power over 
Iran, and to curtail the expansion of foreign influence, can be traced to the harshness of the 
D'Arcy Concession's provisions, the most controversial ofwhich are highlighted below. 
Article I. 
The Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shah grants to the concessionaire by 
these presents a special and exclusive privilege to search for, obtain, exploit, develop, 
render suitable for trade, carry away and sell natural gas, petroleum, asphalt and 
ozokerite72 throughout the whole extent of the Persian Empire for a term of sixty 
years as from the date of the signing.73 
The width of permitted exploration and exploitation, outlined in Article 1, 74 is striking as it 
appears to give exploitation rights over a vast area, while noting that the right is exclusive and is 
effective for an entire 60 years. Moreover, the number of valuable commodities and resources it 
covers is unprecedented in the context of current oil contracts, which are of significantly smaller 
geographic and substantive scope. 
Article 7 
All lands granted by this agreement to the concessionaire, or that may be acquired by 
him in the manner provided in article 3 and 4 of these agreements, and also all 
products exported, shall be free of all custom duties and taxes during the term of 
concession. All material and apparatuses necessary for the exploration, working and 
development of the deposits, and for the construction and development of the pipe-
lines, shall enter Persia free of all taxes and Custom House duties. 75 
72 A naturally occurring mineral wax and paraffin. 
73 ibid., p. 63 
74 Despite being qualified to exclude several provinces in a subsequent Article 
15 The full text of the D' Arcy Concession in the original language, including 18 Articles, can be found in Lesani, 
Abulfazl, Talaye Ssiyah Ya Ba1aye Siyah, (Black Gold or Black Disaster), Amir Kabir, Tehran, 1357, p.65-69 
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The tax-free status given to the Concession's operations is remarkable, especially considering the 
amount of taxes that could have been injected into the economy from a technologically massive 
operation such as the exploitation of a new field. This Article appears to be especially surprising 
and exploitative when taking into account the fairly low76 share of the Persian government in the 
profits. One could note, however, that the Persian government was to inherit all the equipment 
and structures built in the course of the operations; but considering the 60-year length of the 
concession, it would have been unlikely that the equipment could still be used to find viable oil 
deposits in the exploited area. 
In June 1901, just one month after the original concession was granted, the Shah issued a royal 
decree to be added to the original concession, further developing the perception that due to 
foreign pressure, Persia was giving away its natural resources practically for free: 
Pursuant to the concession granted to Mr. William Knox D'Arcy, as a result of the 
particularly friendly relation which unites powerful Great Britain and Persia, it is 
accorded and guaranteed to the Engineer William D' Arcy, and to all of his heirs and 
assigns and friends, full power and unlimited liberty for a period of 60 years, to 
probe, pierce and drill at their will the depths of Persian soil; in consequence of 
which, all the subsoil products wrought of him without exception will remain the 
property ofD'Arcy. We declare that all the officials ofthis blessed Kingdom and our 
heirs and successors will do their best to help and assist the honourable D' Arcy, who 
enjoys the favour of our splendid court. 77 
From the flattering and ornate language used in the addendum to the Concession, the extent 
of British influence on the process of decision-making in Persia, especially in regards to 
concessions, is apparent. It is therefore unsurprising that the Persian government agreed to 
76 16% as per Article 10 
77 ibid. p.33-34 
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the vastly inequitable terms of the Concession and the Addendum, considering the amount 
of pressure to which it was subjected. 
1.3.3 Dispute over the D' Arcy Concession and the Resulting Armitage-Smith Agreement 
During the First World War, disagreements existed over the wording of the concession. The first 
dispute concerned Article 10, under which the Company had to pay the Persian government, 
every year, a sum that was equal to 16 percent of the annual net income of any company or 
companies. 78 In the interpretation of the Company, this applied only to those companies 
operating in Persia, while the Persian government claimed it applied to all companies. The 
second bone of contention stemmed from Article 14, according to which the Persian government 
had to take all the necessary measures to provide for the safety and to facilitate the activities 
related to the concession's object. The Company claimed that the government had failed to 
protect the pipeline and subsequently withheld the royalties to the Persian government. The 
Persian government claimed that under Article 14, " ... it was not liable for loss or damage 
caused by acts beyond its control, and in accordance with Article 17 it asked for arbitration ... "79 
Finally, an agreement was reached on 22nd December 1920 between the Company and the 
Persian government, known as the Armitage-Smith Agreement. 80 This agreement recognised the 
Persian government's claim that the profit-sharing provisions in the concession applied to all 
companies formed by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC): 
" ... the Persian government was entitled to receive a 16 percent royalty of all annual net profits 
arising from the mining, refining and marketing of Persian oil, whether all the stages of the 
78 In additional to initial fees of several thousand pounds. 
79 Moosavi, Amini op.cit., p 48 
8
° Considered to be 'interpretive' as it merely clarified previously signed documents and was named after Sydney 
Armitage-Smith, the British Treasury official serving as the financial adviser to the Iranian government. 
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above processes were handled by the company itself or through subsidiary companies, whether 
in Persia or outside .... "81 
However, an exception was noted: "The government was not to receive royalty on the profits 
arising from the transporting of oil by means of ships ... "82 
In addition, the agreement recognised various deductions for oil and oil products to subsidiary 
companies refining, distributing or dealing with Persian oil. 83 
It also provided that: " ... net profits were to be taken as adjusted for income tax purposes, no 
deductions were to be made from the net profit for interest or dividends, and interest and 
dividends received were to be excluded from the profits on which the royalty was payable ... " 84 
Finally, the agreement instructed that:" ... any dispute regarding royalties should be referred not 
to arbitrators sitting at Tehran, as provided in Article 17 of the concession, but to a Chartered 
Accountant in England nominated by the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England, whose decision should be final ... "85 
It is noteworthy that the British claims of these violations were voiced after the British 
government became the main shareholder in the D' Arcy Concession. As it was the English 
government that had a vested interest in the Concession, the agreement to allocate the task of 
arbitration to an English accountancy firm may further confirm the unbalanced nature of the 
contract, due to the possible lack of objectivity of the English firm. 
This new agreement differed extensively from the original D' Arcy Concession, to the detriment 
of the host country. Also, the motivation behind the policy of linking the payment to the Persian 
81 Farshad Gohar, N., 'Seyri Dar Gharardadhaye Naftiye Iran',( A Survey On Iran's Oil Agreements) Tehran, 1381, 
pg79 
82 Moosavi, Amini , op.cit., p 48 
83 Which were to be made before the calculation of the net profits for the allocation of the 16 percent revenue to the 
Persian government was carried out 
84 Farshad Gohar, N, op.cit., p 80 
85 Alavi, op.cit., p. 44 
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government with the trading profit was to ensure that a degree of protection existed for the 
concession if little or no profit was made during certain years, or even if commercial losses were 
to occur. This method of payment was attractive to the Persian government, as it was hoped that 
it would permit a continuous flow of revenue which was needed to resolve its budgetary 
difficulties. 86 
This method of payment, however, was subject to fluctuations as it depended on the company's 
profits; a situation which was contrary to the interests of the Persian government. Another aspect 
of the concession was the amount of royalty payments, which was fixed at 16 percent of the net 
profit. It conformed to the provisions of the Reuter concession of 1872, "in fact, had it not been 
for the latter, D' Arcy would have insisted on paying l 0 percent."87 
1.3.4 Cancellation of D' Arcy Concession and the Signing of the New Agreement 
In an attempt to renegotiate the Concession, Taimoortash, a powerful court minister, was 
appointed by the government to negotiate with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The government 
was seeking an arrangement which would give Iran the option of owning 25% of the Company's 
shares, receiving a two shillings royalty per ton of oil produced. A further condition was having 
75% of the concession area returned to Iran, dictating that the payment of tax by the Company 
was to occur according to Iranian taxation laws and achieving the recognition of Iran's rights in 
all company operations even after the termination of the terms of concession. If these conditions 
were accepted, the government was willing to extend the agreement for another 20 years. 
Negotiations were ongoing untill93l. During that year, Iran's oil income shrunk dramatically in 
comparison to the previous fiscal year and the blame for this fall of revenue was attributed to a 
86 Zoghi, op.cit., p.84-86 
87 Alavi op.cit., p.41-45 
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global recession by the Company. Reza Shah was dissatisfied with the length of the negotiations 
and the continuous company excuses and issued an order to his ministers to annul the D' Arcy 
Concession. 88 
The Company was informed immediately and the Shah's decision was confirmed by the 
Parliament in its 1Oth session. The British government then issued a strongly-worded 
memorandum, condemning the annulment. A complaint was filed by Britain in the League of 
Nations89 and several warships were sent to the Persian Gulf. A resolution was not passed on the 
matter by the Security Council; instead, it advised that the disagreeing parties seek a solution 
through negotiation. Talks were held until the 241h April 1933, both in Tehran and Europe, by 
Iranian government officials and Company representatives. An agreement was reached on all the 
decisive points, except on the renewal of the D' Arcy Concession, due to terminate in 1951. 
Company officials insisted on a 30-year extension, and the Shah eventually intervened, 
concluding the agreement including such an extension. 
1.4 The 1933 Concession 
In order to fully understand and evaluate the 1933 Concession, it is imperative that the years and 
concessions preceding which impacted upon it be first considered. Without the D' Arcy 
controversy and the politics of the Anglo-Persian Company, the 1933 concession would be 
impossible to consider. 
1.4.1 Criticism ofD'Arcy Concession's Integrity and Subsequent Reforms 
The Persian government asked a chartered accountant, William McClintock, to examine the 
financial relationship between the Anglo-Persian Company and the Persian government, in 1921. 
88 It is said that he had lost control due to these difficulties and hurled oil contract paperwork into a fire. 
89 The predecessor of the United Nations, formed during the 1918-1920 Paris Peace Conference and surviving with 
intermittent success until WWII. 
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A number of serious irregularities for which the Company was to blame were found, and 
consequently the government's concern with the oil issue grew, particularly with the Armitage-
Smith Agreement. In December 1926, the company was asked by the Persian Oil Commissioner 
to hand over its financial records from March 1924 to 1927. Sir John Cadman, the Chairman of 
APOC stated that " ... Mr. Armitage-Smith was not instructed or authorised to draw up an 
agreement effecting changes in the terms of the D' Arcy Concession." 90 In the period between 
1926 and 1931, the company employed various methods of averting any changes in the D' Arcy 
Concession. Once the Depression struck, the Persian government's revenues had decreased just 
as it needed funds for its development programmes. In 1930, the Anglo-Persian Company 
claimed that they were exempt from Persian taxation due to the terms of the Concession and 
refused to pay the taxes. The refusal served as a reminder of the numerous grievances they held 
against the Company. 
The government argued that the D' Arcy Concession was acquired through duress and deceit, and 
therefore had no legal authority. An example of the company's deceit, cited by the government, 
was its failure to provide the government access to the Anglo-Persian Company's books, in order 
for the validity of payments to be checked. The shadiness of the Company's dealings was not 
just limited to deceits of which the Persian government was aware. For instance, the government 
has not been informed of the contract signed by the Company and the British Admiralty for the 
supply of cheap fuel for its war needs and no taxes were paid in relation to the operation of the 
Company's lucrative tanker fleet. In the view of the government, the Armitage-Smith 
Agreement of 1920 was not intended to accommodate the present, extensive scale of the 
company's operations, far larger than what was predicted at the time of the signing. 91 The 
government also felt that Persian rights were disregarded when the Company made the decision 
90 ibid p.55 
91 Zoghi, op.cit., p.l27 
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to sell oil to the British fleet at a sub-commercial rate. The fact that the Armitage-Smith 
Agreement was never ratified by the Majlis was also recalled, as well as the rapid decline in 
royalty payments,92 the main financial source for Persia's social and industrial development 
programs,93 which was further exacerbated by the extreme fluctuations in the price of oil, 
preventing the government from depending on stable annual revenue. The precariousness of 
Persia's possession has been described below: 
A careful examination of the D' Arcy Concession gives the answer. The D' Arcy 
Concession and the Armitage-Smith Agreement rendered the Persian government's 
revenues more sensitive to a decline in APOC's income, to the extent that the 
government was to share (at the rate of 16 percent) in the profit of some APOC 
affiliates after certain deductions were made. Thus during a depression year such as 
1931, Persia was left with a very small royalty, mainly as a result of the decline in 
APOC's profit. However, it is important to emphasise that the decline in the royalties 
was more than proportional to the decline in APOC's net profit. This was because the 
Persian government's share of net profits at 16 percent was calculated under the 
Armitage-Smith Agreement.94 
Supporting its allegations with action, the government cut the special tax discount given to the 
Company in relation to its Persia-related activities. 
1.4.2 The Formation of the 1933 Concession 
Following fruitless discussion between 1929 and 1931, the Persian government declared the 
original concession to be void on 27th November 1932, but expressed its willingness to negotiate. 
Initially, the British government refused to accept Persia's cancellation rights and threatened 
92 The amount of payments fell from £1.2 million in 1931 to £300,000 in 1932. 
93 Fesharaki, Fereidun, Development oflranian Oil Industry, New York 1976 p.ll-12 
94 ibid pl3 
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serious consequences in response to this action. The British then brought the matter up before the 
Council of the League of Nations in 1932. A compromise was reached between the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company and the Persian government on the 29th April 1933, before the Council 
made a decision. The most important provisions of the new concession were as follows: 
The government grants to the company, on the terms of this concession, the exclusive 
right, within the territory encompassed by the Concession, to look for and extract 
petroleum as well as to refine or treat in any other way and render suitable for 
commerce the petroleum obtained through this process. 95 
Additionally, permission to conduct various logistical operations has also been granted . 
. . . the company is permitted to procure, without special license, all imports necessary 
for the exclusive needs of its employees, subject to the payment of the Custom duties 
and other duties and taxes in force at the time of importation .... 96 
The effect of this contract was an alteration in the business procedure, namely instituting an 
annual royalty97 per each ton of petroleum sold, setting a minimum annual total payment to the 
government98 and obligating the foreign companies to pay 20% of the dividends earned from 
distribution. 
The 1933 Agreement also provided Iran with the right to investigate the oil company in certain 
areas,99 which was part of an effort to ensure that the previous difficulties with ensuring the fair 
distribution of profits would not reoccur. 
95 Alavi op.cit., p 58 
96 1bid., 
97 Four shillings per ton of petroleum sold for utilisation in Persia or export to other countries. 
98 The minimum being seven hundred and fifty thousand pounds. 
99 For instance allowing Persian representatives to be present at board meetings and to receive the same documents 
and information as the shareholders did. 
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In case of any disputes arising between the Persian government and APOC, the agreement 
specified arbitration as the means of resolution with the involvement ofthe Court oflnternational 
Justice. 
A significant point in relation to arbitration is the ability of one of the sides to default before the 
60 year period expired in 1993. Default was permitted to Persia only if the finding of Arbitration 
Court was not followed by the foreign company, the Company was to be liquidated or at the 
discretion of the Arbitration Court in cases of terms' breach. 100 
Nonetheless, critics of the concession insisted its conditions were by no means fair to domestic 
interests. Firstly, it was claimed that the 1933 Concession was granted under duress. Whilst the 
company retained power to terminate the Concession, the government had no such power, and 
remained uncompensated for the decreasing value of the pound sterling, in breach of Article 10 
(V)(a) of the Concession, attributable to the use of official gold prices rather than market gold 
prices, as used by the Company, in calculations for the currency. Payments to the government 
were made after British Income Tax had been deducted, contrary to Article 10(I)(b), and the 
British government had unjustly limited the share of Iranian distributed profits. Moreover, the 
sale of petroleum at low prices to the British Navy and British Air Force was seen by many as 
prejudicial as it lowered the company's distributable profits, shared by Iran. Arguably, the 
company's abstinence from releasing complete operating data worked against the Iranian 
government, and aroused suspicion regarding the Company's functions. The Company's 
practice moreover, in refining crude oil extracted from Iranian fields, outside the country's 
territory was in breach of Article 21 of the Concession, and limited the government's earning 
capacity. The Company disrespected its Article 16 duty to progressively substitute foreign 
employees with Iranian employees, and failed to utilise natural resources at their disposal 
100 ibid p.59-62 
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appropriately, wasting large amounts of natural gas. Further, the Company often dodged 
custom duties and charges having equivalent effect on several imported commodities under 
Article 6 of the Concession. Tax was not levied on the allied forces, as mentioned in Article 
19, amounting to losses for the Iranian government of up to $18 million. The conditions of 
employment of Iranian workers were poor, and unions were banned. For all these reasons, the 
Iranians felt justified in holding a grudge against the Concession, and the Company, in 
. I 101 parttcu ar. 
The Company, in its defence, claimed that such allegations were unsubstantiated, and that their 
flexibility of negotiating peacefully had been sufficient at resolving outstanding problems. The 
Company claimed that the Concession had been granted in good faith, under the supervision of 
the League of Nations. Further, it was alleged that no pressure had been asserted by the 
presence of British warships in relation to the drafting of the Concession, that the Iranian 
government itself had abided by Concession and had reaped its benefits for 18 years. 102 
Therefore, it concluded that the Concession was by no means invalid. 
The reason for the Persian government's agreement to the new Concession was its desire to find 
a new method of doing business, which would guarantee a minimum income for the budget. 
When conditions are favourable, the market is healthy and the oil prices are high, a profit-sharing 
arrangement is the model of choice. In times of depression and low prices, however, the ton 
production basis is more desirable. 
It was due to these considerations that the principle of tonnage was introduced, to link payments 
to the volume of oil production with a built-in protection device against change in the value of 
101 The Iranian arguments are presented in various books and reports, eg. H. Makki, 1951. 
102 The British case has been stated in many publications, eg. International Court of Justice 
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sterling. 103 Following the grant of another extension, with the area limit of I 00,000 square miles, 
opinions were divided whether the Persians or the foreign investors acquired the better deal. In 
1951, the Persian government stated that the concession was a disadvantageous one for the 
country. 104 Other commentators suggested that the concession did not confer a significantly 
unbalanced advantage to either side. 105 
A steady progress in oil production, royalty payments and refining capacity followed the new 
concession, as did the opening of new oil fields in the northwest of Iran, in Kermanshah 
province, and the construction of a pipeline to Kermanshah. In 1936, however, a serious 
disagreement occurred between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)106 and the Persian 
government, over the technical definition of the word "ton" in the contract. The government 
argued that by "ton", the concession meant 2,000 pounds, while AIOC claimed that the English 
term ''ton" was used, containing 2,240 pounds. The issues were resolved when the AIOC agreed 
to accept the government's definition of the term. By 1938, however, the production began to 
decline, as did the govern·ment's revenue, creating yet another problem. The beginning of World 
War II, in its overwhelming importance, took the attention away from issues of oil in lran. 107 
The next section will examine the process which finally led the nationalisation of the oil industry 
in Iran. 
1.5 Oil in Iran between the Two World Wars 
For Iran, the period between the two world wars was influenced heavily by outside interests and 
global politics. Lying between Russia and Turkey, Iran was an important area to for both the 
Russians and the Turks during World War One, despite its neutrality. The consequences of its 
103 Moosavi - Amini , op.cit., p.60 
104 Fesharatki op.cit., p. 13 
105 1. Zoghi, op.cit. p. 150 
106 Renamed from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1935. 
107 Alavi, op.cit., p.63-64 
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geographical position and its valuable resources were to influence the country for years 
following the first war. 
1.5.1 The Domestic Environment in the Inter-Conflict Period 
A key concession in this period was the Khoshtaria agreement, which was granted on 91h March 
1916, by the Persian Premier Sepahsalar, in order to utilise petroleum deposits in the north of the 
country. 108 Despite the date of its formation, the important effects of this concession manifested 
themselves during the inter-war years and therefore deserve consideration here. 
An agreement signed in 1919 by the Iranian government, in which it was stated that Britain was 
to exercise a controlling influence over Iranian affairs, failed to be ratified by the Majlis. The 
withdrawal of British forces from the country started two years later. Reza Shah Pahlavi, the 
commander of Iranian Cossack forces, founded a new, independent government soon after, 
himself occupying the post of the Minister of War. In 1923, he became the Prime Minister and in 
two years was elected Shah by the Parliament, which had just ended the reign of the Qajar 
dynasty by deposing Ahmad Shah, the dynasty's last ruler. During Reza Shah's rule, 
modernisation in the areas of the judiciary, transportation and communication took place and a 
course for westernization had been set. 109 The government's next action was the abolition of all 
feudal titles, and an initiation of an economic modernisation program. In 1936, a friendship and 
non-aggression treaty was signed with Iraq and Turkey. 110 
1.5.2 Khoshtaria Concession and Other Oil Transactions between the Wars 
Iran, despite its neutrality during World War I, served as the battlefield for confrontations 
between the British and the Russians on one side, and the Turks over the other, both sides 
108Ghaffari, op.cit., p.45 
"The full text of the concessions can be found in Foreign Relations, 1920, Vol. III, pp35l-352" 
109 A manifestation of this policy, for instance, was the decree ordering Sunni Muslims to wear European-style hats 
instead of traditional fezzes, which led to some violent protests with a lethal outcome. 
110 Malek, M., History oflran, Iran Chamber Society. p. I 
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attempting to acquire Iran's oil. With the backing of the Russian government, a Georgian by the 
name of A. F. Khoshtari, acquired a concession over three Northern Provinces, Gilan, 
Mazandaran and Astarabad in 1916. This concession was very similar to the one given to 
D'Arcy. APOC was worried about the possibility that the Khoshtaria concession could be given 
to another foreign company, since the new Soviet government annulled all previous concessions. 
These fears found confirmation in reality when, for £100,000, Americans purchased the 
concession and founded the North Persia Oil Co. Ltd. With the intention of taking control of the 
entire Persian region, APOC began negotiations with the Persian government, with the purpose 
of acquiring another concession over the two remaining provinces of Azerbaijan and Khorasan. 
Following the Russian Revolution, Sepahsalar, with alleged British support, declared the 
concession invalid. 111 As the result of this declaration, Khoshtaria transferred his rights to APOC 
on gth May 1920, for the optimistic price of £100,000. The North Persia Oil Company was 
subsequently founded, as a subsidiary of APOC, to exploit the concession; endowed with a 
starting capital of £3m and headed by APOC directors. 
Subsequently, an alliance between Persia and Russia was signed on 26th February 1921. This 
treaty's effect was the official annulment of all treaties and conventions between the Tsarist 
Government and Persia. It is noteworthy that the concession's Article XIII prescribed that the 
Persian Government undertook the obligation of not ceding, to a third power or its subjects, the 
property and concessions returned to Persia through the aforementioned treaty but rather keeping 
these rights for the Persians. 112 
111 ibid, p.45. Sir Percy Cox in a letter dated 13th December 1919 stated that "With reference to our recent 
conversation regarding the Khoshtaria concession ... The British government prefer to support the standpoint of the 
Persia government in that the Khoshtaria concession is invalid. At the same time, the British government hope, in 
the interests of Persia, that an English company will be preferred". 
112 League ofNations, Treaty Series, 1922, Vol.IX, p. 383-413 
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Persia's Minister in Washington attempted to persuade American companies to utilise the 
Northern provinces' oil resources, as a means of countering the British and Russian influences. 
The Minister further declared that the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey113 suggested its 
interest in operating in northern Persia, contingent upon the completion of a satisfactory 
agreement.114 Taking into account the extent ofBritain's economic and financial influence on the 
Persian government, due to their ownership of the Khoshtaria concession, the US Secretary of 
State Colly was wary of the 1919 Anglo-Persian agreement and the possible subsequent 
difficulty of procuring concessions in northern Persia by US companies. By the end of 1921, the 
Persian Minister in Washington proffered the granting of concessions to US companies in 
exchange for a loan from the US, which would allow the Persian government to resist Russian 
and British pressure. As a result, on 22nd November 1921, the Khoshtaria concession was 
annulled and a fifty year concession for petroleum utilisation in the Northern provinces was 
instead given to Standard. 115 Article 5 of the enabling legislation, passed by the Majlis, contained 
a restrictive obligation that "the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey shall not under any 
circumstances assign or transfer this concession to any foreign government, company or 
individual or likewise enter into partnership with other firms or capitalists unless permitted to do 
so by the Majlis. Non-observance of this article will entail the invalidity of the concession." 116 
This concession lead to an increase in pressure from both the Soviet Union and Britain, with 
APOC decrying the concession and seeking two agreements; that the Persian government 
undertake to not use constitutional reasons to annul concessions and that Standard be limited in 
its method of exporting oil from Persia to using a pipeline to a Persian Gulf port, as APOC 
owned the exclusive rights of transporting oil throughout Persia, except for the five Northern 
113 Later to transform into the contemporary oil finn Standard 
114 Foreign Relations (FR) 1920, Vol. III, p.353 
115 US Senate, Oil Concession in Foreign Countries, Washington, 1924, p.94 
116 Ghaffari, M., Political Economy of Oil in Iran. 2000, London: Institute oflslamic Studies.p.46 
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provinces and therefore, Standard could not deliver its products to the commercial markets 
without cooperating with APOC. Due to the increasing tension in the region regarding oil 
control, especially as the result of the San Remo deal which divided Mesopotamian oil between 
England and France, excluding the US, the State Department had ample motivation to support 
Standard's position against APOC. 117 
Nonetheless, the British government maintained a policy of averting direct confrontations 
between the two companies. As a means of resolving the situation, an agreement was formed 
between APOC and Standard in February 1921, whereby they would submit a proposal for a 
joint development of the northern fields. 118 This offer, however, was turned down due to the fact 
that APOC was one of the parties. 119 
Meanwhile, Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corporation, known for its oil relations with the Soviet 
Union, itself attempted to gain a concession in northern Persia. The company's relations with 
the Soviet Union were cordial, resulting in a significant concession on Sakhalin Island in the Far 
East as well as a contract to sell Russian oil abroad. This relationship led observers to believe 
that fewer protests would come from the Soviets as the result of Sinclair's concession proposal. 
The Persian Government required thorough concession proposals to be sent to the Majlis in 
August 1922 and on 14 June 1923 the Majlis permitted the government to offer the northern 
concessions to an American company, as long as it can guarantee a $10 million loan to the 
government. Article 14 of the legislative authorisation proscribed the American company from 
117ibid, p.47 "The Russian minister to Persia, Rothstien T., in a note of December 23rd 1921 objected to the granting 
of the concession to standard on two grounds: I) Since the Russo-Persian Treaty of February 1921 had not been 
ratified, all Russian rights in Persia were in full force, 2) even had the treaty been ratified the concession violated 
Article 13, which forbade the granting of a concession formerly held by a Russian subject to a foreign national. The 
British minister protested that the concession was an unfriendly act towards Britain." 
118 According to Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923, p.304, Standard was given an entry into Iraq and 
Palestine in return for the arrangement in Persia. 
119 Ghaffari, op.cit., p.48-49 
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passing on the rights to foreign governments or citizens. 120 The authorisation also noted that the 
length of the concession is to be 50 years, but within eight years the company had to select no 
more than 15% of its assigned area and that the net profits had to be at least 16% or alternatively 
I 0%, paid on the gross value of the oil exploited. An additional requirement was to train Persians 
to fill technical posts as soon as possible. 
The Bill's clauses indicate that the government extracted useful guidance from its previous 
dealings with APOC, namely that the exploitation area was to be limited, involvement of 
Persians in ownership and control be assured and a higher royalty rate be requested. 
The new limitations did not make Standard at all happy, but Sinclair modified its concession 
proposal so as to satisfy the requirements, resulting in a signing on 20th December 1923. 121 It 
encompassed four of the five Northern provinces, with the fifth being kept by the government for 
domestic exploitation; the concession was then confirmed by the Majlis in June 1923. Two 
hurdles remained for Sinclair, namely the required loan and ensuring Russian permission to 
move oil through Russian territory. 122 The latter issue was not as challenging as the former, due 
to the company's standing with the Soviets. The former however proved to be more of a 
challenge, as in October Sinclair announced its inability to find the loan amount as the 
Americans had little eagerness for such an investment, even given the favourable conditions of 
the Standard. 123 Elwell-Sutton argues that this was a clash of conflicting interests, as the Sinclair 
Group had the reputation as the bad boy of US business. Finally, Sinclair notified the Persian 
12° Foreign Relations, 1923, Vol. II p. 713 
121 Full text of this concession can be found in ibid., p. 721-736 
122 Ghaffari, op.cit., p48-49 
123 ibid., p. 49-50, "The British were first willing to let the American come into north Persia. But, after the AIOC 
had bought the Khoshtaria concession, the British were determined to keep the Americans out of Persia except on 
their own terms: the Khoshtaria concession. However, after a visit by Sir John Cadman to the United States and a 
meeting of representations of standard ofNew Jersey and ofthe APOC in London, the American were continued of 
the soundness of the British agreement, and standard withdraw. The US was no longer fighting for the "Open Door" 
and it began to see greater merit in the Khoshtaria concession and corporation between the British and American 
companies for the next decades." 
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government of its abandonment of Northern concessions due to the Soviet Union's cancellation 
of the Sakhalin project, the export agreement and the forbiddance of oil transport through 
Russia. 124 
Overall, despite indications that rich oil deposits were held in northern Persia, attempts to locate 
them failed due to both the political and physical challenges of moving the oil to the markets. 
Such movement was contingent on the cooperation of the Soviets, which was uneven at best as 
the Soviet Union considered Northern Iran as part of its sphere of influence and a strategically 
vital area in which all foreign power establishments were to be thwarted. 
Prior to World War II, Great Britain was especially feared as an old rival and a threat to Persia, 
although Germany would replace it in this respect later. As the result ofthis distrust, the Persian 
government wished American companies to be the ones exploiting the northern deposits, as this 
would have led to increased income while ensuring the political presence of a geographically 
distant, powerful country along the border with Russia, so as to balance out the British influence. 
Nonetheless, the British and the Soviets were not prepared to allow American dominance in a 
region where they claimed their interests were pre-emptive; they eventually managed to exclude 
the Americans due to the latter's lack of political will. The State Department in particular yielded 
to British pressure by not objecting to the Khoshtaria Concession and not fully supporting 
Sinclair in its conflict with Standard and AIOC. This idea was in accordance with the American 
wariness of Soviet expansionism into the Balkans and the Middle East. Efforts by the Persian 
government to give a concession to Sinclair were in vain due to the problems with the Soviet 
Union as well as Sinclair's domestic problems. The political situation was even further 
complicated by the rise to power of Reza Shah which changed both the political landscape and 
the attitude towards the oil industry. 
124 Ibid. p.51 
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1.5.3 The Effect of New Policies on the Oil Industry (the Rise of Reza Shah) 
As the result of internal turmoil in Iran, particularly the Jangli rebellion, 125 the British believed 
that a strong government was needed to maintain order and protect British interests, even if it 
must be dictatorial. As the result of such considerations, British influence secured a promotion 
for a young soldier named Reza Khan to command the Cossack Brigade, 126 with supervision 
from a British administrative and financial officer, Smyth. However, the British could not secure 
Ahmad Shah's agreement to Reza Khan's rule and so the latter led his force of three thousand to 
Tehran in February 1921, with ammunition, money and supplies having been given by the 
British. The reason for the British support of Reza Khan was the perception that a military 
dictatorship in Persia would result in the alleviation of British military concerns in Persia, and 
their description of him as "a strong and fearless man who had his country's good at heart". 127 
Smyth instructed Reza Khan "not to take or allow to be taken any violent measures to depose the 
Shah" but he added "in fact a military dictatorship would solve all our problems and let us get 
out of the country without any trouble at all" .128 British agents introduced Reza Khan to Seyyed 
Zia, 129 who was a journalist in close contact with the British Military Mission. In cooperation 
with the three members of the British mission, he conspired to overthrow the Government with 
the help of the Cossack Brigade, with Smyth and Reza Khan supporting the plan, as well as the 
Gendarmerie officers. Consequently, on 20th February 1921, the Cossack forces arrested sixty 
foremost politicians after marching to Tehran, with Zia replacing the Prime Minister and Reza 
Khan becoming the Persian Forces Commander. 
125 Also known as the Constitutionalist Movement ofGilan, this was a rebellion against the monarchist rule of the 
Qajar central government of Iran, lasting from 1914 to 1921. 
126 The Cossack Brigade was known as the elite unit of the Army. 
127 International Journal of Middle East Studies, Imperial Power and Dictatorship: Britain and the Rise ofReza 
Shah, 1921-1926, Vol. 24, No.4 (Nov., 1992), p.639 
128 Ibid, p.663 
129 Seyyed Zia ed-Din Tahatahai, a proponent of English influence and an anti-socialist, who was fully behind the 
1919 Anglo-Persian treaty. 
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In order to demonstrate the independence of the new government, Zia assured the people of land 
reform, national independence etc. The circumstances of the plot led to the perception that Reza 
Khan was installed by the British, contributing to his lack of popularity. A chief goal of the 
revolution, as declared by Zia and Reza Khan, was the freeing of the country of foreign 
occupation and bringing about national revival, including through the annulment of the 1919 
Anglo-Persian Agreement and the signing of a friendship treaty with the Soviets on 26th 
February 1921. Such a stance against foreign occupation was also clearly relevant to the 
government's stance regarding national resource exploitation. Zia wished to keep some British 
involvement through maintaining British advisers in the Finance Ministry and the Army. 130 The 
British perception of the Zia government was that of a means of maintaining some political 
influence in the region. 
In a statement from 26th February 1921, the Soviets rescinded all Tsarist-era concessions while 
recognising Persian sovereignty and agreeing to move all troops out of the country, cancel all 
Persian debts and tum over the Russian Bank, railways, roads and ports. Article VI pertained to 
the contingency that should a third party intend an armed incursion into Persia so as to use it as a 
base of operations against Russia, and thus a danger be created to Russia and Persian remedy 
was not possible, then the Russians "shall have the right to advance its troops into the Persian 
interior for the purposes of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defence and to 
withdraw troops after the danger was removed." 131 The effect of the treaty was to make any 
American or Western European commercial enterprises in northern Iran nearly impossible. 
As the result of Zia's unpopularity and perceived bias towards the British, he was replaced as 
Prime Minister, with the new leader deciding to sever the employment of British foreign 
130 Documents on British Foreign Policy, Vol. XIII, p 13, p. 736-743 
131 Hurenrity, J. C., (ed), "Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: a Documentary Record 1914-1956, Vol. II", p. 
90-94 
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advisers, kept previously in office by Zia, instead hiring non-neighbouring country advisers such 
as Americans, 132 in a move against the British and the Soviets. The plan had the Majlis's support, 
with the additional request of oil concessions in the north to be granted to 'some progressive 
American companies". 133 
Using his political and military influence, Reza Khan strived to complete his control over the 
Fifth Majlis elections and succeeded in October 1923, when he took the position of the Prime 
Minister. By early 1925, he used his influence over a specially convened Constituent Assembly 
to convince them to depose the Qajar dynasty, 134 while proffering him the imperial position 
instead. The ascent was not without its opponents, with Dr Mossadegh asking ''was it to achieve 
dictatorship that people bled their lives away in the Constitutional Revolution? ... I do agree that 
Reza Khan has performed services for the country" during a Majlis debate. Mossadegh feared 
and warned about that the new leader's power "would lead to a dictatorship, in which foreign 
and internal policies would be determined without parliamentary consultations."135 Therefore, 
Reza Khan's path to the throne involved violence, armed force, terror and military conspiracies, 
all leading to Iran's changed stance towards foreign influence and, consequently, oil exportation. 
Reza Khan's stance on foreign commercial influence was favoured by the Company, especially 
as his style of governing brought about security and order, which are the ideal conditions for the 
Company's activity. Furthermore, the government used its power to prevent workers from 
unionizing or protesting against work conditions and pay. In 1929, the southern oil workers 
numbering 30,000 attempted to strike due to intolerable living conditions. Six thousand British 
and Indian government forces were ordered in to suppress the strike, and they succeeded, 
arresting 200 instigators and agitators. Some of these prisoners were not released until the end of 
132 Banani Amin, "The Modernisation oflran, 1921-1941", p. 40-41 
133 Fatemi, "Oil Diplomacy", p.413 
134 A dynasty descending from Iranian Turkmen, spanning the years of 1791 to 1925. 
135 Makki, H., "Dr Mossadegh and his Historical Speeches", p. 46-52 
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Reza Shah's reign. Such collaboration, both intentional and collateral, was extended further due 
to his need to procure funds for the strengthening of the military without particular regard as to 
the source. 136 
1.6 The Consequences of World War II on the Political Environment 
World War II quickly delivered proof of the increasing importance of oil. The Allied air forces 
operating in the Far East, Europe and the Middle East were heavily reliant on Abadan for fuel. 
Several attempts have been made to form alliances with Iran in the beginning of WWII, 
including by Germany, Turkey, Great Britain and the USSR, but none were successful. In order 
to protect oil fields from being occupied by the Germans, however, British and Soviet forces 
occupied oil-producing areas of Iran in 1941. Following this invasion, all foreigners who were 
citizens of countries allied with Germany were forced to depart Iran, with the diplomatic mission 
of such countries being shut and with the Allies being given access and control over the 
country's communications systems. Reza Shah Pahlavi's connections to Axis interests resulted 
in his abdication. 
The Shah's son, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, took over his father's position and adopted a 
pro-Allies policy, as well as going along with the parliament's request for liberal reforms. A 
treaty promising the observance of Iran's rights to territorial integrity and independence was 
confirmed by the Soviets and the British in 1942, also promising military aid to fulfil the pledge 
of protection. According to this agreement, the Allies vowed to discuss with the local 
government actions pertaining to political, military and economic aspects, which could have an 
effect on Iran and to provide economic assistance and to withdraw the occupying forces as soon 
as the Axis threat passed. 
136 Fateh, Mostafa "Panjah Sal Naft Iran" p. 354 
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As the result of the American military aid and the land-lease system, the USSR and Britain 
extensively enhanced Iran's transportation facilities by 1943, so as to increase its utility as a 
corridor through which military supplies can be quickly transferred to the Eastern Front. 
According to Iran's complaints, however, the USSR cut of all contact between its occupation 
zone and the rest of Iran. The Soviet excuse for this policy was that it was taking defensive 
measures to counteract a potential Anglo-American effort to expand their influence in Iran. This 
dispute was resolved in 1943 at the Allied Conference organised in Tehran, 137 through the 
issuing of the Declaration on Iran, on December I st, stating that the three major world powers 
were, "at one with the government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the 
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity oflran."138 
The unique advantage of the land route to the USSR through Iran, namely its safety, was lost in 
early 1945 once the danger for Allied merchant navies passing through the Bosporus and the 
Dardanelles while delivering war material to the Soviets had decreased. As per the 
abovementioned agreement, Iran sought to rely on the fact that occupation was no longer 
necessary and asked the occupying countries to leave Iran. The US agreed to cease the 
occupation, but the USSR and Britain were adamantly opposed to leaving. Through negotiations, 
however, an agreement from the Soviets and the British to withdraw from Iran by March 2"d 
1946 was procured. The Soviet occupation nonetheless was a cause of grave concern for the 
Iranian government. Allegedly, Iranian officials were not allowed within the Soviet-occupied 
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces in order to suppress protests against Iranian government, 
instigated by groups allied with the Soviets. As the result of Soviet aid, an independence 
movement was created and grew in Azerbaijan. 
137 Attended by the Allied leaders: President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, as 
well as Premier Joseph Stalin 
138 Madani, Seyed Jala al Din, Tarikh siyasi moaser Iran, (Modern History of Politics oflran) p. 289 
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Table 2: Leading Oil Producers as of 1938139 
Country Name Annual Production (million tons) 
United States 161.9 
Venezuela 27.7 
Iran 10.2 
Mexico 5.5 
Iraq 4.4 
1.6.1 Influence of the Soviet Union on Oil Concessions 
Iran became an area of competing interests early on in the Cold War, partly because with the 
increased consumption and importance of oil, 140 the struggle for its possession and use 
intensified and the US took a more active role in regards to Middle Eastern oil. Before the 
outbreak of the war, US companies controlled nearly 16% of Middle Eastern oil production; this 
must be considered in the context of the fact that in 1940 US domestic production constituted 
73% of non-communist output, whereas Middle Eastern production was a mere 6%. 141 Oil, 
indeed, was to play a critical role in the post-war reconstruction and the subsequent economic 
boom. 
Consequently, ample attention from the American side was directed at Iran's political situation, 
especially the issue of withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran became a concern. The Anglo-
Soviet-Iran Treaty of 1942 included a provision whereby all Allied troops be withdrawn from 
Iran in six months, but this was not abided by; despite reemphasising it at the Tehran conference 
between the 'Big Three' of November 28, 1943, where Iran's independence and integrity was 
139 Tugendhat, C. and A. Hamilton, Oil, the Biggest Business. 1975 ed. 1968, London, p. 112 
140 In 1900 oil supplied 3.8% ofthe world's energy; by 1940 this was 17.9%, representing an increase in oil output 
b); a factor of fifteen. 
1 1 Eden (et al), "Energy Economics", p77. The US situation was generally more favourable with American 
companies controlling nearly 40% of 1939's average production as well as a halfofforeign deposits. Painter, 
"Private Power and Public Policy", pl4 
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emphasised. 142 During the occupation of Iran, it was a frequented location for oil concession-
hunting, including in 1943 when the Royal Dutch Shell sent representatives to Tehran in order to 
agree on a concession outside AIOC's area of operation. With the encouragement of Shah 
Mohammed Reza, some American oil companies were also seeking concessions, while 
competing with the Russians. Meanwhile in September 1944, Sergei Kavtaradze, the Assistant 
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, visited Tehran to request oil concessions in the northern 
provinces that neighbour the Soviet Union, but the Iranian government insisted that no 
concessions be issued until the war ended, so as to avoid the impression that Iran was issuing 
them under duress. Nonetheless, the domestic Communist Tudeh Party representatives in the 
Majlis were campaigning for a political balance between the West and Russia. As the British 
were given oil concessions in the South oflran, it was argued that the Russians should be granted 
some in the north; an argument rejected by Mossadegh. The argument he put forward was for 
'negative balance' 143 and to prevent favouritism, he passed a bill through the Parliament that 
prohibited all government employees from discussing concessions with foreigners, with up to a 8 
year prison sentence in solitary confinement as a punishment. 
During this time, Roosevelt and Churchill were in contact with the Soviet Ambassador, 
Gromyoko, who characterised the proposed Soviet concession as a means of aiding Iran and 
helping the friendly relations. He further pleaded for the new petroleum law to be cancelled or 
altered. This request formed a part of the Soviets' agenda, which included the desire to counter 
balance US demands for concessions in northern Iran, to establish northern Iran as a security 
zone and to promote a balanced relationship between the great powers, especially when the 
Soviets perceived the Western powers combining against them. The fact that the partially 
142 Foreign Relations of the US, Diplomatic Papers. The Conference at Cairo and Tehran 1943, US Government 
Printing Office, Washington DC, 1961, pp 646-647. 
143 Whereby no privilege are granted to one power that would require the giving of similar benefits to others. 
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British-owned firm, Shell, was joining US firms in requesting oil concessions probably 
confirmed this perception. It is in this contest that the Soviet reaction to the US attempt to obtain 
an oil concession in northern Iran must be understood. As Kennan, the US Ambassador, in 
Moscow explained, ''the oil in northern Iran is important, not as something Russia needs, but as 
something that it might be dangerous for anyone else to exploit."144 The British consul in 
Mashad, Claremont Skrine, summarised the Soviet reaction to the US involvement: "it was ... 
above all, the efforts of Standard Vacuum and Shell to secure oil prospecting rights that changed 
the Russians in Persia from hot-war allies into cold-war rivals." 145 
Increasing influence of the Soviets led the Iranian government, represented by Qavam, to order 
the arrest of right-wing activists while introducing pro-left wing legislation, most importantly 
disregarding the Majlis law of December, 1944, which prohibited all concessions to foreigners. 
146 Two days after his departure for Moscow, he dismissed the pro-British general Arfa from his 
post as Chief of the General Staff. On February 18, Qavam went to Moscow in an attempt to 
negotiate a solution. He made three important concessions to the Soviets: 
On April 4, 1946 he concluded an agreement establishing a joint Soviet-Iranian company for the 
exploitation of oil in the north. This concession had certain novel features. The agreement was 
to be valid for twenty-five years, to be renewable after that period if so desired by both sides. 
The ownership was to be 51% Soviet and 49% Iranian and after 25 years shares were to be 
50/50; profits were to be divided according to the shares held. No mention was made of royalty 
payments, but profits were to be divided according to the shares held. The borders of the 
original territory of the company allocated for production and prospecting work were to be that 
144 
'US Charge d'affaires in Moscow to the State Department', 7 November 1944, US Department of State, Foreign 
Relations 1944, Vol. 5, p.470 
145 Skrine C.A., "The World War in Iran", London, Constable, 1962, p.227 
146 As the Prime Minister rejected the law contingent on Majles approval, his covert behaviour earned him the title 
of 'Old Fox' when the Parliament convened and prevented his law from becoming permanent. 
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of eastern Azerbaijan situated west of a line running south from the point of intersection of the 
borders of the USSR, Turkey and Iran, to the eastern shore of Lake Rezaeich (later Uromia), as 
far as the town of Miyanduab. 147 This treaty could not become law until it had been ratified by 
the newly-elected Majlis not later than seven months from March 24, 1946. His next move was 
to organise the elections to the Fifteenth Session of the Majlis, in December 1946-June 1947, 
which was to decide on the Soviet oil concession. Using the powerful party machine he had 
built, his party won the majority of seats, while the pro-Soviet Tudeh found it futile to participate 
in the elections. The elections produced a parliamentary majority for the Prime Minister, in 
which the Tudeh party, broken and demoralised, refused to take part. Also some twenty-five 
seats in the Majlis, mostly in Tehran, were won by Mossadegh's National Front coalition. 
Meanwhile, the British Government was apprehensive that, if the Iranian Government were to 
refuse to accept the Soviet demand for the joint development of the oil resources of northern 
Iran, the forces of nationalism might be tempted to challenge the Anglo-Iranian concession in the 
south. In the first week of September, the British Ambassador in Iran handed Qavam a 
memorandum which recommended that the Iranian government should consider the possibility 
of further discussion. The Government should not reject the demand outright; if they could not 
accept the draft Soviet treaty, they should allow revised and fairer terms to be presented. 148 
Unlike Britain, the Americans took a direct hand in the matter. On September 11 the American 
Ambassador made a statement to the Persian-American Cultural Relations Society, in which he 
defended the right of the Iranian people to choose for themselves how they disposed of their own 
natural wealth. 149 
147 Hurenty, op.cit., p.263 
148 New York Times, 13 September 194 7, p. 86-87 
149 Sutton, "Persia Oil", p.ll7. 
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During this period, the number of members of the Majlis opposed to any concession was 
growing daily. On September 21st the deputy, E'tebar, attacked both the proposed Soviet oil 
concession and the existing British one. Qavam on October 5th received a vote of confidence opf 
93 to 27 on his general programme, which made no mention of oil. Finally, on 22nd October, 
after Qavam had given parliament a lengthy account of his negotiations with the Soviet 
Government, the Majlis rejected the oil agreement.150 Qavam skilfully used two tactics to 
diffuse the issue. First, he refused to commit himself outright to the agreement, and thus avoided 
the danger that rejection of the agreement would be taken as a vote of no confidence in the 
government. Second, he followed up the rejection by mustering an attack on Britain, thereby 
salvaging the policy of "positive equilibrium". He obtained parliamentary permission to 
renegotiate the "unjust" 1933 Agreement with APOC, and he went on the radio to assure the 
country and the Soviet Union that he would persevere in his course of "positive equilibrium". 
However, a further law was presented by Dr. Rezezade Shafag, a deputy who later served as 
Iranian delegate to UNESCO, and who was also to sit on the Majlis oil commission of 1950-51. 
The bill contained the following: 
1) The Premier's negotiations for an oil agreement with the USSR were to be null and void, but 
he would be exempted from the penalties provided by the law of December 2, 1944 against any 
minister who tried to negotiate oil concessions with foreigners; 
2) Iran would explore her own oil resources during the next five years and exploit them using her 
own capital. Should it be found necessary to engage foreign experts, they would be drawn 
entirely from "completely neutral countries"; 
150 The vote had the dramatic result of 102 votes to 2. op.cit., Sutton, p. 118 
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3) If the Iranian enterprise discovered oil, the Government would negotiate its sale to the USSR, 
provided that the Majlis were kept informed throughout of such negotiations; 
4) Iran would not grant concessions to foreign powers, or take foreigners into partnership in any 
oil company; 
5) In all cases where the rights of the Iranian nation had been impaired, particularly in regard to 
oil in the southern parts of the country, the government would be required to enter into 
negotiations and take such measures as might be necessary to enter the region to regain national 
rights, and should inform the Majlis ofthe results. 151 
The bill, ratified on 22 October 1947, had important implications for the future of AIOC. It not 
only forbade the granting of oil concessions to foreigners and participation with foreigners in 
such concessions, but also instructed the government to take all necessary measures to secure 
Iran's rights to her national resources where such rights had been violated, "with special 
reference to the southern oil." In response, the Soviet Ambassador sent a note to Qavam stating 
that in view of the British oil concession the rejection of the Soviet oil agreement was a blatant 
act of prejudice against the Soviet Union. The Soviets realised that Iran was determined to take 
control of its natural resources, and that Qavam had skilfully mislead them with the promise of 
oil so that they would move their forces out of Iran. The British, by contrast, did not take the act 
seriously. 152 
Generally speaking, the driving force behind the bill was the revival of national feeling in Iran. 
Now that the days of war and occupation were safely behind them, the people felt that they could 
once more assert themselves and stand up for their own rights. A further important factor was the 
151 USFR, 1946, Vol. 7, pp 560-561 
152 They assumed that the legislators had made a passing reference to their concession merely to maintain a balance, 
but with no intentions of changing the status quo. 
90 
intensity of the political conflicts between Britain and Russia that were fuelled by oil, causing 
instability within Iran and being seen as counter-productive. Qavam tried to be the 
representative of this new national feeling. In a broadcast on December 1, he claimed "I have 
pursued the case of AIOC concession, and will persist as long as necessary to secure satisfaction 
for the Persian nation." 153 It was too late. This appeal to nationalist sentiment did not save him; 
in late 194 7, after most of his cabinet had resigned, Qavam called on the Maj lis for a vote of 
confidence and received only 46 votes against 39 with 27 abstentions. He immediately resigned. 
1.6.2 The 'Golden Age' of Iranian oil 
The golden age of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company AI OC 154 stemmed from the 1930s-50s, and 
during the period between 1933-38, production of crude oil doubled, with refinery capacity 
increasing by three million tons, and facilities such as transportation and market organisation 
witnessing vast improvements. The construction of the Naft-i-Shah, the new pipeline, the 
additional eight ships to the company's tanker fleet, and a new refinery built in Kermanshah,155 
all signalled the marked improvement of the company and induced growth. Such growth in term 
benefited the Government and the company's employees, who soon after drafted a 'general plan' 
to bring in foreign-skilled workers into the Iranian oil market to boost production further. Such 
progress was, inevitably set back in 1939, however, by the outbreak of the war. War made the 
many European and Mediterranean markets inaccessible, and produced shortage of essential 
materials. Further, loss in shipping capacity coupled with a lack of distributive facilities resulting 
from war damage aggravated matters. As a result, production fell drastically to half the value by 
1941, whereupon the market recovered substantially. 
153 Sutton, "Persian Oil", pl19. Also in Survey ofthe Middle East. 
154 In 1935 the Government of Persia officially announced that the names of'Iran' and 'Iranian' will be substituted 
for 'Persia' and 'Persian' respectively. Thus after 1935 the name of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was changed to 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. During the balance of the discussion of this thesis the names 'Iran' and 'Iranian' will 
be used in place of'Persia' and 'Persian'. 
155 In accordance with Article 9 of the 1933 Concession 
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In retaliation to the problems envisaged during the early years of the war, the Government 
reached in accord in the August 1940, whereby the company assented in maintaining the level of 
royalties at a minimum level of 4 million pounds, if ever the actual concession payments fell 
short of such a threshold at any given year. Such an accord maintained the terms agreed upon 
under the 1933 Concession. Company progress however increased dramatically, unequalled in 
history, for the last two years of the war. Such rapid growth 156 was assisted by a striking 
improvement in the company's shipping capacity, whereby the tanker fleet increased by 800,000 
tons since the onset of the war, and of distribution and selling facilities. 
Such improvements boosted the Iranian economy, and government royalties rose to £16,031,735 
in 1950. Further, employment opportunities increased for both skilled and non-skilled Iranian 
workers, as did wages and the company was able to amply supply social amenities and 
educational provisions. 
On the political front, matters had been handled diplomatically in relation to the Concession; 
however, problems emerged in 1947. The 'constitutional democratic' system which replaced the 
monarchy in the early decades of the 1900s, basing itself on abstract principles enlisted in the 
Constitution, and detailing the enacting of laws, to be enforced by a cabinet responsible to the 
people's representatives, was a dramatic change which occurred hastily and failed to allow 
Iranian culture and society to sufficiently adjust to the shift from the deep-rooted autocratic 
mentality to that of democracy. Previously, the sovereign's powers and will had been 
unquestionable, ultimate, and unrestricted. Such unquestionable power to be replaced by a 
constitution to confer powers was a radical change of conception for the Iranian people. It is 
argued that such a constitutional framework, and the parliament which replaced the sovereign, 
156 By 1951, in fact, production increased to 31, 750,147long-tons, and Abadan's oil refinery became the largest in 
the world, producing 25 million long tons 
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were inadequate substitutes for the deeply-entrenched system of monarchy; this did not aid the 
average Iranian in embracing the change of conception, and led to instability, which finally gave 
away to the emergence of autocracy in 1925, with the election of Reza Khan, whose reign made 
a substantial impact in changing Iranian society, politically, economically and socially. As oil 
exploitation is a critical political issue, especially in a country that depends on its national 
treasures to the extent that Iran does, it is therefore necessary to examine the political variations 
which led up to the currently used, restrictive model. 
The Constitution and Parliament did not take up more than a symbolic presence, under the 
authority of Reza Shah; members of Parliament were obstructed from taking policy initiatives or 
formulations, or criticising Cabinet proposals, and were limited to ratifying Government 
proposals and mundane legislative issues. In light of such a setting, the 1933 Concession was 
approved without contention 157 or critical utterances. As stated by H. Taqizadeh, the then 
Minister of Finance and the signer of the 1933 Concession Convention, the endorsement and 
ratification ofthe 1933 Concession was merely a formality after Reza Shah's approbation to it. 
We were a few helpless men without authority who did not agree with it (the 
1933 concession) and we were exceedingly sorry when it happened (and) I must 
say that I had nothing whatsoever to do with this matter except that my signature 
is appended to that paper and whether or not that signature was mine or someone 
else's it would not have made the slightest difference, and what happened would 
have happened in any case. 158 
157 It is interesting to note that the only member of Parliament who publicly opposed the 1933 Concession was Dr. 
Mohammad Mossadegh who was seized by the police shortly afterwards and promptly dispatched to a provincial jail 
in Northwestern Iran. 
158 Iranian Embassy, some Documents on the Nationalisation ofthe Oil Industry in Iran, Washington, D.C.: 1952, p. 
15 
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Any criticisms that were levelled at the 1933 Concession, of which there were many under such 
a regime, therefore remained unexpressed, nor did they find their expression after Reza Shah's 
deposition due to concern about war-time problems, such as economic reconstruction. 
The government faced a major challenge, and to cope, drafted a Seven-Year Plan, detailing the 
expenditure of $650 million over a period of seven years for reconstructing and developing the 
country. A number of American firms were contracted with for the purpose of aiding economic 
development; foreign exchange required the sum, however, of $217 million, 159 which the 
Government failed to raise through various means, and therefore focused on increasing the 
AIOC's annual royalty payments in order to meet the target. In 1948, the Government 
commenced negotiations with the company on such matters. 
In order to illustrate the relationship between external political and military factors and the 
profitability of oil development, the tables below chart the most essential economic data within 
the period preceding World War II, the war itself and a portion of the post-war period. It also 
illustrates the relationship between the net profitability of oil developments and the financial 
benefits to the parties involved, such as the shareholders and the British and Iranian 
governments. 
159 Overseas Consultants, Inc., Report on Seven-Year Development Plan for the Plan Organization of the Imperial 
Government oflran, New York: 1947, Vol. 5. 
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(1) Year 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
Table 3(1): Iran Oil Production, Profit of AIOC, British Tax, Payment to Iran 
Government and to Shareholders pre-World War II 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Yearly Oil Net British Payment Ordinary shares' dividends 
Production Profits Tax to Persian (%) 
(Million long (£000) (£000) Govt. 
tons) (£000) 
5.7 2,319 671 1,339 5.0 
6.4 2,380 195 1,525 7.5 
7.1 2,654 305 1,812 7.5 
7.5 3,183 512 2,190 12.5 
7.5 3,519 409 2,221 15.0 
8.2 6,123 911 2,580 25+50% scrip bonus 
10.2 7,455 1,652 3,545 25.0 
10.2 6,109 1,157 3,307 20.0 
Valuable observations and inferences on the processes affecting oil development and 
profitability can be drawn from the above table. As is evident from the above table, pertaining to 
pre-World War II economic performance, the years of peace has led to a fairly constant growth 
in profitability both for the British government, through taxes, and to shareholders, based on 
increased production levels that stability permits. 
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(1) Year 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
Table 3(2): Iran Oil Production, Profit of AIOC, British Tax, Payment to Iran 
Government and to Shareholders during World War II 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Yearly Oil Net British Payment Ordinary shares' dividends 
Production Profits Tax to Persian (%) 
(Million long (£000) (£000) Govt. 
tons) (£000) 
9.6 2,986 1,956 4,271 5.0 
8.6 2,842 2,975 4,000 5.0 
6.6 3,292 2,921 4,000 7.5 
9.4 7,790 4,918 4,000 20.0 
9.7 5,639 7,663 4,000 20.0 
13.3 5,677 10,636 4,464 20.0 
16.8 5,792 10,381 5,624 20.0 
In contrast, as shown by the above table, during the turmoil of World War II when manpower 
and technical resources were scarce, a lack of production growth is evident while, even in the last 
two years of the war when volumes expanded dramatically, profits have not grown in a similar 
manner. 
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(1) Year 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
Table 3(3): Iran Oil Production, Profit of AIOC, British Tax, Payment to Iran 
Government and to Shareholders after World War II 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Yearly Oil Net British Payment Ordinary shares' dividends 
Production Profits Tax to Persian (%) 
(Million long (£000) (£000) Govt. 
tons) (£000) 
19.2 9,625 10,279 7,132 30.0 
20.2 18,565 15,266 7,104 30.0 
24.9 24,065 28,310 9,172 30.0 
26.8 18,390 22,480 13,489 30.0 
31.8 33,103 50,707 16,032 30.0 
Lastly, the post-war statistics in the above table show dramatic recovery in production volume 
along with disproportionate increases in profitability and a uniform level of shareholder 
dividends, indicating the benefits of stability for production and the positive effects of 
industrialisation with correspondingly greater demand on oil price. This is particularly evident in 
the years of 1949 and 1950, when the profits have increased disproportionately to the increase in 
volume. 
1. 7 Conclusion 
The early to mid 20th century in the life ofthe Iranian oil industry was marked by diplomatic and 
political considerations as much as economic factors, as the granting of a concession could lead 
to conflicts between the various foreign powers which continuously attempted to influence 
Iranian policy, while securing the largest possible share of Iranian oil to fuel their increasing 
97 
consumption. This trend has begun with the early Reuter and Hotz concessions, which were 
heavily biased in favour of the foreign party, by not guaranteeing sufficient technological 
exchange and profit for Iran, therefore leading to instability in the industry and the premature 
cancellation ofthese oil contracts. In the 20th Century, on the other hand, the Iranian grievances 
centred increasingly around foreign diplomatic and political involvement, in addition to the 
acquisition of unbalanced concessions. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, the foreign power 
especially meddlesome was Great Britain, an old partner as well as a rival. Later the fear of 
foreign influence was extended to Germany. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was less 
afraid of American companies, but suspecting that an American company might be used as a 
subterfuge for British penetration, it held back co-operation with American concerns, such as 
with Sinclair in the twenties and Am iranian 160 in the thirties. The Soviets had also become 
suspicious of the US in the 1940s, and in 1944 blocked both British and American efforts to 
obtain concessions in northern Iran by demanding the concessions for themselves. After the war, 
the USSR attempted to fortify its position in the north, through puppet regimes in Azerbaijan and 
by means of an oil concession in the Northern provinces through joint Iranian-Soviet co-
operation. Under pressure from the US through the United Nations, the USSR had to withdraw 
from Azerbaijan, but it retained the oil concession it received and prevented the Western powers 
from obtaining concessions. Because of changed international conditions, and Qavam's political 
abilities - there is no doubt that Qavam had acted with skill and statesmanlike ability as an 
independent politician - the concession was not activated and was subsequently cancelled. 
However, the Soviets had succeeded in preventing the establishment of other foreign companies 
in northern Iran. 
160 Amiranian was an American Oil firm which failed to get a concession in Iran. 
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It becomes clear from these complicated political interactions that Iran was seen merely as a 
pawn in the great game of the world's powers; an attitude that could not escape either Iranian 
politicians nor the people, and consequently can be seen as a major contributing factor to the 
harsh Iranian attitude on foreign intervention present today. 
As an example of attempted manipulation and use of Iran in various global power struggles are 
the consequences of World War II, namely the development of the policy of containment of 
Soviet influence in the region while preserving conservative local regimes, regardless of the 
regimes' methods towards their own people. Iran figured centrally in both these developments. 161 
After the war, despite the fact that Britain remained the principle imperialist power in the region, 
especially in Iran and the Persian Gulf states, the economic and strategic situation there was to be 
radically transformed by a number of new developments such as the weakened global position of 
British imperialism and the growing US presence and role in the region, the rise of power of the 
Soviet Union, the emergence of Arab nationalism, and the establishment of Israel. However the 
biggest post-war problem that the US faces concerned the attempt to displace British influence in 
the Middle East, and the competition between the US and Britain for the acquisition of oil 
concessions in the region. 
Meanwhile, under these new circumstances, the Iranians began to realise the inadequacy of the 
royalties from the AIOC. To be sure, the AIOC had risked capital and it did posses high 
technical knowledge, but the returns of the company were extremely high - in some years as 
much as 150% - and the Iranians felt that they should have a much larger share of their own 
resources. An additional factor in the dissatisfaction with foreign involvement was that influence 
from the competing powers prevented Iran from closing not what were necessarily the most 
161 Therefore Iran also was affected by the 'Truman Doctrine' whereby instead of passivity, the Soviet Union was to 
be 'contained' by sponsoring foreign groups opposed to it. This policy is seen to have started the Cold War. 
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profitable contracts for the Iranian populace, but rather those which encountered the least foreign 
resistance. Therefore in 1948 negotiations with the AIOC had been opened for the conclusion of 
a supplemental agreement for a revision of the royalty terms. For the Iranians, the time had 
come to recover their natural resources and nationalise the oil industry, as we shall see in the 
next chapter. The elections for the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Majlis were the most 
meaningful in Iranian history, until the revolution. The significant features of the results were 
determined, not by the state, but by the relative strengths, on the one hand, of competing social 
forces, and on the other, of organised groups, especially political parties, parliamentary factions, 
and their foreign protectors within the government bureaucracy. Therefore, the country was 
galvanised by lively but highly complex elections between rival candidates attached to diverse 
interests, espousing different views and appealing to antagonistic social forces. As for the Shah, 
when he ascended the throne he was uncertain about his authority, and therefore declared his 
intention to maintain a constitutional monarchy, thus signalling a shift of power away from the 
throne to the Majlis. However, later, the weakness of the internal legal institutions, and the 
rivalry between the allies as well as their influence, encouraged the Shah to regain his power. At 
this time the Shah's personal political base was in the armed forces, and especially in the army-
despite its weakness, the army was still the most powerful force in Iran. As such, its support 
could make the new Shah an important player in politics. This period also witnessed important 
changes in both the domestic political scene and the international economy which led to a 
significant shift in the development path of the Iranian economy and to a restructuring of the 
world capitalist system which now had access to cheap oil under the US hegemony. After the 
war, for the first time, drawing on increasing oil revenues, the government introduced an 
ambitious and extended development plan. This led to an increase in the capacity of the state to 
intervene in the economy. With such increased capability for economic intervention, it is 
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therefore unsurprising that the past and current grievances of Iranians in regard to foreign 
involvement in the oil industry culminated in the introduction of the buy-back contract. 
The next stage in the history oflran's oil contract system which deserves careful consideration in 
the following chapter, the 1951 Nationalisation, therefore did not occur in a historical vacuum, 
but rather was the logical progression of the economic and political forces in the 191h and 20th 
centuries. Such a radical measure would not have been made without the extensive, 
disappointing experience of attempting to renegotiate contracts perceived by the domestic public 
and the authorities as being unbalanced, only to be contractually bound as the result of foreign 
pressure, to further unfair terms. The preceding events, particularly the extensive political 
meddling of world powers after WW2 with the aim of acquiring Iranian support and oil 
resources, also had a significant impact on the Nationalisation, as it was not solely an economic 
rebellion but also a political one. Overall, the events of 1951 cannot be fully understood without 
considering the interaction with foreign elements that preceded it. 
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Chapter 2: The Effect of Nationalisation on Oil Transactions 
2.1 Introduction 
As the result of rising national opposition, due to both economic and political grudges held 
against foreign companies by the Iranians, a radical transformation had occurred in the 1950s 
which changed the landscape of the Iranian oil industry. However, in order to fully understand 
this event as well as its influence on the current oil framework, the preceding events must be 
examined. 
2.2 Contractual Grievances and Renegotiation 
The first Development Plan was approved by Parliament in 1949, with a central focus on the oil 
industry to fund the effort. One change contemplated, during the 1949 elections, to the AIOC, 
was alterations in the agreement, as the British government received greater profits by taxing the 
AIOC, than the Iranian government did from royalty payments. 
The Iranian Cabinet, every time it imposed higher royalty receipts, found itself being challenged 
by the Parliament more and more to offer justification for such increases, as signalled by the 
rider of the 1947 October 22 law, originally designed to guarantee protection against the Soviet 
Union's acquisition of concession rights in Iranian provinces in the north. The rider runs as: 
In all cases where the rights of the Iranian nation in respect ofthe country's natural 
resources, whether underground or otherwise have been impaired, particularly in 
regard to the southern oil, the government is required to enter into such negotiations 
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and take such measures as are necessary to regain the natural rights and inform the 
Majlis of the results. 162 
In place with the Directive issued by the British Government, the AIOC announced that the 
dividends distribution to stockholders would be limited to 30%, contrary to the interest of the 
Iranian Government, as it reduced the payments received by the Government, in breach of 
Article IO(l)(b) of the Concession. Hence, the Government initiated talks to settle the dispute, 
and negotiations commenced in September 1948, continuing through the year, and dealt with 
issues such as the ratio of skilled and non-skilled Iranian workers, employment of foreigners in 
the business, tonnage royalty and minimum payments. 
The Concession was finally supplemented by the Agreement in May of the following year. The 
main provisions were as follows; 
Clause 3 Part (a) of the Agreement provided for an increase of two shillings in royalty payment 
to the Government per ton of oil sold in Iran or exported. Under Clause 7 (a) the company 
agreed to raise its payments with respect to Iranian taxation from nine pence163 to one shilling 
per ton of the annual production in excess of the first 600,000 tons. 
By Clause 4(a) the company pledged to pay the Government, at the ratification of the 
Agreement by the Majlis, a sum of £5,090,909 out of the company's general reserves for 1947. 
It was also made clear that for each year following 1947, the Government would receive 20 per 
cent of the sums placed annually in the general reserves of the company. The amounts 
receivable by the government according to this provision were to be increased by such a 
proportion as would offset the effect of British income tax. 164 
162 See clause (a) of the law passed by Iranian Majlis on the 22"d of October, 1947. The English text of this law is 
~resented in: International Court of Justice, op.cit., p. 273. 
63 As was the case under the 1933 Concession. 
164 Zoghi, op.cit., pg. 251-256 
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All payments to the authorities under Clauses 3(a) and 7(a) were subject to adjustments for 
fluctuations in the price of gold as was provided for in Article IO(V) of the 1933 Concession. 
The company further agreed to discount the basic pnces of all its products sold for 
consumption in Iran by 25 per cent. Furthermore, Clause 4(b) raised the limit of the guaranteed 
minimum annual payment of £4,000,000. 165 
During the same negotiations a new general plan was evolved under which the company 
promised 'to reduce within ten years from 1949 the proportion borne by its non-Iranian to its 
total (salaried) staff from 40 per cent to 33 per cent, and its non-Iranian artisans to its total 
labour (less unskilled labour) from 3 per cent to 1 per cent.' 166 
The revised provisions, in comparison to concessions granted previously, appeared to provide a 
fairer and balanced contractual relationship between the parties, with an emphasis on 
increasing engagement of the Iranian workforce; however the concession was still biased 
towards the foreign companies and this bias was not ignored by the increasingly nationalist 
sentiments of the public. 
2.2.1 Rejection of the Compromise Agreement 
The new Majlis appointed the Mossadegh Committee for examination and recommendation of 
the supplemental Agreement. In conclusion they found the Agreement dissatisfactory in 
meeting Iranian interests; before a new proposal could be forwarded however, the significantly 
more favourable deal between Aramco Oil Company and the Saudi government, 167 making the 
headlines, ignited public dissatisfaction towards the AIOC in Iran, and demonstrators took to 
165 For the English text of the supplemental Agreement see: Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Annual Report an 
dAccounts, 1949, pp. 11 ff. 
-
166 Interniltiorial CourtOflustice, op~ Cit., p: 2 rs. 
167 With the profits being split 50/50 with the Saudi government. 
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the streets protesting the 1933 Concession and demanding its cancellation. The AIOC in 
response proposed an agreement based on 50-50 profit shares, including the payment of 5 
million pounds against future royalty payments, in addition to a monthly advance amounting to 
£2 million until the end of 1951. The proposal was rejected, as the Mossadegh Committee gave 
its assent for the nationalisation of the oil industry. After the Premier's assassination, 168 due to 
his efforts at halting the nationalisation of the industry, the proposal was pushed through the 
Parliament and the Senate, both of which were unanimously in favour of nationalisation. The 
single-article Bill enacted in 1951, reads as follows: 
For the happiness and prosperity of the Iranian nation and for the purpose of 
securing world peace, it is hereby resolved that the oil industry through all parts of 
the country, without exception, be nationalized, that is to say, all operation of 
exploration, extraction and exploitation shall be carried out by the government. 169 
Consequently, British technicians abandoned Iran, and Britain declared a worldwide embargo on 
Iranian oil, dramatically reducing oil production. Iranian assets were frozen in the British 
currency, and exports prohibited. Britain appeared before the ICJ in relation to the legality of 
Iran's nationalisation of oil, which was found to be legal. Hostility between the AIOC and the 
government did not cease however, and Iran's economy suffered. 
The political upheaval which followed, leading to the dissolution of Parliament in 1953 under 
Mossadegh's efforts, had a large impact on the Iranian oil industry. 170 
168 Prime Minister General Haj-Ali Razmara, elected in June 1950, did not agree with the bill on technical grounds, 
but was nonetheless killed in 1951 by militant fuoc.lamentalists. 
169 · ·• c •• • ··b·~·. ·".-'",C.•i--~- ..•.... ~-·c·-~-- '---~~-~-·-
- · -Iraman·Em assy;-op.ctt., p.2 
17
° Farmanfarmaian, Khodadad, An Analysis of the Role of the Oil Industry in the Economy oflran, 
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2.3 Consequences of Nationalisation 
The Oil Committee remained in office for two months after the nationalisation law was 
enacted, introducing the Nationalisation Bill before Parliament, which was approved by the 
new Premier, Mossadegh and assented to by the Senate and the Shah respectively. Some 
Articles of the law that require especial consideration are summarised below: 
Article 2 is the legal basis of the nationalisation, requiring the Anglo Iranian Oil Company's 
assets to be disposed and relocated to the control of the Mixed Board. 
Article 3 allows the government and the companies' claims to be submitted to the Parliament, 
under supervision of the Mixed Board. 
Article 6 requires the gradual replacement of foreign experts by Iranian experts, including 
foreign training for domestic experts. 
According to Article 7, sales of oil would continue to clients at reasonable international prices, 
and with the same sales volume as that enjoyed with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. 171 
Nationalisation had been secured amidst disapproving attitudes towards the 1933 Concession 
amongst the Iranian public, based on the unequal financial relationship of the parties and other 
factors that have been previously described. 172 Fuelled by national outrage at foreign 
intervention, especially in the context of Iran having been the helpless pawn in the Soviet-
American struggle for power, the steps towards nationalisation were as follows. 
The Government interpreted the Nationalisation Enabling Act as granting it power to enforce 
nationalisation without prior authorization from any international tribunal; the Company and 
171 For the English text of this law see: Intemati0~al Cowt ofJ!l_stice,J:>p~ .cit, pp. 279-"280. _ -
17~The chronologicalcaccountcof tl{e-fiafionatisation •s-linfoldTngis found in Benjamin Shwadran, 'The Anglo-
Iranian Oil Dispute 1948-1953', Middle Eastern Affairs, June-July, 1954, pp. 193-230. 
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the British Government opined however that such an act was unlawful, and appealed to the 
International Court of Justice, declaring that it would protect British property and assets in 
Iran. Accordingly, the Iranian Finance Minister issued the statement that all the rights of 
previous purchasers and customers would be protected, and that further, the Company would 
be compensated for any damage caused to it by the nationalisation of oil in Iran. The 
Government-appointed Board of Directors, managing the NIOC was to act in order to respect 
the existing rules and practices of the Company (AIOC), and continue the employment of the 
AIOC's former employees. 
2.3.1 Arbitration and Negotiation 
Despite urges from President Truman, and efforts at reaching a settlement, negotiations ended 
in failure, and the Company withdrew its tankers from Abadan, followed by evacuation of 
British citizens from the country. The International Court of Justice issued an order for the 
protection of both parties' respective rights, to be taken by interim measures. 173 The Iranian 
Government refused to accept the Court's jurisdiction and order of July 5, and in response the 
American President urged discussion between the parties, through the medium of the Harriman 
Commission, to which the Government assented. Lord Privy Seal, Richard Stokes, was to head 
the British side of the negotiations. The delegation submitted the following proposal: 
(a) Transferral of AIOC assets to NIOC. 
(b) Formation of the purchasing organisation to oversee the formation of long-term 
contracts. 
(c) An operation organisation would be set up to manage oil operations, to be financed 
by the purchasing organisation, to be represented by Iranians via a board of directors of 
the organisation. 
173 For the full text of the order see: International Court of Justice, op. cit., pp.715-716 
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(d) Terms to which the purchasing organisation would be subjected would in no way 
be less advantageous to other alternate means of securing the purchase of oil. 
(e) Additional sales by the NIOC could be made to the extent that they would not be 
prejudicial to the purchasing organisation. 
(t) The NIOC would be compensated for the transferred assets by the operating costs of 
the industry, to be retained by the purchasing organization. 174 
The Stokes proposal was duly rejected by the Government on the grounds that it did not 
conform to its nationalisation policy, and the following proposal was forwarded by the 
Government: 
(1) The NIOC would continue to sell oil to its previous customers, based on a 
commercial contract. 
(2) No discount would be made available to the purchasing organisation. 
(3) Sufficient authority would be granted by the Government to foreign companies to 
guarantee effective functioning of their operations. 
(4) The government would only compensate the parties after carefully examining their 
respective claims. 
The Stokes mission ended in failure due to conflicting interests between the negotiating parties, 
and no settlement was subsequently reached. British staff left the Country, and the British 
Government instituted proceedings against the Iranian Government in the International Court 
of Justice. Further economic measures were taken in order to coerce the Government to agree 
to certain British terms; pound sterling balance payments were frozen, and permits for the 
exportation of essential materials to the workings of the industry were cancelled. Within the 
174
-Thestimmaryoftlie-stokes'proposal presentealieieistaken from: W~ Lt:ry, 'Econo~ic Problems Facing a 
Settlement ofthe Iranian Oil Controversy,' The Middle East Journal, Winter, 1954, pp. 91-95 
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United Nations framework, claims were brought by Britain to initiate measures compelling 
Iran to respect the International Court of Justice's previous order for interim measures, as 
issued in 1951. 
Mossadegh represented Iran himself at the United Nations, arguing that nationalisation of the 
oil industry, being a purely domestic matter was out of the Court's jurisdiction, or that of any 
foreign state. 175 The Security Council decided to deal with such a question only after the 
International Court of Justice had ruled on the matter. 
Upon his visit in the United States, Mossadegh was offered a proposal by the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the following terms: 
(a) The Bank would set up an arrangement, agreed to by both parties, of a temporary 
management of oil operations. The top positions would be filled by nationals of 
neutral countries. 
(b) Oil would be sold, by the Bank, under the terms of a sale of contract to be 
approved by both parties, to the AIOC, of which the proceeds in escrow would be 
held by the Bank, until the reaching of a final agreement. 
(c) Funds for the initial operation of the industry would be provided by the Bank, and 
repaid from revenue. 176 
The proposal was originally welcomed by the Prime Minister, and the Bank presented it to 
both governments. However, objectives were placed as to the political situation in Iran, and the 
Bank's accountability as a public body pertaining to 'Iran's account'. 
175 The argument was that 'It is a settled principle of international law that in matters of domestic concern, to which 
this question eminently relates, their(rjgl)ts) exercise can neither be,ltbri<!g~_nor interferedcwith by anyforeign-
sovefeign ofinternationarbo'ey•"shwaCtnin, op.-cit., p:-2IY --- -- -
176 ibid., p. 215 
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Hearings commenced in 1952 on the International Court of Justice's competence relating to the 
Iran and United Kingdom dispute, and dealt with the two main issues of the acceptance by Iran 
of the Court's jurisdiction by the 1932 Declaration, and the 1933 Agreement between the 
Government and the AIOC. The Court reached the ruling that the Court's jurisdiction was 
limited to treaties and conventions only, as accepted by Iran after September 1932, and that the 
1933 Agreement was a concessionary contract to which the British Government was not party 
to, and that accordingly, the Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter referred to it 
by the British Government in 1951. The interim measures ordered previously thereby ceased to 
have effect. 
2.3.2 International Involvement in Crisis Resolution 
In 1952, the Iranian Government met a financial crisis, due to the pending deficits accumulated 
throughout the earlier years. The Prime Minister demanded, from the AIOC, a sum of £40 
million which he claimed was owed by them. In retaliation, Truman and Churchill proposed a 
framework for dealing with the problem, stating that the issue was to be submitted to the 
International Court of Justice, that the United States would advance $10 million in aid, 177 and 
that the AIOC representatives would arrange for access of Iranian oil into the world market. 
This proposal was rejected on the basis that it was inconsistent with nationalisation, and a 
counter-proposal, as suggested by Mossadegh, which ran as the following, was submitted: 
(1) Compensation. The amount of compensation was to be determined by the laws of the 
country involved, and the agreement or consent of the former oil company. 
(2) Basis of Examination of Claims. Claims were to be examined according to the following 
criteria: 
177 W. Levy, op. cit., p. 95 
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(a) Claims of the parties up to the date of nationalisation of the oil industry, in 
consideration of the D' Arcy Agreement and income tax calculations as received by 
the Government according to Iranian law. 
(b) Claims in light of the 1933 Agreement, and the proposed supplemental 
Agreement (which stopped having effect after nationalisation, in 1951 ). 
(c) Claims in light of concession agreements made by other oil-producing 
countries, with similar oil producing costs to Iran, within the same period of time. 
(3) Determination of Damages. Damages were to be determined on the basis of the 
direct/indirect activities of the AIOC which may have acted as financial obstacles and resulting 
in losses, such as delay in fund payments. 
(4) Payment in Advance and On Account. Payment in advance and on account of £49 million 
shown on the former oil company's 1950 balance sheet as increases in royalty, taxes and 
dividends due to Iran from the reserves. From this amount any part due from royalty and tax, as 
it was guaranteed on a gold basis, must be paid in sterling convertible to dollars. 178 
The counter-proposal was rejected, and consequently Iran severed relations with the United 
Kingdom. The US however appeared to be keen in resolving the crisis. 
Further consultations followed as a result of which the British transmitted, through the 
American Ambassador in Tehran, a final offer for the consideration of the Iranian government. 
It was proposed that (a) the issue of compensation be decided by the International Court of 
Justice on the basis of loss of the company's business as well as the counter-claims of Iran; (b) 
an American company be permitted to purchase $133 million worth of oil from Iran with 
discount, and to pay $50 million in advance. In this connection an international company was 
to be formed with the AIOC as one of its members which could negotiate an agreement with 
178 As printed in: B. Shwadran, op. cit., p. 220 
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the Government for the sale of crude and refined oil; (c) before compensation issue is settled, 
Iran should agree to pay Britain 25 per cent of the gross receipts from the oil. After settlement 
of compensation Iran was to pay the company 25 per cent in form of oil deliveries or direct 
payments over a period of twenty years. 
Once again and for the last time, Mossadegh refused to accept the new offer on the grounds that 
the new proposal was in principle no different from the Churchill-Truman joint proposal and as 
such it conflicted with nationalisation law. Overall, a clear pattern emerges of the strong, 
populist resistance to foreign involvement in the energy sector resulting in sufficient political 
pressure for compromises to be rejected, even if they are superior to the originally opposed 
contract. 
On May 28, 1953, Mossadegh wrote a letter to President Eisenhower appealing for financial aid 
to his Government. 179 In reply the President bluntly dismissed Mossadegh 's pleadings stating 
that "so long as Iran could have access to funds .derived from the sale of its oil products if a 
reasonable agreement were reached' it would be unfair if the money of the American taxpayers 
were to be spent in Iran. 
2.3.3 The 1953 coup d'etat and its effect on foreign investment 
The act of closing down the British Embassy in 1952 to stop the intrigues that the government 
believed were underway there had, in fact, put a stop to covert activities of the British, who were 
seeking to undermine Mossadegh's government and replace it with one that would be kinder to 
their oil interests. A full-scale Coup d'Etat was being planned by the British, and they hoped to 
gain support from the Americans. Representatives from the Foreign Office and from MI6 met 
with the CIA to discuss plans to overthrow Mossadegh and his supporters. The British had 
179 Madani, S.J., 'Tarikh siyasi moaser Iran' (The Modem Political f!i.~tory _Qflran),Vol. 1, Daftare Entesharate 
::_ -Esh'lmi; 1982: 28-6 - - -
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already gained support for the coup from various conservative Iranian groups, such as senior 
police and army officers, mullahs and newspaper editors. It was hoped that the shah and the royal 
family would also be supportive, and indeed the shah, as well as his mother and twin sister 
Princess Ashraf, supported the removal of Mossadegh - the women having been 'actively 
campaigning against him' 180 since he assumed the office of Prime Minister. The shah's growing 
resentment to Mossadegh's efforts to curtail the involvement of the royal family in politics meant 
that he agreed to meet with the CIA and he eventually gave his support to the idea of a coup, and 
to the CIA and MI6 suggestion of replacing Mossadegh with General Zahedi, though he was 
nervous throughout the coup and worried that the army would not support him. 
In February of 1953, as Mossedegh left the Palace, a mob was baying outside and followed him 
to his home, which was attacked. Mossadegh managed to escape over a wall and hurried to a 
meeting of the Majlis where he reported what had happened. However, attempts to find and 
question the rioters were useless due to the involvement of various officials. Mossadegh was 
now 'acutely conscious both of the loyalty of the security forces and of his own personal 
safety.' 181 He refused to meet with the shah privately from then on, using only official contacts. 
That April, a new plan to force Mossadegh to resign was undertaken by the CIA, again with the 
knowledge and support of the shah. Several key officials sympathetic to Mossadegh's rule were 
kidnapped in an attempt to throw the country into disarray and turmoil, but the plot was 
uncovered and those responsible arrested (though not before one captive, the loyal chief of police 
Afshartus, had been murdered so as to be unable to give witness as to who had kidnapped him). 
However, after the coup the officials involved were put on trial and quickly cleared of the 
charges. Mozaffer Baqa'i, a member of the Majlis who had once been a close supporter of 
Mossadegh, had been directly involved in the kidnapping and was implicated by three of the 
18CLKatolizian;-H., 'Musaddi~:pma the Struggle for Power in-Iian', 1.B. 'fauns & Co Ltd~Lo-ndon, 1-990: 178 
181 Ibid: 182 
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retired officers involved, was eventually arrested two days before the final coup but after it had 
succeeded all charges against him were dropped. 
The actual go-ahead for the coup was given by the Americans in late June when President 
Roosevelt attended a meeting with British officials in London on the 25th of that month. Those 
planning the coup had, by August, control of four fifths 182 ofthe media and had distributed mass 
propaganda in favour of the shah. However, the first attempt at a royalist coup was to fail as 
Mossadegh learned of the plot and was able to take defensive action. The shah and his queen fled 
to Baghdad and then Rome and the CIA assumed they had failed. 
Amidst the chaos that followed the departure of the Shah on the 17th of August, General Zahedi 
was able to seize control of the Government. The protests in the streets had continued unabated, 
and were continuing on the 19th, unaffected by the police despite Mossadegh's attempt to ban 
demonstrations. The rebels surrounded Mossadegh's house, and put up a white flag, claiming 
he had resigned. Mossadegh in fact escaped once again over the wall, and was arrested within 
days. After his trial, he served three years in prison and was then under house arrest until his 
death in 1967. General Zahedi became Prime Minister and the shah was to rule for another 26 
years before the Islamic Revolution in 1979. A year after the coup, General Zahedi's 
Government concluded an agreement with a consortium of international oil companies which 
will be referred to as the 1954 Agreement, ending the strong, nationalistic stance on the issue 
under Mossadegh. 
The Coup d'Etat of 1953 was the culmination of a long mission by the British to free 
themselves from the restraints that the nationalisation of oil had placed on their investment. The 
Americans, on the other hand, feared that Iran would be the next country to fall under the Iron 
182 Ibid: 188 
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Curtain, due to its links with the Soviet Union, and the 1953 coup became a blueprint for later 
operations, including the 1954 coup in Guatemala and the unsuccessful 'Bay of Pigs' attempt at 
a coup in Cuba in 1961. 183 The Americans were also spurred on by news of the renewed 
activities of the Tudeh communist party in Iran. However, as is clear from the progression of 
events up to and after the nationalisation of the oil industry, the issue of Iranian oil was the 
primary reason for the coup. Thus, it can be argued that the current suspicion regarding the 
outcome of foreign investment resulting in the strict terms that Iranians insist upon in their oil 
agreements is understandable. The overthrow of the first democratically elected government 
has left deep impressions throughout the country, and significantly changed the way that Iran 
views the western world. The capitulation of the shah to foreign interests sowed the seeds for 
the Revolution, which it is almost reasonable to assume could have been avoided had the oil 
interests of the British government, who were exercising an almost colonial rule over Iran, not 
been the first concern of their Foreign Office. The direct relationship between the oil industry 
and national security of the country is important to consider when analysing Iranian oil 
agreements. The removal of the democratically elected government of Mossadegh underlines 
the importance of the oil industry to all aspects of society and politics, as well as the economic 
sphere. 
The one clear conclusion that emerges from the study of the 1901-1954 period in Iran's oil 
history is that the major cause of discord has been in one way or another related to the question 
of the distribution of the direct and indirect economic benefits of the oil industry between its 
foreign owners and the Iranian economy. Other factors may have also contributed to these 
controversies but they were not as important as the differences that existed between the parties 
with respect to the diversion of the benefits resulting from the operation of the oil industry. 
183 Iran Chamber Society op. cit. [http://www.iranchamber.com/history/coup53/coup53pl.php] 
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Consequently, there exists a mutually responsive relationship between Iranian politics and 
Iranian oil; a conclusion that remains true today. 
2.4 Formation of the 1954 Consortium 
A new era in Iran's relations with foreign oil companies dawned when the government changed 
in the summer of 1953. The incoming government was prepared to negotiate with former AIOC 
a settlement to the oil dispute, and also to ensure the enlargement of oil exports. 184 The oil 
companies were equally prepared to sign agreements for refining, marketing and exploration of 
Iran's oil reserves. 
Following the resumption of oil cooperation, Iran and England also resumed their diplomatic 
relations on December 51h 1953. Prime Minister Zahedi 185 created a special committee to resolve 
the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, three days later. 
The new government understood that " ... the basic issue involved was still to be solved. It was 
understood in London, and even more so in Washington, that whatever solution was found would 
somehow to be within the framework of the nationalisation law, even if only formally," and 
" ... could not ignore public sentiment by repudiating that law ... Moreover ... it would not be 
possible to bring back the AIOC as exclusive producer, refiner and marketer."186 
This desire to continue receiving oil profits despite legal restrictions in the source state, and 
various attempts to circumvent these limits, is very similar to efforts currently undertaken by the 
Iranian oil authorities and foreign investors. 
184 Such willingness to conclude contracts was based on the needs of various budget-based large-scale development 
p[ogratl1s fo~ ~i.~i~~ccan~ ~~>,ital, whi~_h_ could o'!IY l>~_~atjs!i_e~_thrQ_~g~ oiilly_~nues. _ 
-
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2.4.1 NIOC's Cooperation with the International Consortium 
Following normalisation of relations between Tehran and Washington, the United States 
promised direct financial and military support to the new government. And in October 1953, 
Hoover Jr. arrived in Tehran to help the new government for a solution to the oil disputes. 
In the beginning of December 1953, AIOC's president organised a meeting for the Standard Oil 
of New Jersey, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Standard Oil of California, Gulf Oil Company, 
Texaco, Royal Dutch-Shell and Campagnie Francaise des Petroles in London, with the purpose 
of studying the best means of bringing Iranian oil into the international market. The companies 
invited stated that they were ready to " ... form a provisional consortium187 for the solution ofthe 
Iranian oil dispute" and that "subsequent discussion between Dennis Wright, the British Charge 
d' Affairs in Tehran, and the Iranian authorities convinced the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that a 
consortium was the best possible answer to the problem."188 
A plan was then formulated which would solve the Iranian oil problem, or so its drafters Herbert 
Hoover Jr. and Loy Henderson, the American Ambassador hoped. The British government did 
not grant its approval to this initiative, in fact "Neither the Anglo-Iranian Co., nor the British 
Government was quick to seize on Hoover's idea of possible solution ... moreover, by December 
1953, Sir William Fraser, Chairman of Anglo-Iranian, was persuaded that it would be in the best 
interest of his company and his country to give the Hoover plan a trial." The United States 
position was that " ... Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's share of the consortium should be limited to 
40 percent and the American Companies should together hold a similar share with the remaining 
20 percent to be held by the Dutch and the French." The negotiations regarding this issue, 
involving the British and American governments as well as various oil companies, did not end 
187 Consortium is an economic formation where each participant retains its _legal ~tatus and the_ consortium as a body 
-onlycontrolsjoint issuessuc!i·as-divisionofprofits.-- -- - - · 
188 Ibid. p.l28 
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for some months. It was the US's position from the beginning that American oil companies' 
participation was to be facilitated. An announcement was made on the 20th January" ... T.Rieber, 
former chairman of the Board of the Texas Oil Company and a former official of International 
Bank for Reconstruction and development has been appointed petroleum advisor to the Iranian 
Government." Only ten days later, on January 30th, "The U.S Department of Justice grants anti-
trust189 immunity to five big American oil companies which are working out a formula for 
settlement of the Iranian oil dispute... This frees them to join British, Dutch and French 
petroleum concerns in forming a consortium to rehabilitate Iran's oil fields and refineries." 190 
A special oil commission, formed as per Prime Minister Zahedi's order on January 31 5\ 
" ... recommended the creation of a consortium of American, British, and Iranian oil companies to 
market Iran's oi1." 191 
An understanding was, at last, reached on August 15th 1954, between Dr. A. Amini, Iran's 
Finance Minister and the Vice-President of Standard Oil of New Jersey, Howard Page and an 
agreement, forming a Consortium, was signed. Following the Majlis's confirmation of the 
agreement on October 30th 1954, only nine days were needed after the ratification to initiate the 
flow of Iranian oil into British, Dutch, French and American tankers, and through them, to the 
world market. The most significant provisions of this agreement were as follows: 
The Consortium of companies will pay the National Iranian Oil Co. for all the 
equipment and personnel training for export and will sell the crude and products 
exported ... Products for internal consumption will be available to National Iranian 
practically at the cost that was required to produce them ... 
189 
'Anti-trust immunity' permits companies to engage in usually prohibited competitive tactics, such as entirely 
dominating a market and setting all prices, consequently limiting cons1.1mer 1Teedorn llrul-choi~e. 
-~ 190-Ibid'p~129 -- __ ._· ~- - - -· - . - -·· - -
191 ibid p.l29 
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The agreement is valid for a period of 25 years, with a provision for three five-year 
extensions ... the total direct income to Iran, after the initial three-months period will 
be: first year, 31 million; second year, 62 million; third year, 67 million... The 
consortium guarantees to export a minimum of 78 million tons during the first three 
years ... The consortium is to pay Iran, in Sterling, approximately half its net 
operating revenue in the form of income tax, and to the refinery a commission of two 
shillings and one-and-a-half pence per cubic meter of crude for exported refined 
products ... The accord provides for the formation of two companies to operate oil... 
One of the companies to exploration and production, the other for the purpose of 
refining ... Each company is to have seven directors, two to be named by Iran and five 
by the consortium. 192 
The composition of the Consortium was as follows: The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Now 
British Petroleum Co. Ltd) held 40%; Royal-Dutch-Shell 14%; Standard Oil (New Jersey), 
Standard Oil Company of Calif., Mobil Oil Company Incorporated, Texas Oil Company and 
Gulf Oil Corporation each held 8%; and Campagnie Francaise des Petrols held 6%. 
The Consortium's formation caused outrage among the smaller oil companies in the US These 
companies wanted to take part in the Iranian oil operation, resulting in the intervention of the US 
State Department which compelled the five large United States oil companies (the Consortium 
members) to grant a small percentage 193 of the Consortium's shares to a group of independent oil 
companies from the US. 194 
192 Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. v, March 1954 P 103 
193 The companies wereobligated to grant 118 oftheir int~rest pac~ges to the~~ SJ1laJler COJ!Ip_ani_e_!LSYch as Hancock_ 
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The Consortium members subsequently founded two operating companies195 whose task it was 
to produce and refine oil and to receive a fee, as well as to have their operating costs 
compensated, but not to engage in commerce and 
... received the necessary rights and powers from Iran and the National Iranian Oil 
Company to be solely responsible for exploration and production in a defined area 
in south Iran and for the operation of the refinery at Abadan, and they exercise these 
powers on behalf of Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company to the extent 
provided in the Agreement. While the National Iranian Oil Company, the shares of 
which are held by the Iranian Government, is the owner of the fixed assets of the oil 
industry in Iran, the Operating Companies have unrestricted use of them during the 
period of the agreement. 196 
The Agreement also specified the role of the National Iranian Oil Company during the effect of 
the Agreement: 
The agreement provides that petroleum products required by the National Iranian 
Oil Company for consumption within Iran shall be delivered to it by the appropriate 
Operating Company. It also provides for the National Iranian Oil Company to take 
over the responsibility for the provision, maintenance and administration of certain 
ancillary services required by the Operating Companies, known as "non-basic 
operations. " 197 
195 The two operating companies were the Iranian Oil Refining Company and the Iranian Oil Exploration and 
Producing Company. 
12~ibid~p~335;o-336--
197 Zoghi, op.cit., p.134 
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2.5 Legal Basis Reform of Oil Agreements 
Three years after the consortium agreement's signing, in 1957, the Majlis passed the first Iranian 
oil bill, allowing the signing of agreements involving foreign investors outside the consortium's 
operating area. Major oil companies were disgruntled due to the innovative participation 
formula. Their opinions shifted, however, once they realised that using the formula was a more 
stable, appropriate method of securing co-operation from oil producer states. Participation 
agreements in Iran were based on a 50/50 ratio, where 50 percent of shares were the property of 
the National Iranian Oil Company while the remaining 50 belonged to one or more foreign oil 
companies. The Iranian government received half of the foreign partners' shares as tax. In effect, 
these agreements were 75/25 agreements, and this name stuck. Further updates of tax laws 
resulted in 85 percent payable tax, in addition to mandatory royalty payments to the National 
Iranian Oil Company. 198 
2.5.1 Commercial Implementation of New Legislation 
Using the 1957 Petroleum Law, miscellaneous contracts were signed by NIOC, usually 75/25 
profit sharing agreements " ... it was stipulated that half of the profits of the exploitation would 
go to the NIOC as partner, while the Iranian Government would receive 50 percent of the profit 
as income tax ... this system is an extension of the 50/50 ... in the sense that tax levied on the 
foreign company's half of the profit is, as before, 50 percent, but in addition, the Iranian 
company owns a one half share of the petroleum produced, resulting from the equal partnership 
with the foreign company."199 
198
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On August 3rd, 1957, the Societe Irano-Italienne des Petroles (SIRIP) was founded as the result 
of an agreement between NIOC and Azinde Generate Italiana Petrole (AGIP), an Italian state 
sector firm. SIRIP, with an equal number of shares belonging to the founding companies, came 
into possession of22,900 square kilometres of the shore of Zagros, in the Persian Gulf. 
The post-tax profit will be shared equally by AGIP and NIOC, but if commercial quantities of oil 
are found, then NIOC would provide half the investment capital required for the discovery's 
further development. 
The agreement's period of effect was limited to 25 years, although a provision for renewal was 
included, giving the option of renewing for either three terms or five years. Drilling had to begin 
within four years of the agreement's signing, and if half the operating area has not been 
developed in ten years' time, then the area must be returned. 
AGIP was obliged to utilise $22 millions of capital for purposes of exploration.200 SIRIP was 
then obliged to compensate AGIP for its expenditures at an annual rate of at least 10 percent per 
barrel produced. SIRIP would exempt from royalty payments and had to pay solely its profit on 
its share of the oil. 
An agreement was signed in June 1958 between the Pan American Petroleum Corporation, a 
subsidiary of Standard Oil of India, and NIOC. The result of the agreement was a joint company 
by the name of the Iranian Pan-American Oil company (IP A C). By virtue of this agreement, 
16,000 offshore square kilometres, in the north of the Persian Gulf was given to the Pan 
American. The same framework was used for this agreement as the one used in relation to GIAP. 
However, it does differ from the latter in certain respects. Pan American paid NIOC a $25 
million dollar cash bonus, procurable in ten annual instalments following the commencement of 
200 6 million within the first four years and the rest within the next eight. 
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production.201 AGIP committed to spending $22 million for exploration, whereas Pan American 
committed $82 millions of its funds for the same goal. NIOC's obligation came into effect with 
the beginning of commercial production, and in both cases, the foreign companies were obliged 
to finance all exploration-related expenses.202 A further contractual obligation was the payment 
of half of their net income, stemming from their activities, to the Iranian government. NIOC, in 
its capacity as a partner in this joint venture, was to acquire 50 percent of post-taxation profits. In 
the end, Iran's total share of profits amounts to 75 percent. 
In a further development in June of 1958, an agreement203 with the Sapphire Petroleum 
Company of Canada was signed by NIOC, the subject matter of the agreement being a 10,000 
square kilometre offshore area that was previously granted to the Consortium and SIRIP. 
The joint agreements between Iran and AGIP, Pan American and other foreign oil companies, 
did not follow the pattern usually utilised in Middle Eastern concessions, and from the 
Consortium agreement of 1954. The main commonalities between these agreements were the 
following: 
1. They created a partnership between AIOC and a foreign oil company. Profits 
were to be taxed at the rate of 50 percent, and the remainder of the profits was to be 
divided equally between the two parties. 
2. Foreign companies were obligated to fund the oil exploration until it was found 
in commercial quantities. 
201 As required by Article 31.5 of the agreement. 
202 ibid p.l44 - ... 
203 The terms were-identical ttnllose use(riim'ie !PAC agreement; witnllie -exception that Sapphire was not obligated 
to pay a bonus because, instead, it pledged to spend $18 million on exploration. 
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3. The primary duration was to be 25 years, beginning with the initiation of 
commercial production and was capable of being renewed for three periods of 5 
years each. 
4. The employment of foreigners by the operating companies was severely limited 
and regulated. 
5. The nationalities of board members were locked at half Iranian and half foreign. 
6. Areas where oil fields have not been developed within a set time period had to be 
gradually relinquished. 
7. Occasionally, a bonus payable to NIOC was made part of the contract, such as in 
the case ofPan American's agreement.204 
2.6 Contractual and Commercial Changes between 1960 and 1979 
The changes seen in the Iranian oil industry during the period 1960-79 were in large part due to 
the attempts at modernisation undertaken by the Shah and the desire for increased foreign 
investment in the field. Economic development was a cornerstone issue of the day and the 
rapidity with which the modernisation of this system was undertaken had profound effects upon 
the infrastructure of the country. These changes are discussed in detail below. 
2.6.1 Oil Transactions as a Part of the Economic Development Plans and Socioeconomic 
Context 
As a result of a substantial enlargement of oil revenues, which coincided with the centralisation 
ofthe Iranian economy, problems of stress within the Iranian society, caused by the imbalance of 
wealth, have become aggravated. The modernisation campaign, continuing throughout the reign 
of Mohammad Reza Shah, had a substantial effect on the commercial infrastructure of Iran, but 
204 ibid. pl45-148 
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little effect on the rigid structure of the political system. The gap between these two aspects of 
Iran's situation was further highlighted due the Shah's adoption of Western industrial policies. 
Throughout the 1960s, four mam goals were kept in mind when planning the economic 
programmes. The first was the speedy growth and advancement of various industries through 
investment and the utilisation of the most modem manufacturing techniques;205 the other was the 
hiring of specialists from abroad with the purpose of further developing the industrial sector. The 
facilitation of significant gains from industry was the third, the fourth being wages management, 
to be done by moving savings from labour costs to capital investment. 
The assumption underpinning this plan was that prosperous industrialists would reinvest their 
funds in the Iranian economy, consequently vitalising it and encouraging further development. 
The assumption was false, however, and the large profits acquired by industrialists simply 
widened the gap between them and the commercial class (or bazaar, the traditional middle class), 
creating discontent and calls for revolution, which eventually toppled the government. 
Mohammad Reza Shah's modernistic reforms and development plans, which he conducted 
throughout the 1950's, were labelled the "White Revolution" in 1963. The term denoted both the 
attempt at modernising the economy and stabilising the political environment. The ultimate aim 
was to increase the pace of national advancement and to improve the government's reputation, 
painting it to be a protector of public welfare. 
Agricultural and industrial reforms were vital parts of the Development Plans, and required 1.5 
billion dollars investment into agriculture alone, requiring profits from oil in order to maintain 
the pace of economic reform. Additionally, a financial expansion had occurred in most 
economic sectors, following the input of US$1.9 billion into the national budget, which the 
205
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government earned through oil revenues. The focus of government activities was on public 
activities, heavy industries, dam building and the enlargement of the oil and gas production 
industries. Another beneficiary of the third plan was the private industry, since they had less 
trouble finding financial backing due to an increase in bank loans. 
The fourth plan's effect was an increase in the rate of fiscal development, with its goal being to 
address problems at the local and national level, through integration into an Iran-wide 
developmental program. As the result of the plan, GOP growth targets were overshot, with 11.8 
annual GOP growth. The biggest strides were made in the petroleum, transportation and 
communication industries, with industry in general also improving substantially. Among the 
structures which were being built during the fourth plan were a refining complex,206 a pipeline 
leading to the USSR, a steel mill and an aluminium smelter. The prioritisation of industry over 
agriculture during this plan, however, resulted in the expansion of the gap between the industrial 
sector and those engaged in farming and crop-production. 
The impact of the third and fourth plans on the urban population was particularly noticeable, 
since high priority was given to expanding the manufacturing of everyday items and increasing 
the production volumes of oil and gas. Such an area of focus resulted in the construction of 
numerous industrial installations between 1963 and 1977, mostly in urban areas. 
The investment that had been initially devoted to the Fifth Development Plan (1973-1978) was 
US$36.5 billion, but substantial successes in acquiring greater oil profits during the Plan's 
duration, expanded the investment size to US$70 billion. The emphasis of this Plan was 
providing accommodation, mineral and industrial development, natural resources enterprises and 
206 An especial efforfwas made to decreaSe-Iranian d~p~~~~ce on foreign technology and facilities through building 
their own refining and oil field developing facilities. 
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telecommunications, since almost two-thirds of the available funds were channelled into these 
areas. 
Moreover, some of the unexpectedly high petroleum profits were paid for rapidly organised 
defence and construction projects, as opposed to the Plan's original zones ofpriority.207 
During the time of immense petroleum price hikes between 1973 and 1977, the Shah's overly 
rapid efforts at industrialisation and the creation of a modern, mechanised military resulted in 
dire consequences. Inflation increased, rural-to-urban migration became more vigorous and 
corruption plagued all parts of the government. Furthermore, due to the failure to train Iranian 
specialists for the jobs occupied by foreigners, more and more foreign technical consultants had 
to be invited to work in Iran. The housing situation in Tehran, already on the brink of 
overcrowding, was made worse by this importing of labour.208 As the result of overly rapid 
economic reform, made possible only through oil money, a radicalisation occurred in the 
population which eventually led to the Shah's downfall; highlighting oil revenues' power to both 
aid in construction and to be the cause of national conflict. 
2.6.2 Updated Terms of the 1965 Agreements 
In an effort to survey the 48,000 square kilometres of the Persian Gulf for the presence of oil, the 
Iranian government, in early 1964, commissioned such a survey from Western geophysical 
companies. In the companies' March 1964 report, it was stated that "the world's biggest oil field 
may be waiting to be tapped beneath 175 feet of Persian Gulf water ... every structure, of course, 
isn't necessarily oil bearing. And talking its size (twenty seven structures) before actual test 
207 Therefore the oil profits played a significant role in improving the state of the Iranian military prior to the Iran 
Iraqi war. . . ....... · .. - ·. -·. ... o ____ - . --------" -=--"---- - -
208
'ThldaC!tofaomesticallyffii:in:ed speCialists cfeariYsliowed that the government's efforts to avoid this by 
imposing limitations on the number of foreign employees as part of oil contracts have failed. 
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drilling is obviously premature, but there is no doubt that the structures and domes uncovered by 
the seismic work are tremendously exciting." 
As a result of this report, in September 1964 NIOC extended an invitation to all companies who 
may be interested in taking part in this scheme to submit their business plans to the Iranian 
government. In January 1965, joint-venture agreements were signed by NIOC with a number of 
companies. 209 
As per the agreement, each group accepted a 50% partnership with NIOC. Furthermore, a bonus 
payment must be paid by each group, in Shell's case, 21,075,000 Rials. This amounted to a 
significant part of the total payment from all contenders, estimated at between 65-70 million 
Rials. 
According to the agreement, the foreign companies would have to pay for exploration costs, but 
NIOC would join the operations if oil were found. During the first stage of development, the 
foreign companies will carry the burden of paying the development costs, but half of the 
development costs paid during this first stage will be reimbursed to them once oil exports have 
begun, over a stated period. Moreover, both the initial and the production bonus are returned, 
amortisable at a rate of ten percent of the total sum, each year. The original production period 
could, at will, be extended by up to three five year extensions. A 50/50 profit split was used for 
this offshore agreement, with sharing taking place on the basis of the posted prices between the 
Iranian government, in the role of the taxing authority, and the joint foreign group and NIOC 
partnership. Consequently, "in virtue of its 50 percent shareholding, NIOC obtains one-half of 
the profits of the joint company, after taxation by the Iranian Government, and the foreign 
partner also receives one-half. Total profits are therefore divisible one-half to the Iranian 
209 The companies were united into 5 groups and included Royal Dutch-Shell and Sun Oil Co. 
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Government and one-quarter each to NIOC and the foreign partner." However, not all groups 
who wished to participate were permitted to form a contract with NIOC.210 
2.7 Turmoil Resulting from the Islamic Revolution 
Following the Islamic Revolution, led by Ayatollah Khomaini,211 NIOC annulled all Iranian 
relation contracts concluded with foreign companies before the Revolution. The NIOC 
legitimised this decision by noting that it stemmed from a decision made by the Revolutionary 
Council212 on 7th January 1979. 
As well as having had immediate consequences, the annulment of contracts as the result of the 
Revolution had effects that were much more far reaching, in the form of costly and prolonged 
litigation over the cancellation damages. 
Three US firms invested in Iranian oil in the form of PSA and joint venture agreements prior to 
the Revolution, leaving Iran after the Embassy takeover crisis and abandoning their designated 
oil operations. In order to avoid further interruptions in the flow of oil, Iranian officials took 
over the fields, as they were sufficiently experienced to conduct such an operation on their own. 
The companies, members of a consortium in the Persian Gulf region, sued Iran but despite its 
offer to compensate them the sums owed under the original agreements, they wished to procure a 
legal verdict against Iran. The disruptive effect of the Revolution can be seen from the potential 
legal effect of the case, which threatened to undermine the Iranian contractual stance that 
companies involved in the type of contract in question only had rights to above-ground oil rather 
than underground deposits. Furthermore, the fiscal dangers of breaching contract due to a radical 
change of stance on foreign oil involvement are shown by the court's final finding, which 
210 Movahed, Mohammad Ali "Nafte va Masaele Hoghooghiye an"( Our Oil and its Related Legal Issues) p.6l 
211 A Shi'i Muslim religi()us leader, poJ.i~!c!~ ll!li:Jgrga.ni_ser qfthe I 979Jntr~i_an fj;yolution. , __ - - - --
-21LA-gr6up'o:ftferics appointe<i'i)y Ayatoi1a1i Kfiomelnnn 19-79 to manage the Revolution of Iran and then legislate 
for the Interim Government 
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ordered Iran to pay the companies compensation according to very optimistic predictions of their 
potential profits. 
Furthermore, a further disadvantage of contractual upheaval as seen in the Revolution was 
highlighted by the ex-NIOC Deputy Managing Director Seyyed Mehdi Hosseini, who noted that 
oil contracts include various implied provisions which become the subject of debate in judicial 
arbitration, leading usually to a finding favourable to the foreign investor as the courts are not 
experts on oil issues and tend to sympathise with the party perceived to have been wronged, 
therefore making any contractual annulment potentially costly for Iran. 213 
An additional ill effect of the Revolution was that, based on their presence at popular rallies, 
cross-country strikes and interruptions of oil flow, some Iranian oil industry employees were 
given the managerial positions in the oil industry, including control over all the relevant 
operations.214 
2.8 Iran-Iraq War's Enhancement of International Involvement 
After the beginning of the Iran-Iraqi war, on 21st September 1980, oil, petrochemical and gas 
infrastructure became the target for heavy Iraqi air and ground attacks. These attacks were 
intended to interrupt Iran's production and export of oil, as well as to undermine Iran's defence 
capabilities by cutting off fuel transmission to cities, war industries and battle fronts. The Iraqi 
military made significant gains in this mission, destroying the Abadan refinery and seriously 
damaging crucial oil industry locations. Oil export terminals were also desirable targets, Khark 
Island oil terminal, for instance, attracting constant fire barrages. Although damage dealt to oil 
213 Exclusive Interview with Mehdi Hosseini, Payvand News, 19th May 2005 . 
. !http~~-J?.ayvan~~c_o~~new~/05/may/~I46.html]~~--····-· --:--- ~--·- c •• ·c: c ___ --. 14 ConseqUently, the Mm1stry's leadership was restructured on the bas1s ofpoht1cal affihatJon rather than busmess 
talent. 
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refineries, pipelines, industrial sites and factories decreased the amount of oil produced, it did not 
substantially decrease the rate of oil export until 1986. 
The average production amount, per day, in the period of 1982 to 1986 was 2.3 million barrels. 
Nonetheless, the compounded impact of decreased oil production and decreasing oil prices 
caused a deficit of foreign exchange and an economic crisis by 1986. The Abadan refinery's 
demolishment,215 the destruction of refining facilities and oil transportation vehicles, as well as 
the ongoing fmancial sanctions against Iranian oil instituted by Japan, US and France aggravated 
the economic trouble. As of November 1987, oil exports were down to an estimated I million 
bpd, from about 1.9 million bpd in the preceding monthly period.216 
Iraq's strategy of frustrating Iran's oil industry began in February 1984, when Iraqi forces 
attacked oil tankers making rounds between the Khark and Sirri islands. As the result of a strike 
on Khark Island, its terminal and cargo handing jetties were damaged and their output decreased 
from 6.5 million bpd to 2.5 million bpd in the space of just three months. Although this tactic did 
not stop Iranian oil exports, the diminishing effect it had on the amount exported resulted in 
financial and funding problems in fiscal years 1985 and 1986. 
Due to the decreased efficiency of Khark Island, Iran began to employ the Sirri Island terminal 
for exporting purposes. Following the beginning of operations there in February 1985, Iraq 
attempted to disrupt the operations there as well, on August 12th 1986. The first attack caused 
disarray and disrupted oil exports for a time, but the Iraqi forces' second assault in the autumn of 
1986 dealt damage to the terminal from which Iran could not rapidly recover. 
Due to the attacks on tankers in 1984, insurance premiums for transporting Iranian oil 
skyrocketed, forcing Iran to offer special incentives to tanker operators in order to compensate 
215 Which was crucial and produced an average of628,000 barrels per day. 
216 NIOC, Brief History of Iran's Oil. P.8 
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them for the risk they incurred. Japan, the largest buyer of Iranian crude, prohibited Japanese 
transports from travelling the Khark-Sirri route. However, following Iran's decision to provide 
beneficial terms to its clients, Japan unfroze its oil trade with Iran in July 1984. 
The attacks on Sirri Island in August 1986 had the effect of decreasing Iran's oil exports to just a 
third of their nominal size.217 An attempt to return the exports to their normal levels was made 
through an effort to export oil through Larak Islalnd, but monsoon winds, which struck in 
September 1986, made dispatching shipments from its main oil terminal, Abu al Bukush, 
temporarily impossible. Iraqi forces then conducted attacks on the terminal in November and 
December 1986 and succeeded in damaging it. The damage was not such that it permanently 
prevented it from executing its functions,218 and by November 1986, Larak Island was repaired 
and inherited the title of Iran's main export point for oil. Unlike the previously used terminals, 
Larak Island had not been as vulnerable to attack as it was located far from Iraq's air bases and 
had a comprehensive anti-aircraft defence system. This allowed it to avoid the fate of other 
terminals and the oil industry as a whole, attacks on which were gradually eroding Iran's oil 
export industry. The shuttle fleet was hit the hardest, with 13 damaged tankers in August 1986 
alone. The attacks on the oil industry have also necessitated a delay in the unveiling of a major 
petroleum installation in Bandar-e Khomeini, scheduled to open in 1989, a joint Iranian-Japanese 
venture. The effect of the war was not solely destructive however, as the serious damage 
inflicted on the Iranian oil industry necessitated foreign involvement in its reconstruction and set 
the tone for further contractual cooperation with foreign companies in the 1990s. 
217 From 1.6 million bpd to 600,000 bpd. 
218 Namely exporting an average of200,000 bpd. 
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2.9 Conclusion 
In order to understand the nature and functioning of modem "buy-back" contracts, it is vital to 
have an insight into the history of the Iranian oil industry, which has been shaped by wealth, 
foreign domination and wars. As the industry's history shows, Iran's restrictive stance on foreign 
ownership and suspicious attitude regarding foreign investments in its oil sector, in view of the 
excessive power wielded in the past by foreign powers, is neither inconsistent with history nor 
groundless. If one limits the analysis only to the present, however, such significant understanding 
oflran's oil industry will be missed. 
One clear trend which emerges from Iran's oil history in the second half of the 20th century is the 
unfair and unbalanced legal obligations which arise from oil contracts with foreign companies. 
As part of the pattern, such grievances lead to an escalation of public condemnation which lead 
to a severe restriction on oil contracts, as was the case in the 1951 Nationalisation and the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979. Another part of this pattern, however, is the eventual reversal of this 
radical position once the authorities, be they that of the Shah or the Supreme Leader, once it 
becomes clear that their ambitious economic reform programmes cannot be sustained without the 
contribution of oil revenues. The significant contribution of the Iran-Iraq war to this continuous 
pattern of oil protectionism and attempts at greater commercial cooperation was the simultaneous 
need for foreign involvement in order to rebuild the oil industry while also maintaining a firmer 
grasp over national oil reserves due to the distrust generated due to Western support of Iraq in 
the war. Consequently, these historical events are a vital and indivisible component of an 
understanding of the buy-back system emerging in the 1990s; combining a willingness to absorb 
foreign technology and investment while maintaining complete control over Iranian oil. The 
events of 1953, where a foreign operation ousted Mossadegh's government for the sake of their 
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oil interests, are enough by themselves to account for a lasting mistrust of any foreign investment 
in the oil industry. 
An examination of the greater economic isolationism that was prevalent during the two most 
important oil-related events oflran's history, elucidates the reasons why the contractual system 
introduced in the 1990s is consistent with Iran's past experience in oil transactions. 
Having reviewed the historical influences that has shaped the perceived need for buy-back as a 
contractual model in Iran, it is necessary to assess, within Part Two, the other commonly used 
international oil contracts to determine their relative advantages in terms to the buy-back, as well 
as to assess their legality in the context of Iranian law, in conjunction with a detailed analysis of 
the legal basis and function of buy-back within the Iranian system. As the academic discussion 
on the issue of buy-back takes place between those who believe an alternative system may be 
used and those who believe in enhancing the existing system, any analysis of the existing 
framework would be incomplete without determining the viability of utilising a different system 
in a legally restrictive environment of Iran. 
In addition to the emphasis placed on determining alternative systems, the importance of which 
is highlighted above, the next Part will critically assess the attractiveness of buy-back contracts 
from the perspectives of both domestic and foreign parties, while identifying areas that may be 
remedied in order to encourage further investment. Crucially, the analysis is not limited to 
theoretical considerations but also incorporates an overview of relevant contemporary contracts, 
in order to illustrate the effect that the foreign companies' misgivings, as well as US sanctions, 
have on the actual involvement of foreign firms in Iranian oil and gas. 
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Part Two: Autopsy of the Iranian Buy-Back Transactions 
Introduction 
Frequent political and economic crises in Iran resulted in recurring disruptions to oil supplies. 
The greatest disruptions occurred as a result of the Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War. Early on in 
the war oil production was all but brought to a standstill. This illustrates how any war or tension 
in the region can cripple the production and transportation of oil. Many buyers who would have 
traditionally purchased from Iran turned to sources in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait out of fear of 
losing tankers. This shows the vulnerability of the region's oil supply. The desire of regional 
leaders to build military power in the region is counter productive to the need to secure a safe 
supply of oil. 
Iran's oil production and export business stabilised in the 1990s but was unable to reach the 
levels achieved in the I 970s. This is because its oil wells are getting older and shows Iran's need 
for new wells if it is to retain its production capacity. In order to increase its production it must 
seek out new oil fields and wells but in order to do this new capital and technology is required. 
Foreign investors are needed. However, this is not easy due to restrictions on foreign investment 
placed on Iran by the US. Nevertheless many European and Asian businesses have invested in 
Iranian oil and gas development. US sanctions have therefore only been a partial success. 
The rapid growth of internal energy consumption has become a source of major concern for the 
Iranian government as it can potentially lower exports and thus the balance of the budget. The 
government has therefore taken measures to cut down internal demand for oil by raising prices, 
switching oil for gas while simultaneously increasing oil production. Iran is anxious to increase 
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its export of energy to various countries but internal political conflict over pipelines has 
prevented the realisation of this goal. 
While service agreements are regarded to create fewer incentives for investors than PSAs, 
nevertheless Iranian experience with buy-back agreements shows that while IOCs may not like 
them they will sign them. Simple game theory explains why IOCs will sign these contracts that 
they claim to dislike. Firstly, they hope that the structure of the contract may change in favour of 
foreign companies over time. Secondly, there is the fear that if they do not sign another company 
will and the aforementioned change in contract structure comes to pass leaving the second 
company in a better position to make a new agreement. It should be remembered that in the mid-
1960s large IOCs were reluctant to sign the then new PSAs and yet over time this became one of 
the most common types of contract. 
From a host country's point of view short-term contracts appear to be the sensible option where 
the foreign investment it needed primarily for building infrastructure and the NOC is considered 
to be capable of the development and exploration ofreserves.219 
An essential component of a critical analysis of buy-back is the juxtaposition of its basic legal 
nature to that of other contractual systems, in order to assess the extent to which they are similar 
and, consequently, interchangeable within the Iranian legal framework. The next Chapter 
provides such a comparative analysis, as well as outlining the nature, advantages and limitations 
of alternative frameworks, with particular emphasis placed on their viability within the Iranian 
context. 
219 Bindemann, Kirsten, Oxford Energy Comment, The Middle East Invites Bids by Foreign Oil Companies, 
December 1999 [http://www.oxfordenergy.org/comment_prn.php?9912] 
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Chapter 3: Types and Nature of International Oil Agreements 
3.1 Introduction 
Oil contracts are strictly regulated and monitored by the host countries' 220 domestic laws, in all 
aspects, from creating a legal framework for a foreign investment, to exploration, production and 
setting tax prices. Revenue-sharing regulations are clear and specific, and International Oil 
Companies (IOCs) should take into account both statutory obligations, and the standard 
contractual terms of the host country when making any agreement. Those agreements involving 
the transfer of possession or rights over natural deposits, are undertaken with the involvement of 
governments or government-assigned companies.221 The majority of these agreements fall under 
one of the following regimes: 
I. Concessionary Systems 
2. Contractual Systems 
The concession is the original legal framework for petroleum exploration and production, also 
being the most common contractual framework when dealing with states.222 It has the form of an 
exclusive license to explore for hydrocarbons. Although the state has title to the petroleum in 
situ, 223 once the concessionaire has drilled a well into which petroleum flows title to that 
220 The territorial boundary over which a Host Government has jurisdiction and which a Company has Extractive 
Industry economic interests. 
221 Total, "Corporate Social Responsibility Report" 2003, 
[ www.total.com/static/en/medias/topic323ffotal_ 2003 _ CSR _5Ethics _en .pdf] 
222 A 1995 analysis ofthe oil related legislation of 116 states demonstrated that: Production Sharing Agreements 
(PSAs) are used in 52 countries, concessions, in 62; In developing countries PSAs are as popular as concessions; 
Out of24 major oil producing states (with production levels at least 30 million tons a year) PSAs are used in 13 
countries, and licenses in 10, ofwhich in two countries a parallel use ofthe two subsoil use systems is established by 
law: in Venezuela (licenses and risk service contracts); and in Russia (licensing system and PSAs). (See: Barrows. 
G. "Trends in Petroleum E7P Contracts Worldwide" 7 OGLTR {1992], p 171.) 
223 In situ is a Latin phrase meaning "in place". In legal context, in situ is often used for its literal meaning. For 
example, in Hong Kong, in situ land exchange involves the Government exchanges the original or expired lease of a 
piece of land with a new grant or re-grant with the same piece of land or a portion ofthat. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilln_situ#Law) 
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petroleum passes to the concessionaire, and the host governmenr224 take their share by way of 
income taxes and additional royalties.225 The concessionaire accepts all operating risks and 
required investment, and agrees to pay the state. 
Under this system, the oil firm is permitted to find, exploit, move and sell the resources in 
question, usually within a specified territory and within a given time. The sale of the resources 
thus acquired is then taxed and subject to various other expenses paid to the government.226 
The concession agreements include a variety of oil contracts; some were signed before the 1950s 
and granted a wide range of concessions to the foreign companies. Most contracts signed after 
that decade used the 50150 share agreement formula. 
Under this scheme, the company assumes any risks, expenditures and fees, while being 
remunerated through a fixed portion of the output, with the deposits themselves not legally 
changing hands.227 
Non-concessionary contractual systems are divided into two groups; Production Sharing 
Agreements (PSAsi28 and Service Contracts. 
PSAs are greater in complexity than concession schemes, as they set out, in extensive detail, the 
regulations for the relationship between the oil company and the host state. Among the 
commitments taken on by the foreign company in such a context is the funding of exploration 
and exploitation while bearing the risk of an unsuccessful development. As remuneration, a share 
of the output known as "cost oil" is granted for the purpose of refunding the costs incurred, as 
224 Host Government includes local, regional, state and federal representatives of these regimes and institutions and 
entities that are controlled by these regimes and institutions but excludes National State-Owned Companies. 
225 Dr Christian Ule & Dr Alexander Brexendrorff, "Investing in the oil & gas Industry" Mena, 2005, P 20 
226 EITI, Oil and Gas Reporting Guidelines http://www.eitransparency.org/docs/reportingguidelines.pdf 23rd May 
2003, P3 
227 Ibid 
228 Also known as 'Production Sharing Contracts' (PSCs) 
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well as any initial funding. Following this refund, the contractual partitioning of the remainder of 
the output is conducted, with the petroleum being shared at this point referred to as "profit 
oii".Z29 
Some IOCs use Joint Venture Agreements, an upgraded form of Production Sharing Contracts, 
which will be discussed in depth in the following sections. 
The Service Contracts also divide into three groups; Pure Service, Risk Service, and buy-back 
agreements.Z30 
Comparison and analysis of the different possible type of oil contract and their relative strengths 
and weaknesses is integral to understanding why Iran chose to use the buy-back model. 
Figure 1: Break-down of Petroleum Agreements 
Petroleum Agreements 
Concessionary System Contractual System 
Production Sharing Contracts Service Contracts 
I 
Joint Venture Contracts 
Pure Service Contracts Risk Service Contracts 
Buy-back Contracts 
22'l Total, The Main Types of Oil Production Contract, (see: http://www.total.com) 
230 
"Autopsy ofthe Oil Contract (Buy-Back)" collection of articles by Dariush Mobaser et al, 2000, pg. 21 
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3.2 Concessionary System in Oil Contracts 
The early search for and development of petroleum in the third world was carried out within the 
context of a legal framework which came to be known as the concessionary system and which 
favoured, naturally enough, the concession-holding company, endowing it with wide-ranging 
prerogatives. The host countries were left with only certain formal, symbolic manifestations of 
supervision as well as a few meagre crumbs of revenue. 
With the passage of time and with the growing importance of petroleum as a new source of 
energy and industrial raw materials, the grave inequalities of the concession regime began 
gradually to unfold. Some of the host countries, becoming increasingly aware of what was at 
stake, began to complain, to seek renegotiation of the onerous contractual terms. They 
demanded equitable new deals. Latin America had the privilege of spear-heading that effort and 
setting an example for others to follow (Odell, 1968). In the confrontations that challenged the 
legitimacy of the concession regime, the host countries brandished the sword of equity and rebus 
sic standibus (changed circumstances) and pacta sunt servanda (the sanctity of contracts). The 
duel went on unabated for many years but it was never formally and conclusively adjudicated 
before a court of law. The deadlock continued until some governments, prompted by sudden, 
unforeseen events, felt sufficiently confident to act unilaterally. At first the anomaly of the 
concession regime was to be alleviated gradually by ad hoc national legislation which was later 
followed by either forced state participation or outright nationalisation. The rest of the story is 
too well known to need any re-telling here. 
In the first half of the 20th century a system of long-term concession agreements grew up in the 
Middle East primarily due to civil law traditions but also because from a handful of common law 
concepts. These concessions had the nature of a self-contained constitution with their own law 
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separate from local law although enacted by it. Disputes were generally settled via international 
arbitration. 
The Middle Eastern concessions covered large areas and tended to be of long durations, often for 
50 years or more, however, their terms were frequently the subject of negotiation. As 
circumstances changed they were occasionally amended by mutual consent and in practice they 
system was not as rigid as some authors would suggest. But the major concessions did place the 
right to fix both production rates and prices in the hands of the concessionary company giving 
them the superior bargaining position. This situation was accepted by host states until the late 
1960s because it guaranteed a high rate of production and ensured that their product reached the 
marketplace. Consumer states assured that supplies stayed at stable prices. Hosts were not overly 
concerned that these prices were low as they had not fronted any money for exploration and 
development and thus had taken none of the risks while they simultaneously earned large 
revenues.231 
Under the concessionary system,232 any conferral of exploitation rights is preceded by an 
evaluation by the domestic partner, based on the premise originating in the French Revolution 
that natural deposits must be operated in accordance to the state's interests. 
In contrast, the antiquated system transferred rights without limits for the exploitation of natural 
deposits, with all decisions being at the company's discretion, including pricing and exploitation 
speed. Thus, only a small, fixed amount was paid as tax and royalties. However, the deep 
political revolution after 1950 (such as the nationalisation of the oil industries) led to a change in 
this arrangement, with discretion over pricing being largely transferred to the host state while 
previous contracts were reconsidered. 
231 Rees, Judith, The International Oillndustry, London 1987 P 60 
232 Sometimes known as the "Tax and Royalty System" 
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An example of these changes was the establishment of OPEC in 1960, with its Resolution XVI, 
passed in 1968, requesting the alteration of previous contractual terms to include gradual 
increases of state control, of 51% by 1983. As the result of this alteration, by mid-1970's, most 
member-states were able to partially or fully control development operations. 
3.2.1 Typical Concession Agreements Concluded prior to the 1950s 
The two following examples demonstrate the typical terms of Middle Eastern concession 
agreements made before the 1950s. 
Under a concessionary contract signed between the King of Saudi Arabia and Standard Oil of 
California in 1933, the foreign contractor had to pay 50,000233 pounds of gold to the King in 
return for a concession covering 500,000sq/km for a 66 year period.234 The initial agreement 
prescribed a yearly payment of £5,000 until exploration was successful. Apart from the 50,000 
pounds of gold loan to the government, once oil was discovered Aramco was also required to 
transfer a fee of four shillings per one ton of output, and to build a refinery, providing the 
government with a free supply of certain quantities of its products. As part of the deal, Saudi 
Arabian taxes did not apply to the activities of the company. In comparison to other 
contemporaneous contracts, the terms were fairly generous. This was due to Saudi Arabia's 
desire to increase foreign investment, and also reflects its bleak prognosis for future exploitation 
potential. 
233 In 1933 the British Pound was worth about US$4.87; there were twenty shillings to the British pound. 
234 Standard Oil of California passed this concession to an affiliate called California-Arabian Standard Oil Co. 
(Casoc) in 1936 with the company having no success at locating oil, the Texas Oil Company purchased a 50 % stake 
of the concession. 
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This agreement was modified a number oftimes. The first modifications were made in 1939 after 
the discovery of oil in 1938.235 When oil was discovered in 1938, the company's operating 
territory was boosted while the time scale was extended until 1999, in return for increased fees to 
the government, as well as an increased donation of fuel to the authorities. 236 
In 1950, the contract was amended to include a split of the fiscal gains down the middle, in the 
form of taxation on each oil barrel. This change resulted in significant increase in the 
government's revenues from the concession. Further modifications boosted the state's portion of 
the profits, particularly after the 1970's. The process continued until the operations area was 
reduced to just 220,000 square kilometres ?37 
The same type of concession could also be found in the USA up to 1930 with single leases 
covering all property over a very long period of time. However, by 1930 the standard US 
contract varied significantly from the Middle East concessions. Leases would expire if no 
production occurred after a specified number of years. Also incorporated in the new contracts 
was a clause specifying a production royalty of 8%. 
From the 1950s onwards many Middle Eastern contracts were renegotiated. As mentioned, this 
was initiated by Saudi Arabia and its attempt to change its income from the ARAMCO 
Concession. The original contract stated that the government should receive 21 cents per barrel 
at a time when the barrel sold for over US$2. Under the new agreement profits were shared fifty-
235 After a long search for oil that lasted around four years without success, the first accomplishment they had was in 
Dhahran in 1938, a well referred to as Dammam number 7. The discovery of this well gave the company the hope to 
continue and flourish. The company name was changed in 1944 from California-Arabian Standard Oil Company to 
Arabian American Oil Company (or Aramco). In 1948 Standard Oil of California and the Texas Oil Company were 
joined as investors by Standard Oil ofNew Jersey who purchased 30% of the company, and Socony Vacuum who 
purchased 10% of the company, leaving Standard Oil of California and the Texas Oil Company with equal 30% 
shares. 
236 In 1973 the Saudi Arabian government acquired a 25% share of Aramco, increased this to 60% by 1974 and 
finally acquired full control of Aramco by 1980. In November 1988 the company changed its name from Arabian 
American Oil Company to Saudi Arabian Oil Company (or Saudi Aramco). 
237 Federal Research Division of the Library of U.S Congress/ case of Saudi Arabia 
http://www.country-studies.com/saudi-al"abia/oil-industry.html 
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fifty between the parties, and the firm had to pay a royalty. The Iran and Iraq concessiOns 
underwent similar changes. 
The production of Iranian petroleum had commenced in the very beginning of the 201h century, 
with the grant to foreigners of exploration and exploitation rights. The most remarkable role was 
played by the aforementioned D' Arcy, an English businessman credited with finding an oil field 
in Masjed- Soleyman. This finding allowed the creation, in 1909, of the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company, renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1935. 
Rows over contractual terms have arisen practically in the beginning of the relationship between 
the Persian authorities and this firm. In 1920 they reached an interpretative agreement, which 
temporarily solved their problems. During the Great Depression,238 however, revenues fell 
sharply and Iran cancelled the concession. In 1932, Britain appealed to the League of Nations, 
pressuring the parties into making a weighty alteration into the first agreement between the 
parties. This amendment was the commitment to pay a fee, per ton of output, in addition to the 
royalties. The result of these negotiations was that the area covered by the concession was 
reduced by about 80 percent, and minimum payments to the government were established. In 
return, the life ofthe concession was extended by 32 years (until 1993). 
However, this was not enough, and disputes continued regarding the contractual provisions. In 
1951, the Iranian Parliament chose to nationalise the entire economic area encompassing oil 
production. In 1954, the authorities changed the AIOC's name into 'Consortium' so as to show 
its varied ownership between those of different states. 239 The contract granted to this 
238 The Great Depression was an economic slump in North America, Europe, and other industrialised areas of the 
world that began in 1929 and lasted until about 1939. It was the longest and most severe depression ever 
experienced by the industrialised Western world. 
239 40-percent ownership held by British Petroleum, 14 percent by Royal Dutch Shell; 7 percent each by Gulf Oil, 
Socony-Mobil, Esso (later Exxon), Standara Oil of California, and Texaco; 6 percent by Compagnie Fran~taise des 
Petroles; and 5 percent by various interests collectively known as the Iricon Agency. 
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organisation was only to end in 1979, subject to discretionary extensions of 15 years. 
Nonetheless, in 1973 following a suggestion by the Iranian authorities, the organisation produced 
an additional entity for the promotion and retail of the country's petroleum output. As 
compensation, members of the original organisation were entitled to the status of protected 
purchasers in relation to 20 years worth of oil. 
During the Islamic Revolution, in 1978, strikes in the oil fields caused disruption to the 
Agreement. Petroleum exporting was not resumed until the monarchy departed in 1979. After 
this, however, the NIOC cancelled the 1973 amended contract, proposing instead a 9-month, 
special contract for the supply of oil which would be the precursor of them losing their 
. •t d h 240 pnv1 ege status as pure asers. 
After the Islamic revolution, the new constitution put an end to the possibility of concession 
agreements with Iran. Article 81 declares that: 
The granting of concessiOns to foreigners or the formation of companies or 
institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, service, or mineral 
extraction, is absolutely forbidden. 
The case of Iran shows that the concession agreements did not serve the needs of the parties 
adequately, and led them, after a number of re-interpretations and amendments, to conclude their 
contract in an entirely different manner. 
Although the concessionary contracts had, m the past, been more than adequate for the oil 
companies dealing with Iran, both their desire to maintain the original concession and their 
willingness to renegotiate can be explained by the following factors. 
240 IT A, Iran Concession Agreements, data as of December 1987 
[http://www.photius.com/countries/iran/economy/iran_ economy_ concession_ agreement~269 .html] 
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Firstly, knowing that the original terms were unreasonably favourable towards themselves, the 
oil companies were worried that a refusal to negotiate new conditions could result in an increase 
of hostility and distrust towards foreign firms, potentially resulting in the nationalisation of the 
industry and the loss of assets. 
Second, the terms of the concession were so weighted towards the oil companies that even much 
less favourable terms would still result in profitable production. Therefore, the consortium was 
willing to flex to any arrangement, as long is it still allowed to reap the benefits of the vast oil 
resources in Iran. Because of the strong vertical integration of the oil companies, with access to 
the reserves they were still able to make profit despite heavy royalties and more unfavourable 
share agreements. 
In conclusion, the typical concessiOns made m the Middle East, before the 1950s, were 
characterised by the following features. 
• The development rights granted to foreign companies covered vast areas and sometimes 
even an entire country. 
• Contracts were signed for long periods of time. 
• The foreign contractor had complete control over schedule and the manner in which 
mineral reserves were developed. There was no requirement to produce set amounts. 
Hence, in times of low oil prices the firm could reduce production without incurring 
penalties. The host government had very limited rights, other than an entitlement to 
receive a production-based payment. 
3.2.2 Typical concession agreements made after the 1950s 
Most of the modem concession agreements used today developed from, and are exemplified by, 
the agreements that were made in Oman (1967) and Abu Dhabi (1974). They granted the foreign 
contractor exclusive rights to explore, develop, and export petroleum, however at the same time 
provided for shorter contract periods, work obligations, a relinquishment clause, higher royalties 
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and bonus payments. It became more common for the state or national oil company to participate 
actively in the venture. The restructuring ofthe concession system focused on three key factors: 
• The level of control given to the foreign company 
• The share of revenue to each party 
• Rights and obligations of the foreign companies whilst in the country (e.g. work and 
investment).241 
The following table is a brief outline of the most important concession agreements made in the 
Middle East and neighbouring regions, showing the duration of the contracts and the area 
covered. 
Table 4: Concession Contracts Signed in the Middle Ease42 and Neighbouring Regions 
Country Name of Year of Duration Area Covered Year of 
Contract Contract Termination 
Iran D'Arcy 1901 70 Years Whole country less 1970 
5 Provinces 
Iraq IPC 1925 75 Years 450km2 2000 
Saudi ARAMCO 1933 66 Years 793 km.L 1999 
Arabia 
Kuwait KOC 1934 75 Years Whole Country 2009 
Qatar QPC 1953 75 Years Whole Country 2010 
Abu Dhabi ADPC 1939 75 Years Whole Country 2014 
Dubai ADMA 1953 65 Years Whole continental 2018 
shelf 
Sudan Chevron 1974 18 Years Southern Sudan 1992 
Kazakhstan Turan 2001 25+ Y ears.L4 j 22,000 km.L 2026 
Chad Energem 2004 50 Years 8,200 kmL 2054 
The rise of OPEC in the 1960s and the growth of smaller 'independent' oil companies changed 
the situation somewhat. Despite numerous compromises and new arrangements in the late 1960s 
to early 1970s such as the Tehran agreement on prices, OPEC states acted unilaterally to take 
241 Bindemann, Kirsten, Production-Sharing Agreements, an Economic Analysis, Oxford University, October 1999, 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM25.pdf 
242 
"Autopsy of the Oil Contract (Buy-Back)" collection of articles by Dariush Mobaser et al, 2000, pg. 24 
243 The contract is subject to renewal upon expiration on unspecified terms and for an unspecified duration. 
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over pricing and as a result the old concessionary regimes came to an end by around 1974. The 
trend in the Middle East is of state ownership, control and operation.244 
In the mid 1960s the Indonesian government introduced production-sharing agreements, as a 
consequence of antipathy to the presently utilised scheme of concessionary agreements. This is 
discussed in detail in the following section. 
3.3 Contractual Systems 
In order to assess the competitiveness and attractiveness of buy back contractual framework in 
the context of the oil market, it is necessary to comprehend and analyse the alternative systems 
available for such transactions. In this section, the most significant elements of the alternative 
systems are highlighted, the various frameworks' legal bases considered and their attractiveness 
and legality relative to buy back is analysed. The results of this analysis is subsequently 
summarised within the concluding section, along with a conclusion regarding their viability 
within the context of Iranian law and other factors. 
3.3.1 Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) 
Agreements on production sharing are legal instruments regulating the relationship of a 
government with commercial partners, in the petroleum extraction industry. 
Within the production-sharing scheme, the authorities retain the resources' ownership while 
hiring the IOC for the provision of technological and investment utilities for the various phases 
of the production process. The government party is ordinarily acting through the proxy of a 
national petroleum authority. Consequently, the IOC is granted a pre-defined percentage of the 
petroleum output so as to compensate it for the risks endured and any facilities and services 
utilised. The remainder of the output is nonetheless owned fully by the government party. 
244 Rees, Judith, The International Oil Industry, London 1987 P 61 
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Furthermore, the state party is afforded the ability to involve themselves in certain stages of the 
exploitation and exploration operations, ordinarily with a common governing body to supervise 
and direct the process. 
An assessment of the PSA must begin with a review of its background. The first PSAs were 
utilised in Bolivia within the early 1950s.245 Their application was met with gradually increasing 
support amongst the large petroleum firms, following application in Indonesia a decade later. 
In the case of Indonesia, PSAs were introduced in 1966, at a time when nationalist sentiment was 
resulting in antipathy towards outside companies and the authorities no longer wished to provide 
concessions. As a response and due to a need for foreign investment and oil profits, the 
legislature passed laws permitting PSAs as they were seen as ensuring the state's continuing 
possession of the resources. 246 
Some scepticism was seen from the companies involved in this area of commerce, due to their 
inability to either legally possess or manage. A further source of anxiety was that an acceptance 
of such conditions in Indonesia may lead to similar demands for PSAs elsewhere. During this 
period of hesitation by the large companies, several smaller firms exploited the opportunity to 
both conclude a profitable arrangement and to wrestle some commercial power from the major 
companies. In practice, the IOCs usually found that they maintained direct control of the 
oilfields. 
The eventual acceptance of such arrangements led to their propagation throughout the world, 
other than Western Europe, as only Malta utilises PSAs in its operations there.247 Productino-
245 Irina Paliashvili, Legislation on Production Sharing Agreements, 14th September 1998; 
http://www.rulg.com/documents/The _Concept_ of_ Production_ Sharing.htm 
246 Barnes, 1995 
247 Kirsten Bindemann, Production-Sharing Agreements, an Economic Analysis, Oxford University, October 1999, 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM25.pdf 
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sharing is the preferred system within 52 states, including Angola, Libya, Egypt, Malaysia, Peru, 
Syria, the Philippines as well as many other countries. The Community of Independent Nations 
(CIS) has, of late, also begun utilising such arrangements?48 
3.3.2 Description of the key components of a PSA 
Within the PSA context, the duties and responsibilities are divided as follows. The legal 
possessor, in this case, the government, passes down the responsibility for locating and 
exploiting deposits situated within a certain, pre-defined area and during a pre-defined time span, 
subject to an eventual compensation payment. In the temporal framework of this arrangement, all 
risks are borne by the contractor, including any expenditures. 
Standards for exploitation of the deposit are prescribed by the state party, particularly pertaining 
to expenses, nature of the activity and the time span involved. Such an arrangement yields a 
clearly contractual relationship, as between legally equivalent partners, with penalties agreed for 
any breaches of this contract.249 
In the majority of countries in the world, the government has absolute control over any deposits, 
allowing them to grant access to the contractor to the exclusion of all others. It is noteworthy, 
however, that the rights transferred to the contractor are not without boundaries, as some bars on 
their activity do exist. 
a) Only the type of operations agreed on within the contract are permitted 
b) Only the deposits agreed upon may be extracted 
248 CIS, Community of Independent Nations, was established by a treaty signed at Minsk, Belarus, on Dec. 8, 1991, 
by the heads of state of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Between Dec. 8 and Dec. 21, the three original signatories 
were joined by Armenia, Azerbaijan, (its parliament, however, rejected ratifying its membership until 1993), 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. When Georgia joined in 1993 all of 
the former republics of the USSR except the Baltic States had become members of the CIS. Its headquarters are in 
Minsk.( http://www.bartleby.com/65/co/CommonweiS.html) 
249 Dr. Irina Paliashvili, Legislation.on Production Sharing Agreements 
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c) All other contractual provisions also serve as limiting factors 250 
3.3.3 The role of the state in a PSA 
Such contracts are private contractual deals, agreed to by entities of equivalent legal standing 
with all provisions mutually agreed upon. However, it is important to remember the government 
participating in the contract does not forfeit its natural powers as a national representative; 
therefore retaining the obligation to exercise its legal powers for the benefit of the populace. It is 
possible for these functions to clash, particularly as positions are equivalent only within the 
agreement's scope while any law may be passed by the state that would affect the agreement. 
This is important, as whereas the host country has automatic entitlement to any production of 
petroleum by the investor, the investor may only gain such entitlement through the PSA.251 
Under a PSA, the investor gams the ability to carry out operations within an area, but no 
proprietary interest IS passed; meaning that the output always belongs to the government. 
Consequently, as the function of the investor is to act as a contracted/employed legal body on 
behalf of the government, its payment is composed of the output, emphasising the essence of 
such contracts, namely the distribution ofthe output.252 
It should be noted that all activities envisioned within the PSA are carried out by the investor at 
their own expense and risk, with the state bearing very little of either. In a scenario where the 
foreign party injects money into operations related to discovering oil but no such deposits are 
found, or if the project is not viable commercially, then no refunds are possible for these 
25
° Farshadgohar, op.cit., p .. 239 
251 Paliashvili, Irina Legislation on Production Sharing Agreements 
252 Outlines of the Presentation of Dr. Irina Paliashvili, the President of the Russian-Ukrainian Legal Group, at the 
Seminar on the Legislation on Production Sharing Agreements, September 14,1998 
httpd/www.rulg.com/documents/The _Concept_ of_ Production_ Sharing.htm 
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expenses. It is nonetheless possible to include a clause within the governing contract that would 
permit the compensation of these expenses. 
A system known as the "point of measurement" is utilised with the purpose of calculating the 
amount of output and to divide it into appropriate shares. This system envisions that a point is 
chosen within the contract, such as the mine shaft exit, after which a portion of the output no 
longer belongs to the government but is rather used in order to compensate the investor for their 
expenditure (cost-recovery product). The remaining output is then split according to the 
proportions agreed by the PSA (profit product). 
The PSA thus allows the state to receive a significant share of the output, without investing its 
own funds or taking any commercial risk. 
The degree of taxation is largely determined by the terms of the contract. If the government 
receives high royalty payments and a large share of profit oil, common sense would suggest that 
little room is left for income taxation as this would provide a disincentive to the IOC. As the 
government's take increases, IOCs' financial stake in the enterprise is decreasing proportionally. 
As a general rule, if the only financial provision for the government is the payment of royalties, 
high income taxes will be imposed.253 
Tax under the PSA is handled in a specific manner. A special regime applying to the investor 
throughout the duration of the PSA is agreed within the contract, so that general national taxes 
are substituted with a portion of the output.254 This does not reflect any special tax privileges or 
253 Bindemann, K. Production-Sharing Agreements, an Economic Analysis, Oxford University, October 1999, 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM25.pdf 
2541t is an important distinction that tax is levied on the share of 'profit oil', rather than on actual profits. 
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exemptions255 granted to the investor, but is simply a replacement of monetary payments with an 
alternative payment. 
Two schemes for substituting tax with alternative output are currently used. The first, used in 
Libya, is a complete substitution of all taxes by alternative output and involves a sharing of the 
output according to a 81/19 share. In light of the above, it is therefore clear that production 
sharing schemes safeguard the investor's wealth in relation to tax law changes, whilst doing the 
same for the state's interests.256 
In conclusion, PSAs are attractive both for the state and the investor. The following reasons 
outline the benefits to states using the PSA: 
• The PSA attracts substantial foreign investment into the exploration, extraction and 
production of oil, increasing the economic stability of the country, and ultimately its 
national security. In many oil producing countries, the government would not otherwise 
be able to afford the development of its oil industry. 
• PSAs are generally long-term agreements, allowing states to forecast future expansion 
within the output rate of national deposits, enabling them to accurately plan their future 
budget. 
• Whereas conventional tax is complicated to calculate and difficult to collect, the PSA 
allows the state to receive a prescribed share of the output, thus simplifying the process. 
PSAs are also desirable for investors, as it protects them from fluctuations in the tax regime of a 
country. Considering that some agreements last many decades, this can make a big difference. 
The relationship between the foreign partner and the government are nearly exclusively 
255 In 2004, for example, the Russian authorities made public several such tax regulations elucidating the availability 
of certain tax exemptions under the Production Sharing Agreements scheme, with an emphasis on thorough 
documentary evidence for such exemptions. Brothers, C. 'Tax Exemptions Under PSA Regime'. Internationa 
/Financial Law Review. March 2004, accessed 23nl July 2007. 
[http:/ /www.iflr .com/? Page= I O&PUBID=33&ISS= 12029&SID=512264&TYPE=20] 
L
56 Paliashvili, Irina op.cit. 
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contractually based (including the tax regime, as shown above). The stability of the legal 
relationships under the contract are thus of utmost importance to the investor. 
3.3.4 Work obligations in Production Sharing Agreements 
In continental Europe and in North America, in the early days of the oil industry, a landlord had 
the right to lease his land, including his ownership rights over the minerals contained in the land. 
The lessee would then automatically gain rights in petroleum Exploration and Production. The 
Persian Gulf later adopted this practice. 
In exchange for the transfer of the above rights, a consideration was given to the landlord, 
ordinarily in the form of a significant cash payment, known as a Lease bonus. The landowner's 
Royalty further included a share of the future production, if the exploitation of the land proved to 
be successful. Usually, an annual rental fee was also granted to the landowner in exchange for 
using his land. This system, known as Cash Bidding, can be seen as an economically rigorous 
one. 
This arrangement, also known as the Auction system, was largely discontinued following the 
Second World War, being replaced by the new Discretionary System of Licensing. In this 
system, the lessor of the petroleum, at this stage usually the government would give the rights to 
Exploration and Production to International Oil Companies (IOCs). This would occur subsequent 
to an evaluation of the competing bids, to be conducted by Ministry officials. The IOCs were 
obligated to pay a modest sum, in the form of a "signature bonus", and to legally dedicate 
themselves to conducting geophysical work and drilling one or several exploratory wells within 
the contractual area. Oftentimes, a further Annual Land Use fee was requested by the 
government. The term "Exploratory Well" was defined with extensive and precise technical 
qualifications. 
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Transaction costs of an oil contract are increased significantly due to the fact that details of the 
Work Obligation, namely the timing and definition of the Exploratory Well, are some of the 
most complex issues to be agreed in the course of the negotiations. The Work Obligation is 
commonly quantified in terms of a Dollar Expenditure Obligation, so that in the case of the IOC 
failing to fulfil its exploration commitments, the government can request compensation for the 
work not done, in cash. In such cases, the Work Obligation is valued by the amount of the 
Expenditure Obligation and consequently, can be considered to be the Consideration to be paid 
in exchange for the transfer of exclusive Exploration and Production Rights, for the duration 
agreed, in the appropriate area. English Law prescribes that a binding contract requires a transfer 
of Consideration and an exchange of offer/acceptance. 
In a situation where the foreign oil company does not fulfil its contractual work, the 
Consideration is considered to not have been completely paid, resulting in the IOC, in its 
capacity as a Lessee, to be in default. The government can prevent itself taking financial losses in 
such cases by requesting either an Irrevocable Letter of Credit or a Bank Guarantee, which are 
easy to enforce. The amount of money the government will procure will depend on the 
proportion of the IOC's work which has already been conducted, as that amount will be 
subtracted from the sum acquired by the government. Such arrangements are standard and 
normal in international practice. 
3.3.5 Production Sharing Agreements in Iran 
Numerous monumental determinations pertaining to the development of the petroleum sector 
and cooperation with outside companies are taken by the Majlis Energy Commission (MEC). Dr. 
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Hossein Afarideh,257 the MEC Chairman, discussed the official view on key issues about oil 
d . d . I 2ss pro uct10n an agreements m ran. 
On the issue of the difference between PSAs and buy-back contracts, Dr. Afarideh said the 
following: 
"[I]n a buy-back scheme the company carries out the project and is reimbursed from the sale of 
its production, but finance is in fact a sort of loan. You get the loan for development of your field 
and guarantee that you will pay it."259 
He continues, saying that "[a]lso, in buy-backs, if the company fails to produce the agreed 
amount, it will be penalised and the reimbursement will evidently be less than earlier 
agreements. That is why these contracts are more risky in comparison with finance deals. But I 
have to say that the buy-back deals we have signed so far have had no risks, because we were all 
certain about the huge deposits of oil in those areas."260 
He moved on, commenting on the PSAs that "we all know that there are legal restrictions [in the 
Iranian Constitution], but still, we are ready to offer PSAs for companies that risk investing in 
the Sea of Oman or Iran's 13 per cent to 20 per cent share of the Caspian Sea."261 
On the issue of balancing the needs of Iran with the desires of foreign companies, Dr Afarideh 
had the following to say: 
257 Dr. Afarideh holds a PhD in nuclear energy and has served in different academic positions, including research 
directorate oflran's Atomic Energy Organisation. 
258 3/5/03 Interview: Iran ready to give Production Sharing Agreements. Source: Menas Associates' Iran Energy 
Focus, February 2003: http://www.payvand.com/news/03/mar/l 026.html 
259 Afarideh, op cit 
260 ibid 
261 ibid 
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"I believe that each of the two parties has its own restrictions here. Foreign companies want to 
have long-term investment, while buy-backs are short-term agreements by nature. We are 
therefore changing them to medium-term contracts. Also, these companies want to have an 
optimal production when they discover a field and take as much oil as possible out of it. We 
don't disagree, but we want this to be done through buy-backs."262 
In response to some complaints made by foreign companies that some Iranian development 
projects, such as the South Pars field, lack attractiveness in the commercial context, Dr. Afarideh 
said that: 
"This is not true. This is their interpretation. We believe it is attractive, but they may want more. 
You know that more attractiveness means more concessions and it is natural that offers are not as 
attractive as they used to be in the early days."263 
On the subject on the issue of whether Iran has the aim of adopting a different system of finance, 
he stated: 
"Why should it? Buy-backs bring us no commitments, so why should we create debts for 
ourselves?"264 
When asked about the problematic constitutional restrictions on PSAs in the aforementioned 
areas, Dr. Afarideh stated that: 
"We will find a solution for that. You see, we will not overlook our national interests and will 
deal with problems when necessary. But for the time being we are not in an emergency, in the 
way that Iraq is. There are lots of companies working with us in the framework of buy-backs, so 
262 ibid 
263 ibid 
264 ibid 
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why should we go for PSAs, which have legal constraints and cause us problems? There are lots 
of companies that are ready to work with us even in the current situation." 
As Dr Afarideh discussed, Production Sharing Agreements are restricted under the Iranian 
Constitution.265 However, the Iranian Government is prepared to make these agreements with 
regard to certain areas, as long as the PSA is governed by terms that are compatible with the 
legal restrictions set out by the Constitution. 
However, as I will discuss in chapter 5, the legal restrictions in Iran are such that if a PSA was 
twisted so as to comply, it would more closely resemble a buy-back agreement, and would have 
very little similarity with traditional PSAs as discussed in the chapter. 
In an interview with IEF, Seyyed Mehdi Hosseini, NIOC deputy managing director made several 
remarks about the various advantages and disadvantages of PSAs.266 He said that "the risk the 
companies accept in PSAs is that of exploration, whereas most of our projects are for 
development and the exploration costs are not very high compared to development expenses and 
the revenues gained. This is particularly true in countries with a very high potential for oil 
discoveries, such as Iran. Therefore, the rewards can be huge and disproportionate to the 
risks."267 
He commented that "from the viewpoint of an oil-producing country, contracts such as PSAs or 
concessions may be best when the potential for discovering oil is low."268 
265 These restrictions are defined in articles 44,45 and 81 of the Constitution 
266 The entire interview by IEF, Exclusive Interview: Mehdi Hosseini, National Iranian Oil Company Deputy 
Managing Director, Speaks Up (Part One), can be found at: http://www.payvand.com/news/05/may/1146.html, 
05/19/2005 
267 ibid 
268 ibid 
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Given the low risks of exploration in Iran Mr. Hosseini indicates that one of the maJor 
advantages of the PSA simply does not exist in Iran. The benefits for the foreign investor for a 
PSA by far outweigh the benefits gained by an oil rich host country such as Iran where extraction 
is relatively easy. 
3.4 Revenue Sharing Contracts 
Revenue Sharing Contracts are very similar to PSAs; however the method of payment (to the 
investor) is different. Although, as in a PSA, the investor provides the capital and technical 
expertise required for exploration and development, in Revenue Sharing Contracts they are then 
paid via a defined share of the revenue rather than a share of the production. If exploration 
efforts are successful, the investor can recover those costs from the sale revenues. 
Therefore, whereas in a PSA the IOC gets a share in the finished product, with a Revenue 
Sharing Agreement they essentially gain a stake in the oil after it has been discovered, but before 
d . . fi . h d 269 pro uct10n ts mts e . · 
Under the current law in Iran, this type of agreement is not possible; and there is no evidence of 
any Revenue Sharing Contracts being concluded with regard to Iranian oil fields. The Iranian 
Constitution requires all natural resources to be owned wholly by the state, and no foreign 
companies are allowed to own any equity stakes: 
Article 45 
Public wealth and property, such as uncultivated or abandoned land, mineral deposits, seas, 
lakes, rivers and other public waterways, mountains, valleys, forests, marshlands, natural 
forests, unenclosed pastures, legacies without heirs, property of undetermined ownership, and 
269 Global unisource Inc, Glossary of Terms, 
http://www.globalunisource.com/glossary _of_ terms_ used.htm 
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public property recovered from usurpers, shall be at the disposal of the Islamic government 
for it to utilize in accordance with the public interest. Law will specify detailed procedures 
for the utilization of each of the foregoing items. 
3.5 Joint Venture Agreements 
In some situations, the state decides to participate as a commercial partner with the IOC, or as 
part of a consortium. These are known as Joint Venture Agreements, in which the state 
contributes a percentage share of the capital investment, receiving an equal portion of the "cost 
oil" and the "profit oil". The IOC's portion is subsequently separated as per the contractually 
prescribed provisions. 
This agreement thus passes some of the risk and potential returns on to the government. Iran has 
a conservative outlook to Joint Ventures, and although they do not disregard them, they generally 
prefer to use buy-back agreements. In an interview with 'Iran Today' (a monthly magazine 
focusing on economics), Seyyed Mohsen Yahyavi, the government's representative in the Majlis 
and a part of the Oil Commission, compared the two types of agreement: 
On the whole, the foreign investor prefers to own part of the joint venture. In such 
ventures, for as long as the oil and gas well is productive, the investor will be a 
partner in the oil well; whereas in the buy -back system, the foreign investor owns no 
part of the well and once invested capital and interest is received, the investor leaves 
the premises.270 
270 Yahyavi,Seyed Mohsen Elaborates Upon, Iran Today; Economic Magazine (Monthly), 'Iran's Oil Performance, 
January 1998 [http://www.irvl.net/NET-Iran-OIL.htm] 
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However, the NIOC has in the past entered into such agreements, for example in 2001 when it 
signed two joint venture petrochemical deals, one with the Italian oil company ENI, and the 
other with South Korean LG Engineering and Construction. 
Also in 2002, a joint enterprise with Abu Dhabi-based National Petroleum Construction Co 
(NPCC) and Iran's Naft Sazeh Qeshm (NSQ) was agreed in cooperation with Shell, in order to 
build the infrastructure required for the exploitation of the Soroosh oil deposit. According to 
John van den Bergh, General Services Manager at Shell EBV: 
It is the largest contract for surface facilities to be signed to date in the development 
of the Soroosh/Nowrooz oil fields ... 
In relation as to why that particular contractor was chosen for the project, he elaborated: 
... The NPCC-NSQ joint venture was chosen because its bid for the contract was 
the best in terms of cost, schedule and level of Iranian content. NPCC-NSQ has 
demonstrated a real commitment towards the development of Iranian industry by 
researching the capabilities of Iranian suppliers who will be used to help fulfil this 
contract .... 271 
In an interview, Dr Hushang Raissi, a chief executive of Tehran Berkeley, a prominent firm 
dealing with building services and engineering work, said: 
This is a long-term agreement. Our main aim is to capitalise on NPCC's expertise in 
offshore fabrications and to create an association between our two organisations to 
develop the Naft Sazeh Yard in the fabrication and installation of offshore facilities 
in the Gulf. It will also generate job opportunities and training for lranians.272 
271 
'Shell in the Middle East', News, [http://www.shell-me.com/english/jan2002/news-mel.htm] 
272 Gas and Oil Directory, 18/01/2002 [http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/company/cnm20636.htm] 
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The above examples show that although Iran does not favour using Joint Ventures, they are 
willing to enter into them where the circumstances make it prudent to do so. 
3.6 Service Contracts 
Service Contracts cover agreements for specific work carried out by a contractor for either a flat 
fee or for a profit share in the final production. These agreements are called, respectively, the 
Pure Service Contract and the Risk Service Contract. 
3.6.1 Pure Service Contracts 
In Pure Service Contracts, specific exploration or development work is carried out by a 
contractor in return for a flat fee; the state takes all of the risk. In the Middle East, countries can 
often have the required funds, but need outside expertise and technology to develop their natural 
resources. The agreements usually cover a specific technical service to be carried out over a 
specific period of time. In most cases, the service company will only have to provide or pay for 
the equipment, tools, and personnel required to fulfil the contract. Reimbursement is usually 
fixed by the terms of the contract, and is generally not affected by either project performance or 
market factors. 
The service provider is usually paid on daily or hourly rates, a fixed turnkey rate, or some other 
specific fee agreed in the contract. Payments are normally paid either on completion of the 
service, or at specific intervals. In some cases payment is tied to specific performance measures, 
for example operating cost reductions. In these situations, any risk taken on by the service 
company is usually limited to non-recoverable cost overruns or contract disputes (such as losses 
due to breach or default). As payments under Pure Service Contracts are not directly linked to 
production volume or market price, they do not usually contain reserve payments or agreements. 
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3.6.2 Risk Service Contracts 
In the Risk Service Contract, the service provider also invests capital in the project. In all other 
respects this agreement is the same as the Pure Service Agreement, however instead of a flat fee, 
payment is based on the level of initial investment. These agreements almost always contain a 
reserve agreement that must be met before any payments are made. 
Risk Service Contracts are typically used for operations which require not only expertise and 
technology but also substantial investment to improve.273 
3. 7 Buy-Back Contracts 
As mentioned in a previous chapter, and as will be further elaborated upon in subsequent 
chapters, Iran's favoured type of oil contract is the buy-back. This is a short term contract, where 
the oil company receives a share of the profit from the government after production starts. Once 
the contract is over, the company/contractor must transfer all land and facilities to the National 
Oil Company.274 
On entering a buy-back agreement, the IOC must provide all investment capital necessary to 
finance exploration or development of the field. Capital expenditure, interest charges, and the 
pre-agreed share of production are then repaid through the sale of the produced oil or gas. NI OC 
has a merely supervisory role. The respective shares for the two parties are calculated by 
translating gross production into gross revenue and deducting operating costs. Net revenue is 
then split according to an agreed formula. There are two stages to this process. In the first stage 
the IOC explores a field, after which the operation is either declared commercial or non-
commercial. In the latter case the IOC bears all the risk and costs, and the contract is terminated. 
273 Farshadgohar, op.cit., p. 239 
274 Mobaser, D., 'Kalbodshekafi Sarmayegozarihaye Sanate Naft, Beyeh Moteghabel, (Autopsy of the Oil Contract 
"Buy-Back"), collection of articles by et at, 2000, pg. 21 
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NIOC will declare a commercial discovery if the projected output results in a minimum rate of 
return after deduction of all capital costs, bank charges, operating costs and fees to the IOC. 
However, the IOC that conducted the exploration work will not necessarily obtain approval for 
the development of the field. It has merely the right of first negotiation with NIOC for the 
development contract. If the negotiations are successful a development contract is awarded, 
however if they are not then the contract will be tendered. In the second case, the IOC will 
receive its expenditure plus an agreed fee. Payment is made either directly by NIOC or by the 
IOC which succeeds in stage two. They in tum are entitled to recoup these costs within the scope 
of their contract. 275 
Unlike a PSA, at the first stage a buy-back agreement only offers the IOC an exploration 
contract, which even with a commercial discovery will not necessarily be converted into a 
development contract. The agreements have a relatively short duration of between five and seven 
years. The agreements contain ceilings on capital expenditure, which can only be raised for 
additional work approved by NIOC. The extra expenditure is then added to the initial capital 
costs and repaid under the amortisation period of the contract. The IOC receives its project 
expenditure plus a fee. The latter is a percentage of total capital costs excluding bank charges 
and operating costs. 
Another important feature of the buy-back agreement is the treatment of price risk. If the revenue 
drops to a level not sufficient to cover the IOC's monthly entitlement, NIOC may reduce its 
share. If this is still not enough to meet the IOC's requirement, the amortisation period will be 
extended. 
275 Bindemann, Kirsten Production-Sharing Agreements, an Economic Analysis, Oxford University, October 1999, 
[http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM25.pdf] 
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The key distinguishing feature, however, is that at no point does the contractor acquire title over 
the petroleum (unless they purchase it directly from the state). 
Despite some similarities between a PSA and a buy-back contract, there are major differences, 
which render a buy-back-structure less attractive for potential investors, as will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter. 
The major criticisms of the buy-back agreement are a lack of flexibility and security concerning 
tax and investment issues (because of potential legislative changes within Iran), and the fact that 
all of the risk associated with exploration and development is taken by the contractor. 
3.7.1 The Structure and Functioning oflnternational Buy-Back Contracts 
International countertrade can be concluded in a number of different forms. One of these 
structures is the buy-back contract, in which machine, equipment, knowledge or technical 
services are the subjects of the primary transaction and will then be utilised by the buyer in order 
to construct production facilities. As recompense for the services rendered above, the purchaser 
pledges to sell the supplier the end products. 
Despite the fact that in its basic form, buy-back only involves two parties, it is possible for three-
party and larger transactions to occur. One such instance, when goods in a buy-back come from a 
party that is not the primary-transaction buyer, is a case when the primary-transaction services 
are bought or hired by a third party, subsequently selling or leasing it to the producer company. 
Buy-back obligations may be transferable, for instance when the original purchaser could either 
choose to sell the products himself or to transfer this responsibility onto a third party, thus 
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making them responsible for singing contracts that implement the agreement with the buy-back 
seller.276 
As can be seen from the above example, international buy-back transactions may be very 
complex by nature, and the degree of their complexity determines whether they take the form of 
a single contract or several interconnected agreements. Such complexity may lead, on occasion, 
to contracts breaking international and national competition rules, due to the geographic 
limitations included in the contract, which renders such a contract unenforceable. Each contract 
must be analysed to determine if it is enforceable, although most buy-backs are less complex, as 
described below. 
When the precise descriptions of the products can be referred to, and no third parties are 
involved, the form that the contract takes is usually that of a single contract, unless financing 
reasons prohibit the use of a single contract, in which case agreements collateral to the principal 
contract may be used. 
Despite the flexibility in regard to the structure of the international buy-back, an element that is 
most often clearly defined within is the final date, which is the date by which all implementing 
contracts must be discharged. 
Similarities exist in terms of the rights and obligations undertaken by the parties in a buy-back 
transaction and those involved in international sales contracts for technology and equipment. The 
crucial discrepancy, however, is the special relationship between the contracts in a buy-back, 
since in the latter, the party who sets up the operation is also contractually obligated to buy the 
end products of this operation. 
276 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Model Buy-back Countertrade transactions, 
(http://www .jurisint. org/ doc/html/ con/en/2000/2000j icon en 13 .html) 
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If any disagreements occur due to the obvious complexity of the obligations undertaken by the 
parties, they will be resolved as per the pre-agreed law which will govern the agreements. 
Before the governing law is resorted to, however, it is advisable to attempt to reconcile the 
clashing interpretations of the contract through negotiation. If a compromise cannot be reached 
amicably, however, international conciliation and arbitration procedures may be resorted to. The 
choice of arbitration rule and the arbiter, including the use of customised ad hoc arbitration, must 
be stated in the contract, along with the relevant procedure to be used. 
3.8 Conclusion 
The purpose of the wider examination of petroleum contract schemes conducted above is to 
provide a broader context to the buy-back contract by cataloguing and investigating the 
alternatives to the current model, used globally, such as Production Sharing Agreements and 
Concessionary Models, as well as Revenue Sharing and Joint Venture Agreements. Their 
function and legal bases have been examined to determine their compatibility and legality in the 
light of the Iranian contractual system and the restrictive laws. An analysis of their relative 
attractiveness has also shown that buy back schemes are amongst some ofthe least profitable for 
foreign companies, therefore, to some extent, justifying the IOC disgruntlement with the system. 
On the other hand, alternative frameworks have been shown to contain exploitative elements that 
have, in the past, been used to unfairly take advantage of Iranian natural reserves; thus, in turn, 
providing a rational context for the domestic authorities' unwillingness to adopt such 
frameworks. 
Oil contracts are strictly regulated and monitored by the host countries' domestic laws, at all 
levels, from creating a legal framework for a foreign investment, to exploration, production and 
setting tax levels. Furthermore, a number of features that are integral elements of the various 
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alternative schemes have been shown to clash with the Iranian Constitution and statutes, 
particularly where foreign ownership of resources and land is concerned, further contributing to 
the assessment that, when limited by legal constraints, few alternatives exist to buy-back. 
In order to determine the relative attractiveness of the various schemes as well as their viability 
within the political, economic and legal context of Iran, the major frameworks have been 
reviewed and analysed. 
In the oldest scheme and the most common contractual scheme when dealing with states, the 
concessionary framework, the company assumes any risks, expenditures and fees, while being 
remunerated through a fixed portion of the output, with the deposits themselves not legally 
changing hands. Despite the common use of such setups, it is nonetheless impractical to 
implement them in Iran as they do not only infringe on the Constitutional limitations imposed 
specifically to combat them, but also rouse historical resentment over such frameworks' 
exploitation. 
Production Sharing Agreements are greater in complexity than concession schemes, as they set 
out, in extensive detail, the regulations for the relationship between the oil company and the host 
state. Among the commitments taken on by the foreign company in such a context is the funding 
of exploration and exploitation while bearing the risk of an unsuccessful development, in return 
for compensation of costs and the sharing of the eventual output. Within the production-sharing 
scheme, the authorities retain the resources' ownership while hiring the IOC for the provision of 
technological and investment utilities for the various phases of the production process. It should 
be noted that all activities envisioned within the PSA are carried out by the investor at their own 
expense and risk, with the state bearing very little of either. In a scenario where the foreign party 
injects money into operations related to discovering oil but no such deposits are found, or if the 
project is not viable commercially, then no refunds are possible for these expenses. The high risk 
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incurred by the company where deposits are far from certain therefore makes this scheme of 
great attractiveness to a state party, as it exploits the IOC as a means of free exploration. 
However, within the Iranian context where deposits are ample and fairly certain, the PSA is not 
as attractive to the government, therefore leading to unwillingness to utilise it as an alternative to 
buy back. In addition to the practical considerations above, PSA's are contrary to the 
Constitution and statutes due to certain integral elements of the framework, and if a PSA was 
twisted so as to comply, it would more closely resemble a buy-back agreement, and would have 
very little similarity with traditional PSAs as discussed in the chapter. Furthermore, the 
inevitable proximity to buy back of the legally compatible version of PSA would not aid in the 
attracting of further investors due to its similarity to the existing scheme, but rather only decrease 
the legal certainty of transactions. 
Following an analysis of alternative contractual frameworks and their relative advantages, as 
well as the impossibility of the use of several other schemes, and in order to be able to accurately 
analyse this system's flaws and suggest improvements, it is necessary to provide a 
comprehensive explanation regarding the legal basis, contractual provisions and comparative 
evaluation in the context of other international oil schemes. 
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Chapter 4: Nature and Legal basis of the Iranian Buy-Back Agreements 
4.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, during the first half of the 20th century traditional 
concessions were the only form of Exploration and Production contracts used in oil agreements. 
A different scheme was introduced, in Venezuela in 1948, when the old concession format was 
upgraded. Whereas the original concessions only used royalty fees, the upgraded form made use 
of a more complex fee system. Such concessions continued to develop and be updated quite 
actively, especially with regard to the fees paid by the concessionaires. In the early 1960s, the 
first Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) scheme was agreed in Indonesia, a variation on the 
upgraded concessions that had been developing previously.277 
In addition to traditional and upgraded concessions, buy-back agreements were established. This 
third model was introduced in the 1970s and was retained until the mid-1990s. By this time, only 
a few Latin American countries continued to use buy-back agreements. Before the end of the 
1990s such countries had almost entirely replaced buy-back agreements with Concession-
Contracts or PSAs. Iran in 1989 and Venezuela in 1993, however, reintroduced buy-back 
agreements to the world's oil and gas industries. However, following the general nature of the 
original buy-back, which originated in the 1970s, these agreements had evolved and were 
presented in a slightly amended form278 (a more detailed comparative analysis of the original and 
the amended forms are located in Chapter 8 of this work). 
277 Konoplyanik, A: "Concessions: from D' Arcy to Kozak", in Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 
(OGEL)Newsletter, Volume I, Issue 01,2003 ( http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/articles/roundup_06.htm) 3rd July 
2006 
278 David. M. R. Hodgshon. S: "Production Sharing Agreements, the Commercial Implication of their Development" 
in: O.G.L.T.R. 1999 p. 302 
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Since the late 1980's, the buy-back financing model became the hallmark of petroleum 
transactions in Iran. The Iranian government sees it as an effective method of ensuring 
investment from abroad, as well as know-how, while minimising the costs of foreign exchange 
and expanding their export balance. Since their conception, a number of buy-back contracts have 
been agreed in relation to the oil and gas industry, and the Iranian government is intending to 
continue using this type of agreement in their future transactions. 
The basic nature of the model being examined is that of a barter transaction,279 where the 
necessary components such as machinery, structures, services and technology are supplied by the 
outside investor in return for the final products, resulting either directly or indirectly from those 
facilities. In Iran, however, the meaning of such transactions has evolved, as have their terms, 
therefore making it unique among buy-back agreements worldwide. 
Their basic nature is defined in Iranian Law by Article 2 of the Executive Rules, ratified by the 
Council of Ministers. Such transactions are described within the Article as: 
... one in which the supplier wholly or partially puts the needed goods and services 
for the establishment, expansion, reconstruction, improvement or continued 
production of manufacturing enterprises of the country at the disposal of the 
producer. The price of the said goods and services, after deducting the amount of 
down payments plus the related costs disbursed on the basis of the concluded 
contract, is paid to the supplier or buyer through the delivery of goods or services of 
279 A trade between two countries by which goods and services are exchanged for other goods rather than for hard 
currency. 
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the producer and/or through delivery of other industrial and mineral goods and 
services produced in Iran.Z80 
Under a buy-back transaction m the oil industry, the contractor funds all investments, 
engineering, purchase and installation of major equipment and acquires compensation from the 
NIOC, as a share of the product, and subsequently returning oil operations to the domestic oil 
company after the contract expirest. Buy-back agreements, therefore, can be described as "risk-
service" based, with the foreign contractor providing the funding while also taking on the risks. 
The compensation received by the investor, contractually pre agreed at a rate of, usually 15- 17 
%, and is paid in the form of a percentage of the product equivalent to the owed amount. The 
customary buy-back contracts281 used in Iran are not the norm in other major producers, where 
the monetary income is divided instead. 
Because of Article 81 of the Iranian Constitution, which prevents the government from granting 
concessions to foreign companies with the purpose of owning Iranian oil reserves, buy-back 
transactions take the form of service contracts. The buy-backs entered into by the NIOC thus far 
largely involve operation of offshore reserves, shared between Iran other Persian Gulf states. 282 
4.2 Definition of the Terms and Conditions 
The contents of a standard buy-back contract should include the defmition of all the rights and 
obligations conferred by the contract, particularly: 
• Those related to the exchange of services and goods 
• Concerning economic relationships 
• Method of dispute settlement 
• Requirements for performance 
280 Petroleum Iran, Iranian oil information portal (http://www.petroleumiran.com/buy-back.html) 1st September 
2006 
281 As described in last section ofthis chapter 
282 Petroleum Iran, op.cit. 
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• Means of improving technical capabilities over the contract's duration, and related 
maintenance needs 
• Amount of exportable end product 
• A schedule of activities for cases of price, operational expenses and fluctuations of 
foreign exchange, over an extended time period 
• Delivery ofthe imported/exported goods 
• Providing teaching in technical matters to the specialist employees needed, and 
broadening the qualifications of the currently employed 
• Stating a concrete end date of the contract283 
In order to enhance the understanding of the buy-back contract, and the roles which each 
contractual party performs in it, the terms and terminology used should be elucidated. They are 
as follows: 
• The Supplier is any natural or legal subject, who transfers to the NIOC, the technology, 
expertise and funds in a buy-back oil contract. 
The Supplier can either be an international or a domestic oil company; the latter must 
have been registered in Iran. 
• The Buyer refers to the NlOC, acting under the authority of the Ministry of0il284 which, 
by receiving the abovementioned technology and services, undertakes the obligation of 
compensating the Supplier, in the form of a share of the end product. 
• Capital Costs: the capital needed to fund all the direct expenses incurred during the 
development phase, payable by the investor. This term encompasses the following 
expense: engineering, purchase and installation of major equipment, service-provider 
fees, instrumentation, and secondary facilities, as well as buildings and structures. The 
283 Shoja E. Hosseini, Iran Mania Business & Economy, lOth August 2001 
(http://www.iranmania.com/news/economy/featureslbuy-backoil/default.asp) 24"' July 2006 
284 Also known as the Ministry of Petroleum 
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Buyer in a buy-back contract would not be responsible for footing any of the above 
expenses.285 
• Non Capital Costs: Includes indirect costs accrued while operating the development, 
which are not covered by the capital costs category, for instance training and providing 
education to the employees, paying taxes and custom duties.286 
• Cost Recovery: According to a standard buy-back contract, the foreign party is charged 
with developmental operations, as well as costs for exploration. In exchange, will be 
reimbursed for the expenditures (both funding and undertaken in course of operations) 
out of the output. The party in charge of operations is ordinarily compensated in the form 
of petroleum output and bears the risk ofboth exploration failure and market fluctuations. 
• Operating Costs: the equipment required for the conduction of oil operations, including 
pipes, drilling machinery, storage equipment, drilling platforms and any other standard 
expenses related to the process of producing oil. This also includes the cost of 
maintaining the labour force, conducting repairs and supporting the related 
infrastructure. 287 
• Petroleum Costs refers to costs paid out by the foreign party, defined within the 
contractual document, pertaining to field operations. 
• Development Operations means operations conducted with the purpose of developing 
the particular oil field and evaluating the oil deposit's size, which is the subject of the 
buy-back contract. This could include the following: 
285 Mobaser et al, op.cit., pg. 54 
2
R
6 Rabiee, Faranak, 'Hoghoogh-e-Gharardadha', (Contract Law), Tehran 1381, pg 76 
287 Ibid. 
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I. The development of wells, drilled for the purpose of such development; including any 
operations intended to enhance the quantity of petroleum being acquired, the means of 
storage or the method of transporting the final product. 
II. The construction and establishment of offshore and onshore drilling platforms and their 
operation, which encompasses: machinery, implements, utensils and other articles 
required for purposes of producing and processing oil, as well as delivering it to the end 
source. 
III. Any accommodation or living needs of the personnel, including administrative space, 
health care facilities and centres for training and education.288 
• Exploration Expenditure, denotes all expenses stemming from exploration of the 
subject-area in a buy-back contract, including the following items: 
I. The acquisition of machinery and implement required for purposes of oil 
exploration, including drilling equipment and offshore platforms. 
II. All logistical expenses, including repair, property rent charges, labour and fuel, 
connected to oil surveys, with the exception of appraisal drilling 
Ill. The provision of training and education to Iranian citizens, for the purposes of 
training qualified technical staff, in order to prepare for the eventual return of the 
field to the Iranian authorities. 
IV. Expenses incurred that relate to maintaining of the original environmental 
condition, throughout exploration and exploitation of the oil reserves, and the 
prevention of pollution from resulting due to the operations.289 
288 Farshad Gohar, Naser, 'Seyri Dar Gharardadhaye Naftiye Iran',{ A Survey On Iran's Oil Agreements) Tehran, 
1381, pg 262 
289Mobaser, op.cit., pg. 56 
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V. Customs duty payments relating to the importing of supplies and equipment 
necessary for the conduction of oil operations (as per the conditions of the particular 
buy-back contract). 
• Development Phase indicates the time frame during which the Company exploits the 
Scheduled Fields. 
• Effective Date means the date of commencement of the contract, as agreed by the parties 
in a buy-back contract. 
• Master Development Plan is the graphical representation of the future operations, 
including site plans and maps, accurately describing where and how the future operations 
will be conducted. It also includes contingency plans for emergencies such as 
earthquakes, requirements for the platforms' structural integrity, the route for the oil pipe 
network and a detailed time scale for the construction stages.290 
• Maximum Efficient Rate: the highest possible rate of oil exploitation possible without 
causing physical damage to the field or a loss of oil pressure, as dictated by international 
practice in this field. 291 
4.2.1 Buy-Back agreements, as defined by the Council of Ministers292 
In 200 I the Council of Ministers ratified the Regulations for conditions of buy-back contracts. 
This was based on a joint proposal submitted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the 
Iranian Central Bank, 293 as per Clause V of Article 85 of the Third Development Plan. The 
290 Rabiee, op.cit., pg 76 
291 Mobaser, op.cit., pg. 54 
292A full translation ofthe Council of Ministers' Decree, No. H21560T/50991, can be found at: Petroleum Iran, 
21/05/2006 [http://www.petroleumiran.com/buy-back.html] 
293 Central Bank of the Islamic Republic oflran 
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Council of Ministers subsequently issued a decree, which contained a number of provisions 
which defined the exact nature of buy-back transactions.294 
Article Two of the decree outlined the basic nature of the transactions to which it would apply: 
buy-back or counter transactions apply to the transaction methods by virtue of which 
the Investor undertakes to provide the Investment Receiver all or a part of financial 
facilities (in cash or kind) for the supply of necessary goods and services. This 
includes capital or intermediate goods or raw materials or services, for the purpose of 
establishment, development, reconstruction and improvement of production or 
services units. The facilities will be repaid including the principal and the resulting 
costs, through exportation of goods and services produced by the Investment 
Receiver. 
Article Three stated that all profits acquired through buy-back transactions would be regulated 
by the "Law Concerning Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment" and that within the 
framework of this law, guarantees will be granted against confiscation and nationalisation of 
both property and funds, in addition to the granting of additional protections against sudden 
changes in export laws. 
This is further guaranteed by Article Four, which states that the government will not forbid the 
export of products or services arising from buy-back activity. If any changes in laws and 
regulations impede the implementation of contracts on the "export of mutually agreed upon 
goods and services", and results in the non-fulfilment of the Investment Receiver's295 
commitments, Article Five ensures that: 
294 The Decree was signed by the First Deputy President Hassan Habibi on 29th January 2001 
295 
"Investment Receiver" refers to any Iranian real and legal person who is engaged in establishing, developing, 
improving or reconstructing production or services units through foreign financial fucilities in the form of buy-back 
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The matured instalments shall be paid to the beneficiary in accordance with the same 
foreign exchange stated in the pertinent contracts and in compliance with the 
regulations of the Law Concerning Attraction and Protection of Foreign 
Investment. 296 
With the purpose of ensuring the fulfilment of commitments to those investing, the Investment 
Receiver is authorised, under Article Six, to organise the exporting of all output from a single 
factory, manufacturing organisation/company. 297 The level of repayment (in goods or services 
exported to the Investor) is specified by the relevant domestic authority. 
This is required under Article Seven, which also provides that the Organisation for Investment, 
Economic and Technical Assistance of Iran is responsible for notifying the Customs, Export 
Advancement Centre, Central Bank and the managing bank in order that the export of the said 
goods or services will be facilitated within the framework of all relevant regulations. 
The foreign exchange earned by the export of the goods or services carries no obligation to 
return the earnings to Iran, and is exempted from any duties. These protections are guaranteed 
under Articles Eight and Nine. 
Article Ten states that: "With regard to buy-back contracts, specific mechanisms should be 
devised for the following matters: 
• The manner of fulfilment ofthe Investment Receiver's commitments to the Investor 
• The manner of determining the price of the goods or services within the transaction 
contracts for the purpose of importing services, raw materials, intermediate and capital goods in order to implement 
production and services operations in the country, and shall directly or through any other real or legal person pay for 
the received goods, services and financial facilities by exporting goods and services and delivering the same to the 
investor. (As defined in Article One of the Decree) 
296 Petroleum Iran, about Buy-back agreements, (http://www.petroleumiran.com/buy-back.html) 18th May 2006 
297 Plant is the industrial or other installation where products are made. 
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• Necessary arrangements for settlement of accounts of the contracting parties 
• The method of mutually acceptable inspection for quality control of goods or services to 
be exported 
• Appointment of the inspector for examining the quality of equipment, machinery, goods 
or services."298 
The decree allows for all contracting foreign investors, and their representatives, to be issued 
with multiple entry visas (for the purpose of the contract), and Article Twelve requires that the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopts suitable measures to issue these. 
Article Thirteen restricts any changes to the contract which may affect the financial 
commitments ofthe parties, and states that: 
Any amendment, alteration or extension of the contract which may cause changes in 
the financial commitments of the contracting parties, shall be permitted only after the 
declaration of opinion of the Organisation for Investment, Economic and Technical 
Assistance of Iran and ratification of the related Ministry and the independent 
0 0 299 
orgamsat1on. 
4.2.2 Resolution of issues arising under the Decree 
For the purpose of accelerating the procedure for buy-back operations governed by the 
aforementioned regulatory standards and to ease the process of resolving problematic issues, 
Article Fourteen of the decree requires that a committee board should be formed. This must be 
comprised of representatives from the Ministries of: Economic Affairs; Commerce; and Foreign 
Affairs; as well as representatives from the Management and Planning Organisation, the Central 
298 Petroleum Iran, [http://www.petroleumiran.com/buy-back.html] 21 51 May 2006 
299 Ibid. 
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Bank, and the Iranian Chamber of Commerce, as well as Industries and Mines. Depending on 
each case, other pertinent organisations may also have their own representatives. 
This board must adopt measures to pursue and obtain reports on the performance of all buy-back 
projects, and gather and analyse pertinent issues. They are responsible for proposing 
amendments to resolve any problems or difficulties, either in more general terms or with a view 
of the specific circumstances of the disagreement. These proposals are then forwarded to the 
related authorities to enable them to make the appropriate analysis and conduct the necessary 
actions. 
In case a Council of Ministers order is required, due proposals must also be presented to the 
Council of Ministers' Secretariat, which is situated in the Organisation for Investment, Economic 
and Technical Assistance. 
4.3 The Relevant Iranian Laws with regard to buy-back Transactions 
Iranian law is based on the Islamic Shar'ia law, which causes all legal provisions to be derived 
from the principles of Islam as defined by the Constitution. The lack of separation between 
church and state means that all regulations have to be approved by religious bodies as being 
within the principles ofJslam. The consequences ofthis are considered here. 
4.3.1 Iranian Constitution 
Perceived by many investors as being prohibitive, Iran's laws derive from the Constitution ofthe 
Islamic Republic. The Constitution is a direct derivation from the clerics' interpretation of the 
Holy Islam, which primarily declares that only God is sovereign and has the right to legislate.300 
Under Article 4 of the Constitution, all legal provisions should stem from principles of Islam. 
300 Ute, Christian& Brexendrorff, Alexander, 'Investing in the oil & gas Industry', Mena, 2005, P 12 
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All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and 
other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies 
absolutely and generally to all Articles of the Constitution as well as to all other laws 
and regulations, and the fuqaha' of the Guardian Council are judges301 in this matter. 
Due to the Islamic legislative base of Iranian law, all buy-back contracts must be in accordance 
with Islamic criteria and this is supervised by the Majlis. This indicates that a certain religious 
factor will be persistently present while forming a contract with the Ministry of Oil. Accordingly, 
the buy-back model was introduced to negate these constitutional and religious restrictions and 
therefore provide a degree of certainty to the contractual parties. 
When concluding an oil contract, a further notable characteristic of the Iranian political system is 
the existence of a power structure which is parallel to it, must be considered. For every 
institution of the state, a corresponding supervisory Islamic shadow exists, an institution which is 
oftentimes the more powerful ofthe two.302 
The effect of this parallel power structure is that there exists a possibility of any contract signed 
with the Ministry of Oil being reviewed by the Majles .. 
Article 43 of the Constitution aims to avert foreign economic domination over the country's 
commercial life. This Article stems from Iran's previous difficulties related to excessive foreign 
political power based on the foreigners' control over the natural minerals and the country's 
301 It is a constitutional authority which reviews Majlis's legislation in order to ensure that the legislation is in 
accordance to the Sharia law and the Iranian Constitution. Legislation which is deemed to have failed this test is 
returned to the Majlis for revision. It is composed of 12 members, half of whom are clerics, appointed by the 
Supreme Leader, and the other are lawyers, who are nominated by the Head of the Judiciary and subsequently 
approved by the Supreme Leader. Only the clerics are permitted to vote on the compatibility of new legislation to 
Sharia law. Appointment occurs on a phased basis, so that every three years, half of the members are changed, but 
the actual term of service is six years. If no consensus is found between the Council of Guardians and the Maijlis, 
then the Expediency Council makes the final decision on the matter. 
302 Notably, the power of the President is overshadowed by that of the Supreme Leader and the Parliament (Majlis) 
is subservient to the Council of Guardians, which consists of eminent Islamic jurists. 
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economy. The following is an extract, relevant to issues of foreign investment, from the 
Constitution: 
The economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with its objectives of achieving the 
economic independence of the society ... is based on the following criteria: 
5. The prohibition of infliction of harm and loss upon others, monopoly, hoarding, usury, 
and other illegitimate and evil practices; 
8. Prevention of foreign economic domination over the country's economy; 
9. Emphasis on increase of agricultural, livestock, and industrial production in order 
to satisfy public needs and to make the country self-sufficient and free from dependence. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 44 prescribes that all large-scale and "mother" industries, as well as the 
mining of Iran's most economically-significant minerals, be encompassed by the state sector of 
the economy. Oil deposits are obviously included in the above state-controlled industries, and are 
therefore susceptible to stricter government control, as evidenced by the Article below. 
Article 45 grants the Islamic government the authority to manage non-privately owned 
entities and resources, such as natural deposits, as they see fit. 
Public wealth and property, such as uncultivated or abandoned land, mineral deposits, 
seas, lakes, rivers ... , legacies without heirs, property of undetermined ownership, and 
public property recovered from usurpers, shall be at the disposal of the Islamic 
government for it to utilize in accordance with the public interest. 
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As the above Article makes evident, oil deposits are the property of the public and therefore 
any ownership or long-term granting of exclusive use of oil fields is in contravention of this 
Article. 
Article 77 declares that "International treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements must be 
approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly." 
For this reason, any buy-back contracts would have to be subject to Majlis approval. Generally, 
this power is delegated to the Ministry of Oil, which will make this decision. However, the 
Majlis has been known to take particular interest in specific contracts and review them itself, in 
order to ensure the protection of the public interest. 
The most prohibitive Article, and the one which necessitates the use of buy-back as a means of 
side-stepping the Article's prohibitions, is Article 81 of the Iranian Constitution, which prohibits 
the legal ownership of oil and gas fields by foreign entities. It prescribes that: 
The granting of concessions to foreigners for the formation of companies or 
institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, services or mineral 
extraction, is absolutely forbidden. 
This prohibition is absolute, and the government is not granted the power of consent to foreign 
ownership, subject to the passing of a parliamentary decree (this issue will be addressed below). 
The private ownership of minerals is illegal, as is their extraction unless these minerals will be 
subsequently utilised for the purpose of facilitating the state's commerce. 
If the subject matter of the agreement is contested by the parties, the provision which is most 
influential and relevant in governing this process is Article 139 which reads: 
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The settlement, of claims relating to public and state property or the referral thereof 
to arbitration is in every case dependent on the approval of the Council of Ministers, 
and the Assembly must be informed of these matters. 
The same law elaborates on cases where a foreign participant is involved: 
In cases where one party to the dispute is a foreigner, as well as in important cases 
that are purely domestic, the approval of the Assembly must also be obtained. Law 
will specify the important cases intended here.303 
In summary, the Iranian Constitution prohibits the direct ownership of Iran's mineral wealth by 
foreigners. Consequently, concessions and production-sharing agreements so commonly found in 
other nations with large oil reserves, including those outside the Middle East, are practically 
impossible to negotiate. 
However, despite this, Iran does not have the requisite funds and technical knowledge to be able 
to implement all ofthe necessary projects without external assistance. To solve this problem, the 
NIOC proposed to establish the buy-back model, and this was confirmed by both the Council of 
Ministers and the Majlis, through the process described above.304 
4.3.2 Iranian Petroleum Law 
The Petroleum Law of 1987 authorised the government to control all activities related to the 
exploration and production of oil, outlining the functions and duties of the Ministry of 
Petroleum. Therefore, the oil industry in Iran is under strict government control. For a foreign 
303 The full translation of the Imnian Constitution, including the texts used in this Chapter, can be found at 
[http://www.imnonline.com/imn/iran-info/Government/constitution.html] 
304 Atieh Bahar, Oil & Gas Market Overview (http://www.atiehbahar.com/Resources/Oii&Gas.htm) 
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company to take part in any project, they must not only partner up with an Iranian company 
(with a maximum foreign shareholding of 49%), but they are also obliged to obtain the approval 
of Iran's High Economic Authority. 
The updated Iranian Petroleum Law of 1997 allows the formation of agreements, by the 
Petroleum Ministry or publicly owned companies, with "local and foreign natural persons and 
legal entities". The prohibition offoreign ownership of minerals in the Islamic Republic has been 
interpreted to bar foreign control of reserves. Consequently, this interpretation dictates that 
foreign oil companies may only act as contractors to the NIOC, rather than the principals. 
Article 2 of the above law reiterates that all petroleum reserves belong exclusively to the Iranian 
government, and thus its people, and are solely under government control, administered by the 
Ministry of Oil with Iran's best interests in mind. 
The petroleum resources of the country are part of the public domain (properties and 
assets) and wealth and according to Article 45 of the Constitution (of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran) are at the disposal and control of the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and all installations, equipment, assets, property and capital 
investments which have been made or shall be made in future within the country and 
abroad by the Ministry of Oil and its affiliated companies will belong to the people 
of Iran and remain at the disposal and control of the government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 
Jurisdictional control over the petroleum industry is granted to the appropriate Ministry, 
subject to regulations, in the remainder of this Article: 
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The authority for exercising sovereignty and ownership rights over the petroleum 
resources and installations is vested in the government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran which on the basis of the regulations, rights and powers prescribed in this Act 
shall be undertaken and executed by the Ministry of Petroleum in accordance with 
the general principles and policies of the country.305 
Under Article 5 of the said law, any important contracts concluded by the Ministry of Oil 
must be subsequently ratified by the Council of Ministers so as to have effect. The Article 
proclaims: 
Conclusion of important contracts between the Ministry of Oil or petroleum 
companies and the local and foreign natural persons and legal entities and 
determination of the important cases shall governed by the By-Laws to be approved 
by the Council of Ministers upon the proposal ofthe Oil Ministry. 
The fact that the legal limitations imposed by the Constitutions apply in this context is 
highlighted in the remainder of this Article: 
The contracts concluded between the Ministry of Oil and other governments shall 
fully conform to Article 77 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic oflran.306 
4.3.3 Legal Basis for Buy-Back as Outlined in the Five Year Development Plans 
The basic legal foundations of the buy-back transactions are found in the legislation of "The 
Laws of the Five-Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plans of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran", and the yearly Acts of the National Budget. Since 1989, the Development 
Plans have been renewed and updated every five years, with the fourth Development Plan having 
305 The full translation of the Iranian Petroleum Act can be found at: 
[ www .alaviandassociates.com/documents/petroleum.pdf] 
306 According to Article 77 of the Iran's Constitution" International treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements 
must be approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly.(Majlis)" 
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been passed in 2005. Each ofthese plans contains provisions regarding the use of this contractual 
scheme in order to appeal to outside investors, in a number of sectors, and Iran's Central Bank of 
issues the regulations required for each particular arrangement. In addition, several annual 
national budgets307 contain sections distributing the income from buy-back contracts between the 
different sectors ofthe economy. 
The First Development Plan308 contained Article 29, which allows the state party to utilise profits 
from petroleum contractual schemes, in the form of buy-back, in order to supply the funding for 
other budget-funded projects, particularly where manufacturing and exporting of goods are 
concerned, with the set maximum often billion dollars' worth of profit. 309 
Under Article 22 ofthe Second Five-Year Plan, 310 the government was permitted to participate 
in such arrangements, utilising the national fiscal institutions and banks, so as to boost Iran's 
output of exports while also providing funding for budgetary projects: 
When concluding contracts with foreign companies and contractors, the government 
must oblige the selling party to transfer the technical know-how, training and 
manpower for related activities. With regard to equipment and machinery purchases, 
utmost use must be made of the available manpower within the country. 
307 Budgets of 1993,1994,1997, 1998, 1999,2000 
308 The Islamic Republic of Iran's First Five Year Social, Cultural and Economic Development Plan was 
implemented from the periods of March 1989 to March 1994. The primary objective ofthe First Plan was to remove 
the legacy of the economic burdens brought about by the Iraqi invasion of Iran. It was within this context that the 
First Plan envisaged an annual growth rate of 8%, the creation of some two million new jobs, the rehabilitation and 
expansion of new industry and greater de-centralization and private sector participation. 
309 Mobaser, D. Moje Dovom, "Second wave", ,2002 Kavir, Tehran, p. II 0 
310 The Second Five-Year Social, Cultural and Economic Development Plan (hereinafter the 'Second Plan') was 
drawn up specifically with the achievements and failures of the First Plan in mind. As a result, following a one year 
delay so as to incorporate necessary revisions, the Second Plan has envisioned that for the period of March 1995 to 
March 2000, development and administrative expenditures will total $135.5 billion, greatly outpacing the 
expenditures accommodated by the First Five-Year Plan. The Second Plan was based on projected oil revenues of 
$86.5 billion. 
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In regard to the implementation of buy-back agreements, from the domestic angle, NIOC and its 
affiliated companies are responsible for putting the contract into force. Consequently, within the 
context of contractual agreements, the remuneration for imports of materials, equipment and the 
necessary professional expertise provided, is granted through permission for the final products' 
sale outside of the country. According to Article 22 to the Second Five-Year Plan Act, the fiscal 
and insurance institutions involved are obligated to provide any guarantees required to the 
supplying party, instead of adequate material guarantees of performance (such as the state party's 
properties, the goods produced or any other guarantees provided). The bank in charge of the 
arrangement would further contact the outside participant in order to ensure that assurances for 
the successful export of the output are provided. In turn, the involved bank has to fulfil their 
obligations to the supplying party, while failure to fulfil the contractual clauses by either party 
could result in the taking of possession ofthe guarantees provided. 
With regard to government-owned or associated companies, local authorities and other state 
institutions whose commitments did not require the provision of a guarantee, payments would 
instead be taken from their funds directly so as to eliminate the possibility of a default. 311 
The Oil Ministry must issue an economic, technological and technical confirmation in order for a 
bank guarantee to be granted for a buy-back contract. It is also required that the managing bank 
confirms the agreement, after having considered the relevant fiscal interests and context, as well 
as the standing policies of Iran's Central Bank. By the term 'managing bank', any bank that is 
designated as such on the authority ofthe Central Bank, instructed to handle the arrangement's 
affairs. This institution is given the choice of either operating on its own or in cooperation with 
another authorised banks or establishments, capable of providing credit. 
311 Iran Trade Point 26 July 2006, (http:/ /www.irtp.com/howto/Buy-Back/b I O.asp) 
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Note B to Article 85 of the Third Development Plan states that in order to create a foreign 
currency policy for Iran which balances the need for settling the country's foreign debts with the 
acquisition of funds for internal investment, the state is authorised to acquire funds from sources 
settled outside of Iran, within the limitations imposed by the relevant budgetary Act. The 
outcome of this balance, by the end of the Third Development Plan, must be a difference 
between investment and debt of less than USD$25 billion. The Islamic Republic of Iran's 
Central Bank must enforce this policy while giving consideration to the following factors, as 
outlined in Part I ofthe Article: 
The timing of repayment... shall be made in a way that the annual repayment of 
such loans and obligations, excluding buy-back obligation, do not exceed thirty 
percent (30%) ofthe foreign exchange revenues upon termination of the Third Plan 
period. Priority shall be given to long term foreign finance.312 
Moreover, part E of the same Article states that the relevant authorities must provide 
information on petroleum ventures, at the time of the annual budget presentation, to the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) and, subject to the latter's approval, execute these 
projects. 
Furthermore, under Article 85, all schemes and plans related to buy-back transactions 
should be drafted by the relevant Minister and be ratified by the High Economic Council. 
In order for the above to be ratified, the relevant Minister must make a case for the 
importance of their role in the national economy. 
312 The full Translation of the Iranian Third Development Plan can be found at: http://www.irtp.com/laws/3socio-
economic/ll.htm 
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It is also noteworthy that contracts with a value of over USD$1 million, where a foreigner 
is one of the parties, must be put to tender, as described in part 3 of Article 85. 
Article 14 ofthe Fourth Development Plan, which is to be in effect until2010, the utility of 
the buy-back agreement as a means of formalising oil-related transactions has been 
reaffirmed once more. The other provisions of the Third Development Plan regarding 
settlement of foreign debts and the requirement for tenders (of contracts worth more than 
one million USD) have been included in the most recent Plan. 
A further noteworthy element of the above is the instruction to the government to make 
known, to the Central Bank, any previously-undeclared foreign accounts that are credited 
as the result of buy-back transactions and their sizes. 
The provisions discussed below establish the specific structure of the buy-back transaction from 
the perspectives ofthe two parties, as prescribed in the new Foreign Investment law. 
4.3.4 The new Foreign Investment Law (FIPPA) and its implications for buy-back 
contracts 
Iran actively encourages foreign investment in most sectors but requires the involvement of a 
local partner to whom a technology is transferred. Generally, the local partner is expected to 
have a minimum share of 51% in the project (because of the Constitution's restrictions) The 
Foreign Investment Act covers foreign investments including Buy-back contracts.313 
313 The Canadian Trade Commissioner Service, Sources of project financing, Iran (http://www.infoexport.gc.ca/ie-
en/DisplayDocument.jsp?did=384 73) 
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On 241h August 2000 the Majlis approved the initial version of 'Foreign Investment Promotion 
and Protection Act' (PIPPA), which is a governing act for foreign investment.314 It was approved 
by the Expediency Councie 15 in May 2002, after months of dispute between the Iranian 
Parliament and the Guardian Council. This law had evolved from the 1956 Law for the 
Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment, which had similar goals of encouraging foreign 
funding. This law is seen as an improvement over the previous foreign investment law, although 
there remain ambiguities concerning the protection of foreign investors in oil & gas buy-back 
arrangements. 
According to the 1956 law, the Iranian state encouraged investment by offering support from the 
authorities, particularly with regard to foreign companies being permitted to take their profits, in 
the original currency used, out of Iran. It further promised compensation for any instances of 
nationalisation due to a valid public interest. 
PIPPA integrates the majority of clauses found in LAPFI. Nonetheless, its definition of 
'investment' goes further, and is inclusive of certain funding setups, including buy-back, which 
were not represented within LAPFJ. 
PIPPA, moreover, widens the scope within which the legally protective effect is provided, as 
under LAPFI, funding of only certain projects from outside Iran were covered: 
314The full translation of the FIPPA is available in the official website of the Iranian Embassy in London at: 
http://www.iran-embassy.org.uk/web/page/?jsession=&m=vp&i=58 
315The Council is an advisory body for the Leader with an ultimate adjudicating power in disputes over legislation 
between the parliament and the Guardian Council. The Supreme Leader appoints its members, who are prominent 
religious, social and political figures. In October 2005, the Supreme Leader gave the Expediency Council 
"supervisory" powers over all branches of government, delegating some ofhis own authority as is permitted in the 
constitution. (BBC News, 
http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk'/ I /shared/spl/hi/middle _ east/03/iran _power/html/expediency _co unci l.stm) 
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. . . development, productive, industrial, mmmg, transport or agriculture or for 
granting credit and financial assistance to Iranian firms engaged in the 
[aforementioned] activities can enjoy the privileges of this [law]. 316 
Consequently, many vital areas were absent, including buy-back agreements, service sector 
funding, build-operate-transfer (BOT) schemes, and financing of foreign investments, among 
others. 
Under FIPPA, "foreign investors who participate in investment schemes that are also open to the 
Iranian private sector can enjoy the protection and privileges of this law." It also extends full 
protection to investments in the areas of finance provision, such as buy-back transactions, project 
finance, BOT projects, etc. Consequently, the updated legal provisions ensure greater and wider 
protection for vital sectors of foreign investment. 
As the previous law did not cover contracts for the provision of services due to the limited scope 
of the terms used, no legally protective effect was available in the context of such arrangements. 
However, the provisions in their updated form allow such an effect on a general basis, rather 
through the specifying of certain areas, therefore also being inclusive of buy-back arrangements. 
Under FIPPA, the following relevant categories are considered foreign investment and afforded a 
protective effect: 
• foreign currency 
• Items and Assets of a technological nature 
• Knock-down components (CKD) and semi-knock down components (SKD) 
(e.g. to be used for vehicle production), raw materials, etc. 
• Tools and spare parts 
• Fiscal gains adduced to the investment capital 
• Other areas, subject to discretionary approval 
316 The full translation of this law can be found at: http://www.irvl.net/newforeigninvest.htm 
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The benefits ofbeing registered as an investor, per FIPPA, are as follows: 
• Nationalisation is permitted only where a national interest is being pursued, legal 
regulations are followed, a non-discriminatory procedure is used and fair compensation is 
provided, calculated as the real value of the property prior to the occurrence of 
nationalisation. 
• Foreign investors will be affected by regulations just as they affect local participants, 
including any benefits and exceptions 
• General laws of Iran will not be applicable to areas where travel of foreign employees is 
concerned 
• Foreign funds and providers of such funds are entitled to the advantages provided within 
the law until a more advantageous legal instrument is ratified 
• Disputes between investors and the government are to be resolved in a manner agreed by 
the parties. It follows that the investor may choose the jurisdiction for foreign arbitration, 
under certain circumstances. 
• Pursuant to the approval of a relevant body, those foreigners are allowed to annually 
remove their earnings (following the payment of necessary taxation and other costs). 
• The process of removing such earnings can be carried out in foreign currency or related 
goods.317 
4.4 Shortcomings of the new Foreign Investment Law 
Although FIPPA permits the funding of a broad range of industries, comparable to the scope 
available to local investors, there are a number of constitutional restrictions which still affect 
dealings regulated by this law. 
As was already mentioned, Article 44 of the Constitution separates the economic structure into 3 
areas: public, cooperative and private. Even though a technical interpretation of this article 
attributes 90-95% of the economy to the public sector, such a rigid reading does not correspond 
317 Ule, & Brexendrorff, op.cit., p. 14 
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to reality. Iranian firms have found it relatively easy to enter the many economic spheres not 
explicitly delineated as being open to non-public investments. Even the banking sector, which 
had been privatised by the government, is one of such accessible areas. 
Where constitutional restrictions are involved, FIPP A does not clearly state if participants from 
outside Iran acquire protection of the law in such areas, even if, de facto, local investors are 
vigorously operating in such areas. 
Under the Iranian Constitution, any participation of a public authority or entity in arbitration has 
to be confirmed by the Majlis. Therefore, even though the new law sets down dispute-resolution 
procedures, the foreign participant only has the option of ensuring the effectiveness of the 
contract's arbitration provisions if a dispute has already occurred, with a subsequent submission 
to the Majles. This gives significant discretion to the Majlis, resulting in foreign parties' further 
doubts regarding the security of their investments. 
As an alternative to this doubt-filled process, the Guardian Council or another similar authority, 
could reinterpret the Constitutional provisions causing such difficulties. This tendency is already 
manifesting itself in some sectors of the economy, with the Guardian Council giving its approval 
to various laws which are in conflict with Article 44 of the Constitution, for instance the recent 
April2000 Act allowing private bank ownership. 
Taking into account the above considerations, one possibility is that Iran is already in the process 
of liberalising the Constitutional restraints so as to allow foreign activity in the traditionally 
publicly owned and operated areas.318 
318 Iran Insurance Market Report; Insurance and Economic Magazine (Quarterly), Autumn 2000, Vol. 3, No. I 
(http://www.irvl.net/newforeigninvest.htm) 
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4.4.1 Shortcomings of Article 2 of FIPPA 
Article 2(d) dictates that the areas into which foreign capital may be invested and the size of this 
capital must comply with regulations approved by the Council of Ministers. These pertain to 
"Crude oil and natural gas (exploration, extraction and transfer)." Exemptions from the 
abovementioned regulations are provided to foreign investments relating to the production of 
services and commodities for export purposes, but explicitly not for crude oil investment.319 
Although 'downstream'320 oil projects appear to come under FIPPA's protection for their share 
ofthe capital (for example, in case ofnationalisation), the situation seems to be entirely different 
for 'upstream'321 projects. Because such projects involve direct investment into finding and 
expropriating the oil, there is a constant threat of clashes with the provisions of the Iranian 
Constitution outlined above. 
How buy-back projects would enjoy such protection under FIPPA remains unclear, since the 
relevant provisions make specific reference to "deprivation of national assets and property" 
within this context. Nonetheless, as in the contractual scheme being considered, the IOC never 
gains actual ownership of the oil itself, only the right to develop a specific field. Therefore, it is 
unclear whether an act of the government, which results in the premature termination of the buy-
back contract, might be brought under the scope of the term 'nationalisation' within FIPPA's 
scope. 
Article 2( d) states that the value of services and commodities resulting from foreign investments, 
compared to that of the services and commodities supplied to domestic markets, in every 
economic sector and in every field shall, proportionally, not exceed 25% and 35% respectively. 
319 Ule & Brexendrorff, op.cit., p. 32 
320 Downstream, in the context of the oil and gas industry, applies to the refining and marketing sectors of the 
industry.· 
321 Upstream is a term which describes the exploration and production sectors within the oil and gas industry. 
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These proportions should be seen in light of Article 2 (b) and (c), highlighting the main fear of 
the influential political and religious circles in Iran, that foreign investments shall undermine 
Iran's national security and the public interest. The Article makes it clear that foreign investment 
shall not involve concessions to be granted by the government to foreign investors.322 
The matters discussed above stem from Article 2 of FIPP A, which, in translation, reads as 
follows: 
Admission of Foreign Investment shall be made in accordance with the provisions of 
this Act and with due observance of other prevailing laws and regulations of the 
country, for the purpose of development and promotion of producing activities m 
industry, mining, agriculture and services, and is based on the following criteria: 
a) The investment brings about economic growth, improves technology, enhances the 
quality of products, increases employment opportunities and raises export amounts; 
b) It does not pose any threat to national security and public interest, or causes damage 
to the environment; and does not disrupt the country's economy, or jeopardise 
production from local investments; 
c) It does not entail the grant of concessions by the Government to Foreign Investors. 
'Concession' stands for special rights, which place the Foreign Investors in a 
monopolistic position. 
One of the most important requirements included is the delineation of the share of profits 
and commercial transactions for foreign as opposed to local investors: 
d) The ratio of the value of the goods and services produced by the Foreign 
Investments, contemplated in this Act, to the value of the goods and services supplied 
to the local market, at the time of issuance of the Investment License, shall not exceed 
322 Ute & Brexendrorff, op.cit.,p.32 
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25 percent in each economic sector and 35 percent in each field (sub-sector). The fields, 
and the extent of investment in each, shall be determined in the by-law to be approved 
by the Council of Ministers. Foreign Investment for the production of goods and 
services for export purposes, other than crude oil, shall be exempted from the 
aforementioned ratios. 
Note to Article: The Law for the Ownership of Immovable Property by Foreign 
Nationals enacted on June 6, 1921 shall remain in effect. Ownership of land of any type 
and to any extent in the name of Foreign Investors is not permitted within the 
framework of this Act.323 
4.4.2 Shortcomings of Article 3 of FIPP A 
Article 3(b) places foreign funding, of any area, into the category of "civil participation", 
applying also to buy-back transactions in the oil industry within its protection. However, this 
appears to have the effect of placing buy-backs in direct conflict with the provisions of the 
Iranian Constitution concerning "mother" industries; oil & gas exploitation, exploration and 
export are supposed to be strictly state dominated. 
However, a careful analysis of both FIPPA, and its Implementing Regulations (I.R.-FIPPA), 
suggests that up to a certain limit, even direct foreign investment into exploration and production 
falls under its protection. 
The following is a translation of Article 3 FIPPA, containing the above provisions: 
" .... Such investments may be admitted under the following two categories: 
323 The full translation ofthis Article is available on the website ofthe Iranian Embassy in the UK: http://www.iran-
embassy.org.uk/web/page/?jsession=&m=vp&i=58 
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a) Foreign direct investment (FDI) in fields where the activity of the private sector is 
permitted; 
b) Foreign Investments in all sectors within the framework of "Civil Partnership", 
"buy-back" and "Build-Operate-Transfer" (BOT) schemes where the return of capital 
and profits accrued is solely emanated from the economic performance of the project 
in which the investment is made, and such return of capital and profit shall not be 
dependent upon a guarantee by the Government or government companies and/or 
banks ... "324 
In conclusion, below is a graphical representation of the rights and obligations of foreign 
companies in the context of a buy-back agreement. 
Figure 2: Legal Framework for Buy-Back Agreements 
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4.5 The Contract's Governing Law 
The governing law under which the buy-back contract is formed can be of further interest to the 
parties, since it will regulate the conduct of their affairs. Four Articles within the Iranian Civil 
Code exist which pertain to this matter. According to Article 966: 
Possession, ownership and other rights exercised over moveable or immovable 
property follow the laws of the country where the things exist or are situated; 
nevertheless, the transfer of moveable property from one country to another cannot 
affect or limit the rights which persons may have acquired over those things in 
accordance with the laws of the country in which the things were first situated. 325 
Due to the principle stated in this Article, whereby the governing law of a transaction 
depends on the location of the object, oil, which, in case of buy-back transactions, is 
located in Iran, therefore, if no conflicting provision is included in the agreement, Iranian 
law will be used due to the location of the agreement's subject matter and the general 
principles of the local law. A further critical factor is the location where the buy-back 
contract was signed, as per Article 968: 
Liabilities arising out of transactions are subject to the laws of the performance of the 
transaction except in cases where the parties to the transaction are both foreign 
nationals and have explicitly or impliedly declared the transaction to be subject to the 
laws of another country. 326 
It can be deduced from the above provisions that the location where the contract is signed is a 
crucial factor when determining its governing law. Another important rule to consider is the fact 
that, according to Article 969, the method of formulating an agreement coincides with the law of 
325 Badrian, F. Attorney at Law, The Civil Code of Iran, Daneshvar, p. 269 
326 ibid p. 270 
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the place where the contract was produced. Consequently, the Iranian law resigns its 
responsibility over the model upon which the contract is based and the procedure for forming a 
contract, if the event of the formulation and signing takes places outside Iran. The existence of 
explicit provisions choosing a different governing law in the contract itself will not have legal 
effect unless all parties to a contract are foreign nationals. In such a case, an expressly stated 
choice of governing law will have legal effect. 
With regard to a contract dispute, the governing law and court that are responsible for 
enforcement will be determined as per Article 971: 
Claims and lawsuits follow, in matters of competency of the court and of laws of 
procedure, the laws of the place where they are instituted. The fact that the same case 
or claim is already being decided by a foreign court cannot nullify the competency of 
the Iranian court.327 
Generally, in the case ofthe occurrence of a contract dispute between IOC and the NIOC, Iranian 
law will govern the enforcement of the contract and any claims made in relation to it must be 
decided upon in the Iranian jurisdiction. However, an exception may occur if a different choice 
of governing law and jurisdiction is explicitly made in the contract. In such a case, the NIOC will 
comply with any contractual provisions relating to arbitration or court proceedings outside Iran. 
Further analysis of this important topic will be conducted within the Arbitration sub-section of 
Chapter 7. 
327 Ibid p 271 
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4.5.1 Laws regarding the registration and operation of foreign companies in Iran 
The legislation that governs commercial transactions is, primarily, the Commercial Code of 
Iran.328 The Code allows the operation of most business models, including companies, collective 
bodies and partnerships. 
A foreign investor, however, will encounter difficulties when attempting to form a legal entity, 
of any form, in Iran. Such actions are prohibited by Article 81 of the Iranian Constitution, 
prohibits the registration and operation of non-Iranian companies within the country's 
jurisdiction: 
The granting of a concession to foreigners for the formation of companies or 
institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, services or mineral 
extraction is absolutely forbidden.329 
The sole method, for a foreign company, to operate in Iran, is to forego the establishment of a 
company but rather to create this company outside of Iran and subsequently have a legal 
representative/branch office registered in the country. This action should receive specific 
approval from the relevant authorities, as dictated by the Registration of Companies Act 1931. 
This Act has been frequently amended and is used by the Ministry of Commerce when 
instructing the foreign companies as to the procedure for the establishment of a local branch. The 
granting of such approval is limited to those foreign firms that have a contract with the Iranian 
government or one of its state-controlled institutions. When the Iranian Parliament's approves 
the company's registration, it would be in the form of a decree, permitting the establishment of a 
local office of the company, with the sole purpose of fulfilling the contract that has been 
concluded. Furthermore, foreign ownership of Iranian property is possible as long as it complies 
328 Ghanoon-e-Tejarat 
329 The full translation of the Iranian Constitution is available at: http://www.oefre.unibe.cMaw/icl/irOOt_.html 
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with the Iranian law's requirements. The following is a description of this matter, suggested by 
the Iranian Embassy in London: 
Agencies or representatives of a foreign company or foreigners as legal persons or 
real persons are allowed to buy a property in Iran on the grounds that there is some 
reciprocal permission between Iran and the origin country of the buyers, but a 
company registered in Iran, even if all of its shareholders are foreign, can buy and 
own as much property as it wishes in Iran without any restrictions. 330 
In order to finalise the foundation of a business enterprise in Iran, the company must register 
either on the general or the commercial register, and the following documents must be included: 
• A certificate from a government ministry or public authority, showing the existence of an 
arrangement with the non-Iranian firm 
• A declaration of registration 
• An officially approved copy ofthe company's articles of association. 
• An officially approved copy, granting power of attorney rights, to the company's highest 
ranking executive in Iran 
• A letter, instructing an Iranian lawyer to serve as a proxy in cases where he is assigned 
the procedures for registering the company's branch. 
• Any additional company officials entitled to sign contracts or other legal commitments on 
the company's behalf.331 
Further legal requirements for the foreign company are the keeping of separate books for the 
branch in Iran, as well as the appointment of a special company representative to the country. 
330 Embassy of the Islamic Republic oflran in the UK. ~http://www.iran­
embassy.org.uk!web/page/?jsession=&m=vp&i=69) 30 November 2002 
331 For further details, see the Islamic Republic oflran Ministry of Commerce explanation, found at 
http://www.irtp.com/howto/forgin!b 12.asp 
202 
To summarise, a foreign oil company wishing to enter a buy-back transaction with the Iranian 
Ministry of Oil cannot establish itself legally within the country. Instead, it may be created 
elsewhere and then register a branch in Iran for their local operations, through the process 
described above. As is evident from the above list of required documents, the process of 
registration is prohibitively bureaucratic for foreign companies. This point will be further 
developed in the last chapter of this paper. 
4.5.2 Legislation Related to the Taxation of Foreign Enterprises 
For a foreign investor who wants to enter a buy-back oil contract in Iran, it is necessary to know 
about fiscal system enforced in the country. The majority of the taxes are either corporate or 
personal taxes on income. Investment in certain sectors, such as industry and mining and other 
production-related enterprises can enjoy tax deductions and other facilities, such as exemptions, 
with the purpose of encouraging foreign investment. The law which governs the extent and 
process of taxation for all legal entities, including companies and partnerships, is the Law of 
Direct Taxation of 1988. Tax is payable on the entire income of companies registered in Iran. 
Foreign companies' income, on the other hand, is taxable when it was received from Iran or 
earned in Iran. The government institution in charge of taxing, including customs and excise 
duties, is the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance. The evaluation of the amount oftaxes to 
be paid is carried out by a district tax auditor, mandated by the aforementioned Act, who is a 
member of the relevant authorities charged with resolving such issues. 332 The basis for the 
evaluation of the magnitude of tax, to be paid by a local-foreign joint venture, are the book 
accounts of these companies. 
332 Iran Export, 26 July 2006 (http://www.iran-export.com/invcli/taxation.htm) 
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Amendments have been made to the Law of Direct Taxation by the Majlis, in 1992 and 2002. 
The amendments included a cut to the tax payable, a measure intended to promote domestic and 
foreign investment. 
A flat rate of 25% taxing has been established in the amended tax law, deductible from the total 
income of domestic entities, whether it was earned in Iran or outside it. The foreign entities in 
Iran are obligated to pay the same flat rate on the income generated by investments in Iran or any 
other activities that took place there. 
Tax cuts do exist for foreign companies contracted to conduct operations according to 
government contracts. The cuts apply to the expenditures incurred as the result of buying 
equipment and supplies outside Iran. Such exemptions apply to industrial and mining enterprises, 
where a six year tax exemption is granted, with the possibility of this period being extended if 
production is located in an economically deprived area ofthe country.333 
4.6 Significant Elements of Iranian Buy-Back Contracts 
The Iranian buy-back agreement resembles a variation on the standard risk-service agreement, 
specifically a short-term version of such an agreement. The agreement will ordinarily be 
concluded between NIOC and the contractor, composed of an international oil company or a 
consortium of such companies. 
Under the agreement, the foreign contractor is in charge of the provision of Exploration and 
Production services and is subsequently reimbursed for these expanses, as well as rewarded, 
once the project begins producing an income. 
333 Iran Yellow Pages. 26 July 2006 
(http://www. iranyellowpages.net/en/ About_iran/Economy/foreign _investment/foreign _investment I. shtm) 
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The buy-back agreement is composed of two portions: the contract which pertains to the 
development stage of the oil field, known as the sample exploration service contract and later, a 
long-term oil sales agreement (LTEOSA), based on volume, which dictates the distribution of 
compensation and the amount of oil and/or gas which will compose the contractor's reward. 
No cash return occurs in the course of a buy-back contract. The contractor's initial costs for 
developing the field, such as capital expenses, operating expenditures and accrued bank charges 
are then compensated by the NIOC, in the form of the final product. Moreover, a previously 
contractually agreed fee is granted to the contractor, ordinarily in the form of a share of the oil 
produced. Simultaneously, the contractor acquires procurement rights to a share of the crude, as 
well as the right to equity oil. The consequence of this arrangement is a positive effect to the 
corporate balance sheet. The size of the compensation is determined by the value of the rate of 
return, specified in the contract, which usually is about 15-18%. 
The quality and value of the equipment and materials used by the IOCs in their operations are 
subject of evaluation by a mutually accepted inspection agency. The said agency's evaluation of 
the quality and value of the materials are binding on the parties and not subject to appeal. 
In an effort to cut the bureaucratic and procedural length and expense connected to the 
implementation of buy-back contracts, a commission was formed of the major economic 
agencies' and ministries' deputies, tasked with providing supervision over such arrangements. 
This authority is entitled to make decisions which have legal force, and it is to be informed of 
ongoing buy-back deals by the banks involved. 
In order to facilitate the smooth execution of buy-back contracts, and to alleviate the problems 
arising from this process, a board has been formed, consisting of deputy ministers of the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and Finance, Ministry of Commerce, the Plan and Budget Organization, the 
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Central Bank of Iran, the Ministry of Oil, a representative of the managing bank and the Iran 
Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines. This board is the highest authority tasked with 
supervising buy-back transactions and producing decisions which are binding for all natural 
persons and legal entities. The board is headed by the Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs and 
Finance who is also in charge of banking and insurance matters. The managing bank must send a 
copy of all the final buy-back contracts to the board and to report the agreements' progress to 
them, on a monthly basis.334 
It is possible to change the terms or renew the buy-back contract if the endorsement of the 
managing bank is procured and if such an amendment is permitted within the contract. 
The long-term oil sales agreement will be discharged once the contractor has been fully repaid 
for its petroleum costs and the contractor has fulfilled all of his contractual obligations. 
It is normal practice for the IOC to be obliged to conduct development for two to three years, and 
further conduct operations for a period of between five and eight years. 
In summary, there exist two options for the contractor in an Iranian buy-back agreement. The 
contractor either concludes the full extent of work required by a full-cycle exploration and 
production project, or does so only for a development and production project. If the former is to 
be carried out, and in the process, the contractor discovers a commercially viable source of oil, 
then the NIOC and the contractor must negotiate the terms of the future development before it 
can be started. The two types of buy-back contracts, and the responsibilities and obligations 
which stem from each type are shown below.335 
334 
- Petroliumiran.com, 'Buy-back', first accessed 05/07/2007 [http://www.petroleumiran.com/buy-back.html] 
335 Ule, & Brexendrorff, op.cit., p. 38 
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Figure 3: The Basic Structure of a Buy-Back Agreement 
Buy-Back Contract 
Sample Exploration 
Service Contract 
Development Phase 
Ministry (N.I.O.C): 
• Provides land, access rights, data, 
consents 
l 
Contractor (IOC): 
• Performs explorations, field 
development and production 
operations at own cost 
• Recovery of costs only up to 
ceiling approved by N.I.O.C. 
• All land, assets acquired into the 
property ofN.I.O.C. 
• Accrues entitlement to pre-
determined measure of 
remuneration 
• Transfers operator ship to N.I.O.C. 
after commissioning and start-up. 
• Delivers custody of all produced 
oil to Ministry 
• Undertakes to enter Long Term 
Export Oil Sales Agreement 
Long Term Export Oil Sales 
Agreement 
Exploitation Phase 
N.I.O.C. (Seller): 
I .__Pn-·ci-ns___J Lrru 
1
rter (customer) 
.t basis 
Agree-
ment 
I ,/ Sales Contract 
Contractor (Buyer): 
• Introduces a customer (Lifter) with 
whom, together with Seller, pricing 
basis shall be agreed 
• Buys Repayment Oil and pays 
N.I.O.C. for Repayment Oil at 
market price, BUT Ministry offsets 
money due for Repayment Oil 
against Petroleum costs, Bank 
charges and Remuneration 
(effectively no money passes 
hands) 
• This continues until contractor has 
fully offset its Petroleum costs and 
Remuneration up the prior agreed 
return 
• Contractor receives Repayment Oil 
which it can on-sell. 
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4.6.1 Procedure for Formulating a Buy-Back Transaction 
The following are the possible outcomes after the development stage had concluded, according 
to the Model buy-back Exploration Service Contract: 
1) If the exploration fails due to the absence of discovered oil or a discovery that is not 
commercially viable, the Explorations Service Contract is discharged and the exploration 
contractor receives no compensation. 
2) If the exploration is a success, then the contractor may negotiate the terms and conditions of 
the future Development Service Contract (L TEOSA), resulting in two possible outcomes: 
a) If a Development Contract is concluded as the result of negotiations, then the 
contractor acquires the right to the overall negotiated Internal Rate of Return (IRR), as per the 
Development Services Contract; or 
b) In case of failure to conclude a Development Service Contract (because of a 
breakdown of negotiations or the NIOC's discretionary choice to not carry out the development 
of the field), according to the most recent buy-back contracts, the NIOC will compensate the 
contractor, in the amount that was negotiated, encompassing taxes paid, expenses and bank 
charges incurred, as well as a compensation based on an IRR of about 15%.336 
336 Mobaser, D., op.cit., p. 54 
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Figure 4: Procedure for Securing a Buy-Back Contract 
Stage I 
Exploration/Evaluation 
• ... 
• • 
Commercially Viable Decision Non-Commercially 
I 
(Conclusion of Stage I) Viable 
Negotiation with Stage I I 
IOC IOC Carries all Costs 
and Risks 
l-4 Successful F~iled I I 
I I Discharge of Stage II Submit Field 
Contract Contract for Tender 
Granted I I Bid Succeeded I 
I 
I Contract Granted I 
Further possible scenarios for a commercial arrangement, which may occur under a Buy- Back 
agreement, are as follows. 
In the case of the commercial discovery's development by a third party, the original contractor 
has the right to at least 30% equity in the produced oil, as well as proportional compensation of 
the exploration expenditures and a contractually agreed reward. 
If the exploitation of an existing discovery is involved (or both the appraisal and the discovery), 
the contractor submits bids, as well as a work plan for the project. If the contractor's bid is 
successful, he conducts the agreed-upon extent of work and after commissioning, the NIOC 
operates. 337 
337 ibid p. 56 
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From the total duration of the buy-back contract, the amortisation period begins after 
development of the discovery commences and its commissioning. In the subsequent 5 to 8 years, 
the contractor must ensure its payback. While the amortisation period is ongoing, the contractor 
is granted a compensation amount equal to his costs plus interest, as well as a monthly 
remuneration. If a contractual provision exists for uplift, it will also be provided. 
According to the Model buy-back Contract, a fine may be levied against the contractor if the 
project is not complete by the agreed deadline. No banking interest will be granted for the 
duration of the delay. 
If the compensation fee and the petroleum costs are not completely compensated in the course of 
the amortisation stage, the contractor will instead receive crude oil/gas made from the field until 
the required fees have been paid, according to Article 22.4 of the Iranian Model buy-back 
Contract. 
Despite the fact that initially, it may appear as if the contract would be guaranteed to receive the 
ROR, the previously negotiated duration of the Long Term Sales Contract still plays a limiting 
role (as per Article 3.3 of the Model buy-back Contract). 
It would appear that the contractor is barred from maintaining long-term access to crude oil by 
the current structure of the buy-back. Theoretically, subject to Article 3.3 of the buy-back Model 
Contract, the contractor could initiate a series of continuous buy-back agreements, timed in a 
way which would maximise the return of the previous project, thus creating a stream of 
investment money which may be channelled into successive projects. 
The duration of the agreement is a matter of negotiation, but is likely to be extended for several 
ye~rs: !he ~axiJ:ll~m dl:J:ration of the ~:"ploitat~io11 period P!ll~t" pqt ke l()ng~r than ~five years, and 
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the sales agreement cannot exceed fifteen years, as dictated by Iran's Petroleum Act. Naturally, 
no guarantee exists that a series of projects will be offered by the NIOC in the above-described 
manner, nor are there guarantees that the IOC will be allowed to buy a production share. 
4. 7 Conclusion 
As detailed in this chapter, the constitutional bars on foreign investment in Iran's oil sector have 
led to the conception ofthe buy-back model contract, as opposed to utilising other methods, such 
as joint-venture and production-sharing agreements. Since the introduction of the buy-back to the 
Iranian oil industry, in 1989/38 numerous such contracts have been concluded and plans to sign 
further agreements are in the making. The international oil companies are not entirely 
enthusiastic regarding participation in buy-back agreements, as they consider them to be a 
"method of finance", as opposed to an oil contract. Nonetheless, several arrangements based on 
buy-back contracts have been planned between numerous foreign partners and Iran, such as 
Japan, China, India and Pakistan, as well as with domestic companies. Taking into account Iran's 
significant role in the international oil tender market and the limited capacity to conduct more 
business affairs with the global oil industry due to the restrictive nature of the buy-back, it is 
evident that the current model must be altered and further modernised. The Iranian decision-
makers should consider all the criticism and concerns voiced by foreign and domestic 
participants and respond to it by amending the law. Any amendments made should reflect and 
address any reasonable concerns expressed by beneficiaries of the oil contracts. Such alterations 
are not uncommon in the international oil market, as other oil producing states frequently change 
their laws and policies in order to reflect the demands of the oil market. In the following chapter, 
the buy-back contracts would be critically analysed, in the light of the criticisms expressed by 
338 If the initiation ofthe First Development Plan is to be considered as the milestone at which buy-backs began. 
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both the foreign investors, who believe that the current arrangement is not sufficiently attractive 
when attempting to bring in foreign capital and technology, and domestic critics. The flaws of 
buy-back contracts will be further illustrated by case studies based on agreements previously 
concluded with foreign companies using this model. This precedent-based analysis will be the 
subject of a different chapter. 
Having recognised the Constitutional limitations placed on any oil transaction occurring in Iran, 
as well as analysing the means by which buy-back contracts circumvent these limitations, it is 
logical to critically analyse the existing Iranian buy-back in order to determine which aspects of 
the framework are less attractive to investors than those of the alternative systems. Furthermore, 
as an oil transaction can only take place with the willingness of both parties, it is therefore also 
necessary to determine the concerns of the domestic party and suggest an optimal means of 
reaching a compromise on buy-back terms that would facilitate foreign investment. 
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Chapter 5: Critical Analysis of Iranian Buy-Back Contracts 
5.1 Introduction 
As buy-back contracts are a form of contractual relationship which governs transactions of 
tremendous scope and size, it is unsurprising that they have been the subject of intense critical 
scrutiny. Such criticism often advocates a diversification in the type of financing contracts that 
the NIOC employs, arguing that the buy-back model does not sufficiently protect the nation's 
resource reserves. 
The alternatives to the buy-back proffered by its critics include BOT339 type contracts, whereby 
private companies are granted franchises from the government to build and operate the resource 
developments for specified periods for which they are paid fees, with the field's operation being 
transferred to the public following the period's expiry.340 A similar scheme, called BOOT341 also 
includes an ownership transfer to the company at the beginning of the contract and a return at the 
end.342 Another alternative, also aimed at maximally boosting a country's profits, is the use of 
bonds. 
However, others critics propose that buy-back contracts are not perfect, but are nonetheless the 
optimal financing means, requiring only some alterations in their provisions. Their view is 
supported by practical and legal considerations, for instance the fact that in one of the world's 
top oil producers, Iran, Article 81 of the Constitution prohibits granting concessions in any 
industrial sphere, therefore limiting any changes to the financing schemes to alterations to the 
existing buy-back model rather than the use of a concession-based, alternative scheme. 
339 Build, Operate and Transfer. 
340 This scheme is used in countries such as Hong-Kong, Malaysia and Japan. 
[ www .eforceglobal.com/ppt/eFORCE _BOT.ppt] 
34hMeaniiig" Biiita~own~··opernte~aria trntisfer': 
342 Lecture ofProf. Quiggin on BOOTs. [http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/johnquiggin/Conference/BOOT.html] 
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Nonetheless, it can be noted that even in such legally limiting circumstances, it may be possible 
to employ, on a case-by-case basis, certain other schemes such as the creation of partnerships 
with minimal risk. 
The necessity for some change, whether revolutionary or evolutionary, is nonetheless evident as 
both foreign and domestic participants in oil contracts voice their grievances with the current 
scheme. Consequently, whether to satisfy the perceived need for greater profits for the domestic 
public as advocated by the domestic parties, or to ease the costs and efforts of oil fields' 
exploitation, as argued by the foreign companies, alternatives to buy-back contracts must be 
examined so as to determine their viability. In order to do so, however, it is necessary to 
evaluate the needs and grievances of domestic and foreign parties. 
5.2 Risks of Buy-Back Contracts as Seen by IOCs 
The issue of oil fields' developments in OPEC's second largest exporter, Iran, is complicated by 
the diplomatic and political ramifications of conducting such business in Iran. As the result of the 
potential for profit from exploiting Iranian oil reserves, political deterrents to oil-related 
economic activity with Iran, in the form ofthe 1996 US Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) as well 
as the widespread unpopularity of buy-back with oil firms, have not prevented vigorous pursuing 
of oil contracts by European and Asian oil companies. As a result, 11.5 billion dollars' worth of 
oil and gas contract money has been secured since 1997; a necessary sum for the significant task 
of modernising the energy sector, harmed by both the Iraq-Iran War and the continuing US 
sanctions. 343 
343Payvand, 07/04/200 I [http://www .payvand.com/news/0 I /jul/1 013 .html] 
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Domestic political oversight is another factor limiting the introduction of serious alterations to 
buy-back contracts, as the Majlis utilises it's 'legal right' of Oil Ministry supervision so as to 
ensure no overly controversial oil deals are made, which could potentially result in a 'sell-off' of 
national wealth, while permitting the renewal of earlier buy-back permits and authorising NIOC 
to sign 7.5 billion dollars' worth offoreign buy-backs. 
In order to emphasise the importance of improving the nature and thus the popularity of oil 
contracts in Iran, special attention must also be given to the increasing competition in the energy 
sector due to Iraq's reintegration into the world markets. On one hand, if Iraq employs a more 
investor-friendly scheme than that of buy-back contracts, it is entirely possible that investors may 
be lured away from Iranian fields. However, such an assertion is subject to the current reality that 
insufficient stability exists in Iraq for foreign investment to be appealing at present. Moreover, 
such competition is only realistic in the area of oil as Iran's natural gas reserves are vastly 
superior. Indeed, some argue that the process oflraqi reconstruction may in fact boost the Iranian 
energy sector as this process opens a new market for Iranian products while at the same time 
offering contracting opportunities for Iranian companies in the course of reconstruction. 
The contributing factors to buy-back's lack of support among foreign oil firms are numerous, but 
the most drastic and potentially damaging is the possibility of an oil field not being exploited, 
resulting in a lack of compensation to the IOC for both petroleum expenses and remuneration. 
The Ministry of Oil's discretionary and non-reviewable right to determine the commercial 
viability of exploitation significantly contributes to this risk, and may serve as a deterrent to 
business involvement. 
A further area in which the domestic party's exercise of discretion may lead to risk for the IOC is 
the NIOC's freedom to refuse to grant expl,oitation rights to -the IOC whi'ch discovered the- oil 
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deposit; therefore permitting the NIOC to largely dictate the contractual conditions due to the 
power to exercise this discretion. 344 
5.2.1 Risks created through the structure of Buy-Backs 
As the result of the domestic party's desire to limit its temporal obligations, the contracts are of a 
shorter length than the scope of an endeavour such as an exploitation of oil may suggest, only 
about 7-10 years, with an additional 5 years as a designated 'investment recovery period'. A 
technique has developed to partially circumvent this limitation, namely through concluding a 
number of successive contracts to enable the contractor to use the funds from the previous 
project to finance the next one. However, as contractual simplicity serves to lower both the costs 
and the time needed to conclude oil contracts, it is clear that this element of the buy-back model 
is in dire need of alteration. 
a) A corollary risk to the duration limitation, especially in view of recent fluctuations in oil 
prices/45 is that the agreed upon limit on the amount of oil lifted will be broken prior before the 
IOC is fully remunerated. One means of resolving this issue is including 'carry over' provisions 
whereby the IOC is allowed to acquire a larger quantity of oil within a specified time frame if the 
provisional amount was not sufficient; having the effect of decreasing the amount lifted in the 
period following the increased production. Arguably it is a deficiency of the model buy-back 
contrace46 that such a provision is not included, necessitating additional negotiation so as to 
ensure such provisions' presence in the final contract. 
344 This is particularly relevant if the NIOC has cash flow problems at the time of discovery, and therefore does not 
wish-to compensate the discoverer. 
345 It should be noted that this circumstance is le.ss rele~ant at the present time, due to tile _elevate~ pri~e of_9_i!. 
However: ihs~posslbtethatffie'prices~may-aecreaseonce-morf'ifid-ilieretor~ exac~rbateth~--n1k5--aescnbect above. 
346 A sample contract for Buy-Back transactions issued by the Iranian authorities to standardise oil transactions. 
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b) The financial structuring of a buy-back contract creates an additional challenge, as per Article 
II of the Model Contract, assets acquired by the contractor will remain NIOC's property, subject 
to pre-determined purchases of oil and remuneration not being granted until the rescinding of 
IOC's control. 
c) An additional dissuading factor for commercial involvement in oil fields is the possibility that 
the project costs may be higher than originally estimated, forcing the IOC to pay the difference, 
resulting in additional risk while the returns decrease. Even factors beyond the IOC' s control, 
such as an unpredictable drop in oil prices, 347 can result in serious difficulty as the foreign 
company would be obligated to make up for the costs and agreed return by using a limited 
amount of oil. The buy-back contract fails to account for such commercial contingencies, 
therefore not allowing for a standardised resolution procedure which would inspire confidence in 
foreign participants. 
d) Due to the nature of buy-back contracts, which require that all expenses and potential returns 
from the fields be accurately documented in the contract and that estimate is subsequently used 
as the basis for compensation, an additional source of risk arises as factors such as productivity 
rates, extent of oil reserves, time required for production and production costs are difficult to 
accurately predict before the operations have even begun. 
5.2.2 Foreign oil companies' stance on buy-back 
As well as receiving academic criticism, buy-back has also been the subject of critique by many 
ofthe foreign oil companies which had first-hand experience with the scheme. Total's envoy to 
Iran, for instance, insisted that such contracts are not the correct contractual type for the transfer 
347 Such as the·mostrecerif nadir, reached in January 1999, after increa5ed oil production from Iraq coincided with 
the Asian financial crisis, thus curtailing demand. 
217 
of know-how and technology: "In buy-back you develop fields and when it is finished you say 
goodbye to everything. You don't know how it is produced. And it is exactly the problem". He 
further noted the vulnerability of such contracts to changes in domestic politics, as last-minute 
changes in the contract are often demanded by the domestic authorities348 and international 
politics, as he insisted that Total would be unable to operate in Iran if further sanctions were to 
be imposed. This is not solely Total's position, as other European oil companies such as Shell, 
Eni SpA (E) , who have significant operations in Iran, agreed that the system may discourage 
them from investing in Iranian projects, with the alternative production sharing system being the 
preferred one. The view may have been accurately summarised by Bill Ramsay, a top executive 
of the International energy Agency who stated that: "Iran needs to provide a political and 
business environment in which companies won't feel they're going to lose their shirt." A recent 
cancellation of an investment in the energy sector by an energy consortium/49 attributed to 
negative domestic attitudes towards foreign involvement, shows that the political and business 
environment is indeed having a detrimental effect on oil commerce. 350 
Such a critical position on the viability of buy-backs as a financing scheme is also shared, to an 
extent, domestically, for instance by the Chairman of the Parliamentary Energy Commission of 
Iran Mr. Kamal Daneshyar, who anticipates "total change" in the structure of the oil sector and 
"fundamental" alterations to buy-back schemes, although unlike Total's position, his was based 
on the inefficiency of the system from the government's perspective. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
some consensus does exist that at least some modifications to the system are necessary, even if 
the reasons for such changes differ between the parties. 
348 
-Pfeiffer, D. A., 'Target Iran', first accessed 05/07/2007 
[http://www.fromthewildemess.com/free/ww3/082404_target_iran.shtml] 
349 Led by Germany's Linde AG (XET). 
350Market\Vatch:' firsraccessed'05/07 12001 
[http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?dist=newsfinder&siteid=google&guid=%7B46 
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Surprising, a minority of energy sector companies do maintain their satisfaction with the buy-
back schemes, for instance the Norwegian company Statoil, saying that "we do not feel there is 
any obstacle" in relation to Iranian energy operations, while its partner in the South Pars gas field 
project,351 the Swedish Finnvik, proclaimed its awareness and general satisfaction with the buy-
back scheme, given that " ... certain amendments (to the buy-back contract mode) that would help 
improve future deals"352 are made. 
5.2.3 Issues of legal and fiscal certainty in Buy-Back contracts 
It is not surprising that the financing mechanism that is buy-back contracts, which, especially in 
Iran, arise out of political considerations, are especially vulnerable to political fluctuations, 
therefore resulting in significantly less legal foreseability than do Production Sharing 
Agreements.353 This vulnerability is particularly present in regards to Iranian buy-back contracts, 
as the government policies, legislation and general attitudes tend to rapidly change, thus resulting 
in a degrading standard of protection for IOC's fiscal and legal position. Furthermore, the 
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act (FIPPA) passed by the Majlis in 2002 and 
regulating foreign investment in Iran does not offer holistic protection of upstream oil and gas 
buy-back contracts. Any suggestions of instituting major alterations in the buy-back model have 
been rejected on similar grounds of legal certainty as the senior Iranian diplomat Nejad-
Hosseinjan recently stated that "the main existing problems with our buy-backs can be modified 
by some slight changes without taking much time, given using any new model will lead to delays 
351 Oneofthe most extensive and promising fields in the region, shared between Qatar and Iran. 
352 Iran Daily. [www.irandaily.ir/1384/2274/html/focus.htm] 
353;PsAs· are rufalten1ative io the:Buy:.s·ac~'oft"erin!i affip1e i>rofecl:ioil":ffoiil rislftoffie invl!sfors.a.n<tlias been'ilsect 
favourably in poorer countries, often with difficult to access deposits. 
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in contracts under negotiations."354 Among these changes, the Scandinavian companies wish to 
see buy-back contracts being extended to over 20 years. 355 
In addition to these concerns, as Iran's legal system is based on Shari' a law, the domestic courts 
may have jurisdiction over disputes and certain vital commercial transactions, such as the 
charging of interest through LffiOR, 356 are banned. 357 Due to the power and wide jurisdiction of 
these courts, it is also possible that in a case of a contract dispute, these courts may deem the 
entire contract to have been illegal and void based on a violation of some tenet of Islam. The 
buy-back contract is the only feasible type of agreement permitted within the current Iranian 
Legal system. 
5.2.4 Issues with contract negotiation and bureaucracy 
As has been shown above, several provisions necessary for ensuring sufficient protection for the 
IOC are not included in the default Model Contract, therefore requiring separate negotiation for 
all aspects to be accounted for. Some of these decisions must be made in a speedy manner, which 
is inherently inconsistent with the bureaucratic and slow NIOC executive process. There is a 
consensus among oil companies involved in Iran that "We would obviously prefer things to 
happen more quickly" but "Iran is a country with a complex social structure, a complex political 
structure with a lot of checks and balances."358 Such comments are unsurprising as since the 
1979 Revolution, a redundant bureaucratic system has been built around the oil industry, with 
both the Ministry of Oil and the National Iranian Oil Company duplicating one another's work 
while lacking accountability and transparency, and therefore complicating the legality and 
354 China Institute. 
[http:/ /www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/nav03 .cfin?nav03=44161 &nav02=43873&nav0 l =43092] 
355 Iran Payvand. [http://www.payvand.com/news/06/apr/1186;html] 
356 London Interbank Offered Rate, a daily interest reference rate 
357'Nonetlfeless~interest'iirofteiitimes chargecfilfHusines's~tfansactiohs despite the official prohibition on doing so. 
358 According to Alan Stott, Iranian envoy ofBG Group, an oil extraction company 
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efficiency of dealings conducted with these structures. Indeed, Dr. Mina notes that even the 
structure of these authorities is not clear, as over a hundred companies affiliated with the Oil 
Ministry and NIOC have been created since the revolution/59 making dealings with the 
authorities cryptic and difficult. An additional complicating factor is the lack of a standard 
regulating law, or a replacement for the repealed Petroleum Act for the functioning of these 
authorities, as "decisions are made on the spur of the moment, without any consistency or regard 
for a long term national interest."360 
5.2.5 Domestic authorities' control over IOC activities and ramification of contract 
termination 
Iranian government authorities have significant and perhaps excessive control over the IOC due 
to domestic legal provisions. One of such laws is Article 139 of the Constitution which requires 
the approval of several authorities, including the Council of Ministers and the Parliament, to 
initiate arbitration of any legal disputes between a foreign party and a domestic party such as the 
NIOC. The discretionary approval may be of particular relevance where the contract is 
terminated prematurely, which is one of the contingencies in buy-back Agreements, allowing the 
NIOC to take ownership of IOC-built facilities. The consequences would include a tremendous 
financial loss and no compensation, either because the NIOC refuses to cooperate, as it acted as 
per the contract or due to the difficulty of procuring a permission to arbitrate. 
As this discretionary power of approval is placed in the hands of authorities linked by common 
interest to one of the parties in the planned arbitration, procuring such an approval from the 
Council of Ministers or the Parliament will be difficult. This is especially true as the current 
Parliament is known for its hard-line stance and is therefore unlikely to either authorise the 
_::.;- 359 Now employing over t8o;ooo people iil comparison to about so;ooo pnor to 1979. 
360Interview with Dr. Mina. [bayegan.blogspot.com/2005/08/irans-new-oil-disorder-interview-with.html] 
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formation of new contracts with foreign firms or arbitration of existing ones. As was noted by a 
source in the Iranian business community, "any attempt by the reformers to base their 
negotiations with foreign companies on market norms always faces problems because a very 
conservative section of the government has to be persuaded that it is in the country's benefie61 
and nobody can be accused of having sold the country out." 362 
5.3 Risks and Disadvantages of buy-back contracts from the perspective of the NIOC 
The presence of numerous grievances advanced by the foreign companies regarding buy-back 
contracts does not preclude a similar number of complaints from the domestic authorities. The 
sharing of such a stance by the government also adds to the political difficulty of instituting any 
significant reform, particularly a complete change of the contractual framework. Consequently, 
in order to assess the potential and scope for change within Iranian oil transactions, the 
grievances of the domestic participants in buy-back must be understood. 
5.3.1 Lack of financial incentives for improvement of efficiency and long term development 
Contrary to the assertion of the IOC that the viability of its involvement in Iranian oil projects 
may fluctuate suddenly along with the oil prices, the NIOC maintains that no actual price risk is 
placed on the IOC, which leads also to no incentive being present to improve the efficiency of 
the operation. This is due the fixed rate of return363 and the lack of financial benefit for 
increasing exploitation effectiveness. NIOC's liability for price decreases may indeed be drastic 
361 The domestic authorities' fear of excessive foreign exports and involvement may be based on the 8% annual 
decrease in JJroductiQn capacity while the national consumption is increasing by 7%. 36? ,..___ :-::_ ~,..-.... ~~ . .,_~·.-:-.,:.-,,.-·- -;,~~,.:"."-" -~..,.-_....;~,,--"'=>:•'-'"::~ _., ... ··-"~· -....,.._ ..... -~- -- -,. ~-~,'- - -~:- ' ..... ' --·-"'-"" --·J·- .~_,.--.. e;....,;...-~ -~,-~. • • . . . 
- BBC News. [hnp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2512015.stm] 
363 Usually 15-18 percent. 
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as if such fluctuations occur, NIOC must sell greater quantities of the product in order to fulfil 
the compensation provision.364 
However, the argument of the IOC that negative market movements in regards to oil may mean 
that the quantity of oil permitted to be exploited may not suffice for repaying project expenses 
and the agreed return rate. 
A point on which both domestic and foreign critics agree is the length of the contract, which 
those concerned with the maximally effective exploitation of Iran's natural reserves claim 
compels IOC to recover its costs thro.ugh the sale of oil at the peak stretch of the field's 
performance, rather than to ensure a longer period of high performance and sell the product 
during this 'plateau' period. Vitally, no incentive for ensuring high performance exists at all 
immediately prior to turning the production over to the NIOC at the conclusion of the contract. 
The need for efficiency-improvement incentives is evident to some foreign companies, for 
instance Statoil which stated that "some incentives are needed; if you do good job you should be 
awarded and ifyou do bad job there should be no more cooperation."365 Dr. Ghanimifar suggests 
that the problem ofiOC's disinterest in the output of the operation after it has finished selling the 
product for its own compensation benefit may be resolved by allowing the contractor to play a 
supervisory role after returning the project to the NIOC, therefore creating an incentive to ensure 
its continued effectiveness. 366 
364 Iran Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis - Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal. 
[http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabsllranlpdf.pdt] 
365 As stated by Statoil's representative in Iran. [http://www.payvand.com/news/06/apr/1186.html} 
366 Iilterview'wiill'Dr:-ohanimifai"c" · · · · · --- - · - --- · · ·· - --· · -
[ www.petroenergyinfo.net/News View.aspx?Groupld=5&Mnuld=6&Newsld=26603&Page= 1} 
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5.3.2 Problems with comparing competing project bids and inaccurate project demands 
The process of determining the optimal arrangement for oil exploitation and exploration is vital 
for maximising profits for the NIOC. However, the bidding process is itself mired with 
problems, namely that of bids not conforming to the stated requirements and therefore not easily 
comparable. For instance, the recent bidding for the three Bangestan fields, by BP, Shell, Total, 
FinaElf and Eni resulted in varied, multi-phased bids with 15-20 years duration of project work 
rather than the requested five-year buy-back contract format. This example is indicative of a 
secondary problem of bidding; namely the unrealistic requirements of the NIOC which, the 
companies have decided in this case, were not economically worthwhile or practically possible. 
Due to this lack of standardisation of bids, extensive negotiations between PEDEC367 and each 
participant would instead be required, therefore losing the economic efficiency and speed of a 
bidding approach. 
5.3.3 Drawbacks of the present contractual structure 
Iran released two model contracts in 2003: Sample Exploration Service Contract and Sample 
Service Contract for the Development Operations, the former being a contract to explore for 
reserves for a specified period with a successful exploration allowing for negotiation of a 
Development Service Contract and a failed exploration resulting in a negotiated fee and a 
Remuneration Fee based on the internal rate of retum.368 Meanwhile, the latter contract is of an 
unspecified duration, with a Joint Management committee overseeing operations while the 
foreign contractor operates the field development. The contractor is subsequently compensated 
for the operation expenses and remuneration being made available as a percentage of the net 
revenues from sale. 
367 Petroleum Engineering and Development Company, a NIOC subsidiary charged with oil buy-back contract 
-- negotiatio1i~ " · · · - · 
368 Currently constituting 15%. 
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Despite the recent issuance of the Model Contracts, they nonetheless fail to address the previous 
problems of buy-back contracts and introduce even greater legal uncertainty as the current 
separation of contracts into two types makes assessment of required development costs overly 
difficult. A single, combined contractual framework would permit a more appealing set of 
obligations, with guaranteed repayment of exploration expenses, regardless of whether it was 
successful. 369 
5.4 Conclusion 
The numerous flaws of the current version of the buy-back system have been exploited by its 
critics to allege that the model as a whole is not a superior or viable alternative to other schemes, 
such as PSA or concessions, even taking into account Iran's unique constitutional limitations. 
The opponents of buy-back believe that the constitutional limitations may be sidestepped through 
an appropriately altered interpretation of concession or PSA regimes, while resulting in greater 
efficiency and profit balance than the buy-back currently allows. 
Opponents of buy-back contracts also cite statistics which appear to show the buy-back 
contracts' inability to suit the Iranian market, through the recent decline ofthe rate of inking new 
oil contracts.370 However, it is arguable that the declining popularity of such contracts may be 
attributed just as easily to the specific grievances with buy-back terms as implemented in Iran 
rather than with the structure or idea of the buy-back contract in itself. 
Among such proposed schemes is a version of PSA suited specifically for the Iranian 
environment, whereby foreign and Iranian oil companies would form joint ventures which would 
not contravene the Constitution while essentially acting as a PSA. The Majlis is allegedly 
369University of Dundee, 08/05/2003 [http://www .dundee.ac.uk/cepmlpllnfoServ/Barrows _ Alerts.php] 
370
'1ris'rtotewortlif1hiWdespite'this fac('Imnstill receiveit T4 cl:iiiliortdoiifu-5' foreign investmenrTri the .years prior to 
2005, with 12 billion originating from Buy-Backs. 
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considering such a proposal at the present time, so as to attract further foreign investment to a 
country in need of modernisation in the energy sector. 
A factor that cannot be ignored when considering the adoption of schemes alternative to the buy-
back is the constitutional and political ramifications. Even if such a proposal was not prima facie 
contrary to Article 81 of the Constitution, for instance the 'joint enterprise' proposal described 
above, it must be noted that the Iranian courts would retain jurisdiction over any contracts signed 
through this new scheme and, as they are traditionally prejudiced against foreign involvement, 
would be likely to strike down any such deals due to their perception of them as being 
exploitative of Iranian national wealth. In view of the escalating conflict of Iran's government 
with those of Europe and US, where the major oil companies are located, it is therefore unlikely 
that an adoption of an alternative scheme, even if disguised as a 'joint enterprise' arrangement, 
would survive such parliamentary or judicial review. 
Moreover, other attempts at substantially reforming the buy-back system have not succeeded as 
resoundingly as critics of buy-back would suggest. For instance, a contract was signed with the 
Canadian firm Sheer Energy, using ENI-limited risk/reward terms,371 a substantial alteration to 
the default buy-back scheme, but a burst of commercial interest in further investment was not 
forthcoming. 
It is of further note that no reason exists why the current desire for reform found within the 
domestic energy authorities cannot be used so as to integrate certain aspects of other financing 
schemes. Simply because the alternative financing schemes, be they PSAs or concessions, are 
illegal due to the limiting articles of the Constitution, does not mean that their constituent parts 
cannot be joined to the current framework of buy-back. 
j 
371 Named"afterthe"Jiliie200lsigningonfBuy~Bad( contrad\vitll'ENI to develop Darkhovin field, with the 
significant difference of payment being linked to production capacity. 
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Despite frequent assertions by the Iranian authorities that buy-back in its current form is a 
success/72 the dissatisfaction pertaining to its terms is often shared between domestic and 
foreign participants. Consequently, reform is called for, especially considering the ambitious 
targets set out by the current administration for the near future, with the Fourth Five Year Plan 
(2005-2009) calling for a 5.2 million barrel boost in oil production, which can only be 
accomplished through extensive foreign investment, with just an addition of one million barrels 
requiring 12 billion dollars of foreign money. Taking into account the possibility of additional 
sanctions and the resulting dissuasive effect, the improvement and modification of the current oil 
contract negotiation scheme appears to be necessary. The beginning of such reforms may be 
gleaned from the most recent negotiations with Shell and Repsol, which have previously signed 
energy contracts but were dissatisfied with financial losses due to the unexpectedly rising prices 
of products and equipment, as well as fluctuating oil prices; all common complaints in relation to 
buy-back terms. In response, a new version of the contract was offered by the government 
whereby Iran will have a closer relationship with the foreign companies during the 
implementation stage of the project, including participation in calculation of expenses. Vitally, 
the agreement stipulates that in the contingency that the required machinery and equipment is 
more expensive than predicted contractually, the domestic party will help compensate for the 
difference. Such reforms, even if limited, nonetheless contribute to the lowering of the much-
dreaded risks associated with buy-backs for the IOC, making such contracts with Iran 
significantly more appealing. 
> 372 For instance, it was asserted by 'the Khatami-era Oil Ministry that over 90% oflranian energy projects have been 
successfully tendered during his administration. 
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Indeed, the most recent information pertaining to buy-back reforms373 suggests that officials are 
willing to extend the reforms beyond the simple alteration of the existing components of buy-
back contracts, such as the duration, but also to more substantive aspects, borrowed from other 
schemes. One example of such substantive reforms are the proposals to provide contractually 
agreed upon reward bonuses for foreign contractors whose fields exceed expectations, therefore 
ensuring the presence of a motivator for enhancing their performance even after they have 
acquired their core compensation quantity from the output.374 Such terms are atypical for a buy-
back contract and clearly indicate the integrative nature of these reforms. Even more technical 
alterations may amount to greatly increased incentives for involvement in the Iranian energy 
market, such as the proposed innovation of determining the capital budget at a later stage of the 
project than is currently the practice, therefore permitting one of the most presently dangerous 
aspects of buy-back contracts to be bypassed-inaccurate estimates of costs for which the 
contractor would then be liable. Indeed, even the traditionally uneven balance of the bargaining 
and arbitration power within buy-back contracts is about to be altered through the inclusion of 
'get out' clauses permitting contract termination in the case of sanctions. 
Despite addressing some of the aforementioned IOC concerns, another significant source of 
criticism remains unresolved, namely the excessively short duration of buy-back contracts; 
unsatisfactory for both the IOC and the NIOC, albeit for different reasons. Some suggestions that 
contract length was to be lengthened were heard from the Oil Ministry, namely the former 
Deputy-Minister Nejad-Hosseinian. Nonetheless, the official position as voiced by the ex-
Petroleum Minister Seyed Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh remains that granting of longer term contracts 
would contravene the Iranian law banning the sharing of natural reserves with other parties. 
373 Such as the 2007 article in the Economist 'Polishing the Shop Window' 
{http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfin?st()ry_id=8~575Q2] . .. . . . . . . . .. ·····.··· ..... _ .. 
7
.4 Ifis'notewortliy tliat'iliisoiffenttroiliihe'r>reVIOTisYerm'SCaS"'ftie~contrador .could be punished lor sub-par. 
performance, but never rewarded for exceeding the targets. 
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Some incremental change may be forthcoming, however, as it has been suggested that companies 
be permitted to consult during the production processes, so as to gain experience in these 
processes for future projects. An additional benefit of this reform in the long term is the 
improvement of field efficiency due to the ability of these consultants to offer proposals to the 
NIOC with practical experience at hand.375 Nonetheless it remains to be seen whether such 
measures will remain purely cosmetic or if they help address the seemingly unchangeable limit 
on the length of the contracts. 
However, it is possible that encouraging greater involvement of the foreign parties with the oil 
fields, even past the actual duration of the contract, may discourage the tactic of taking vast 
amounts of oil for compensation at the peak of the production, so as to shorten the capital 
turnover, but at the risk of damaging the field. Additionally, the ex-Petroleum Minister insists 
that such tactics are becoming less viable as the relationship between the parties are more 
structured, with the use of Master Development Plans predicting such actions and the NlOC 
having the 'final say' on permitting them. An increasing pool of educated Iranian geologists and 
other related professionals, the ex-Minister claims, will ensure that only carefully devised and 
fair MDPs will be approved.376 Collaboration and consultation with foreign companies may 
have the added advantage of aiding the technology sharing, which is currently a concern for the 
NIOC as the short contract durations do not permit significant technology to be acquired by the 
NIOC from the foreign contractor. This problem is especially serious due to the practice of the 
IOC acquiring its compensation share of the production from the peak period, and subsequently 
not applying its superior technological resources to enhance production when the field begins to 
decline, when such technology would be most effective. 
> 375 The'Ministerchiim-s"thafSeveftil major-companies have already voiced interest in this scheme. 
376 Interview with the Petroleum Minister. [http://www.shana.ir/99264-en.html] 
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Such less radical, integrative changes, like the January 2004 decision to increase the maximum 
contract length from 5-7 years to 25 and permit IOC involvement following the hand-off to 
NIOC, may boost foreign interest more effectively as they partially address some of the 
investors' main concerns without introducing the legal and commercial chaos that might stem 
from a rapid and drastic change of the contracts' structure and legal basis. These reforms were 
confirmed in September 2006 when the NIOC issued 24 international tenders for fields with the 
proviso of longer contract terms being available so as to increase recovery rates, and as stated by 
Mahmoud Mohaddes, 377 such changes may legally and profitably balance the need for 
government control of the fields with the commercial interests ofthe investors. 
In the light of the above factors, it therefore becomes clear that the interests of both parties to 
energy negotiations, that of utilising national reserves in a maximally efficient manner, and that 
of maximising profit, may be achieved through continuing and expanding the current reform 
trend without the need for social and political upheaval that would inevitably result from the 
adoption of an unconstitutional, non-buy-back model. 
Having studied the relative flaws and strengths of the existing model, it is now appropriate to 
consider the sum of Iranian oil transactions since the introduction of the buy-back in order to 
understand both the general state and terms of oil contracts and the effect of external factors on 
foreign investment. The most important and influential projects have been chosen to illustrate 
these economic trends in the following chapter, as well as to show the practical effects of 
dissatisfaction with the existing buy-back provisions. 
377 The NIOC director of exploration. 
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Chapter 6: Case Study on Iranian Buy-Back Transactions 
6.1 Introduction 
As we have seen, Iran's constitution allows neither direct equity stakes nor the grant of 
concessionary rights. In the light of this, the Petroleum Act made provisions for the formation of 
agreements between the Petroleum Ministry and "local and foreign national persons and legal 
entities." 
The early 1990s saw a re-evaluation of this position in the light of the economic imperative to 
develop Iran's crude oil production; a succession ofthree Five Year Plans sketched a succession 
of ambitious plans in this regard, all of which ultimately proved unworkable, the two biggest 
obstacles being the low domestic levels ofboth capital and expertise. 
It had become clear that Iran could no longer operate in isolation: overseas technical and 
financial investment was necessary to realise a vibrant oil sector. In 1995, the oil industry 
approached the Majlis in an attempt to circumvent the entrenched barriers formed by the 
Constitution; after some debate, it was decided that whilst "investment" would remain forbidden, 
mere "financing" would not. 
This doctrine was to produce the "buy-back" contract. The reality is, however, that the typical 
role played by the foreign company in such agreements is substantially that of a technical 
adviser. Essentially the foreign party undertakes the initial investment and is assumed to recoup 
by exploiting the end product. 
It was envisaged that the buy-back contract would maintain Iranian possession of and control 
over its oil ana gas reserves. The aims ofthe contract are as follows: 
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• Transfer of technology; 
• Short-term contractor presence; 
• NIOC's full control and close supervision over the schedule and costs; 
• Lower costs compared to other contracts commonly used in the oil industries; 
• Maximum use of domestic engineering, technical and executive capabilities in order to 
promote the quality of domestic sources and prevent the outflow of foreign currency.378 
In this chapter we will attempt to assess those contracts which are signed under the buy-back 
scheme, and to see whether the underlying aims and objectives have been achieved. 
6.2 A Summary of the Contracts 
In 1998 the first major buy-back investment project came on-stream. The offshore Sirri A field 
(under the operation of Total and Petronus) was now producing 7,000 bp/d. Shortly afterwards 
the adjacent field of Serri379 E began production, with an expected combined output of 120,000 
bp/d. The 1995 agreement would see NIOC slowly assume control over five years from the start 
of production, although Total will remain close to the operation until its investments have been 
fully realised. The March of 1999 saw Total (then the French Elf Aquitaine) and Eni win a $1 
billion contract over the Doroud oil and gas field off Kharg island, in a secondary recovery 
programme intended to boost production of the 1.5-billion-barrel field from 136,000 bp/d to a 
projected 205,000 bp/d; Eni holds a 45% stake, whilst Total (the operators) hold 55%.380 
378 Oil and Gas article, Atieh Bahar, date of access; 4/5/2006 [http://www.atiehbahar.com/Resources/Oii&Gas.htm] 
379 Reuters announced on 9th October 1998 that Total, a major French oil firm, initiated the Sirri deposit's 
exploitation which was the first collaboration in petroleum with Iran since the Revolution. However, the starting 
statistics have been lacklustre in relation to other buy-back deals, with onlny Bow Valley and Premier securing 
deals, as well as the aforementioned Total agreement. K. Bassiti Associates 
I~o~{(;!~~~;~~~~~t~~~~;~~r;}oreign·co;iifidhih Involvement, 05/3/2006 
[http://www.oilgasarticles.com/articles/ll6/l/lran-Oii-Sector-and-Foreign-Companies-Involvment!Pagel.html] 
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In April of that year, Elf (46.75% share) Eni (38.25%) and Bow Valley Energy (15%) were 
awarded a buy-back deal to exploit the Balal field, with it 80 million barrels of reserves. 
Production began in 2003 at 20,000 bp/d, doubling to 40,000 bp/d by February 2004.381 
In 2000, the Norwegian Statoil concluded a number of contracts382 with NIOC to fmd petroleum 
in the Strait of Hormuz, 383 and in February 2001, the finding of a large deposit, named Dasht-e 
Abadan near its port-city namesake, was proclaimed, with the size of the deposit possibly 
rivalling that of Azadegan. 
In January 2001, the Majlis sanctioned the exploitation of Azadegan by participants from outside 
Iran using the "buy-back" system. Inpex, lacking an in-house upstream experience, involved 
Total and the commencement of production is anticipated after 2009, rising to 160,000 bbl/d by 
2012 and 250,000 bbl/d by 2014/15; the production could therefore form up to 6% of Japan's 
total crude imports. Thus far, however, the project has failed to advance much: most critically it 
still lacks a NIOC sanctioned operating agreement. 
Disputes have arisen over the minefields (abandoned after the Iran-Iraq war) which still litter the 
area, as well as the rising cost of steel which have served to make the initial contract less 
attractive to the Japanese. Iran submitted a protest in 2005, criticising the slow progress and 
warning that unless a final agreement could be concluded within a year (by September 2006) 
they would begin development themselves. 
381 Oil Magazine, a quarterly Magazine published by Ministry of Oil, Kuwait 
[http:/ /www.moo.gov .kw/magazine/en/index.asp?More=yes&NewsiD= 354&mode=O&day= l3&page=20] Date of 
access: 14/6/2006 
382 The two firms further collaborate on the building of a processing factory for fields in the south, as well as the 
Salman deposit. 
383Fiashpoihi:' 'World Conflicts Report on Iran [http://www.flashpomts.info/countries-conflicts/lran-
web/Iran _ briefing.htm] 
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In 2002, the Petroleum Ministry inked a buy-back agreement in the value of almost $600 million, 
with Petrolran, whose parent company is the NIOC, in order to exploit the Foroozan reserves, 
located on the border with Saudi Arabia and expected to produce up to 65,000 bbl/d .. 
The Cheshmeh-Khosh oil field is located in Dasht-e Abbas, in southern part of Ilam province. 
Exploitation rights were initially given to the Spanish firm Cepsa for three hundred million USD, 
but was subsequently given instead to the Central Iranian Oil Fields Company, another state 
subsidiary.384 
Canadian Sheer energy was given rights to exploit the Masjed-e-Suleyman deposits in 2002, with 
the aim of boosting output to 20,000 bbl/d. This firm's commitment was replaced by that of the 
Chinese company, CNPC, which purchased the subdivision of the Canadian company 
responsible for the contract, and subsequently initiated its operations in 2005. 
In 2004, a group of Japanese companies, headed by Inpex, inked a contract valued at $2 billion, 
for the exploitation of the huge Azadegan field, known for being the biggest find in Iran for three 
decades. An onshore field in Khuzestan, Azadegan has proven crude reserves of 26 billion 
barrels, but the geological complexities of the field are anticipated to render extraction more 
complex and thus expensive. 
Moreover, in March 2005, an agreement to exploit the Bangestan reserves was given to Petro 
Iran Development Co., 385 following a number of time-consuming obstacles. The field in question 
384 Addressing the inaugural ceremony, the managing director of the NIOC on July 2006 noted that the project has 
cost about 73.5 billion Rials and 6.8 million dollars. Alireza Zeighami noted that Iranian specialists have totally 
designed and built water processing and wastewater treatment plants, which are being built in Iran's upstream 
industry for the first time. Referring to production capacity of National Iranian Central Oil Company, he stated that 
the company is currently producing 122,000 barrels per day crude oil. He added that Cheshmeh Khosh plant will 
increase production capacity of the company to 150,000 barrels per day, but needed pipelines should be constructed. 
Shana Oil and Gas Information, 28 July 2006[http://www.shana.ir/86680-en.html] 
385 Petro Iran Development Company (PEDCO or Petro Iran) was established in October 1998 and is stiiJ evolving 
as ·a:new··entity'wiiliiii 'theoil'sector.'Petrolrm{was""illiila1lyforme<i'i0'6eilie1niDirurpartiier.o1 f~"'reTg;i .contra~~rs 
with a 10% share in each buy-back contract. Atieh Bahar [http://www.atiehbahar.com/Resources/Oil&Gas.htm] 
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is one of Iran's oldest and most effort-intensive, although approximate 6 billion barrels are 
available for exploitation at a rate of 158,000 bbl/d. The field is experiencing production drop-off 
issues due to its advanced age, with half its output already lost while another half is expected to 
disappear due to insufficient gas re-injection.386 
In the last decade, the state oil agency found several deposits, particularly the Darkhovin field, 
which was the subject of a recent 2001 deal with Eni, for a five and a half year duration and $1 
billion value, with the unusual component of a provision linking the production capacity with the 
extent of compensation. 387 
A further recent discovery is that of the Anaran deposits, with 2 billion barrels and a capacity of 
up to 100,000 bbl/d, with Lukoil and Norsk Hydro participating in its exploitation, which is 
made more difficult by an abundance of mines in the area. 
An additional element of Iran's efforts to increase the inking of contracts is the 2006 
announcement by the chief executive of the Petroleum Engineering Company that I 0 more fields 
in the south of Iran will be made available to tender, with around $7 billion worth of funds 
required for their development. 388 
386 EIA, Energy Information Administration,[ http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/lran/Oil.html] 
387 Oil Magazine, Ministry of Oil, Kuwait, date of access: 14/6/2006 
[http://www.moo.gov.kw/magazine/en/index.asp?More=yes&NewsiD=354&mode=O&day=l3&page=20] 
:> 388 Petio Iran Development Company (J>EOCO or Petro Iran) was established in October 1998 and is stifl evolving 
as a new entity within the oil sector. 
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FigureS: Major Iranian Oil Fields 
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Source: Joint Economic Committee Research Report, March 2006 [www.house.gov/jec] 
According to Market Research Oil Report 2006389, Iran 's oi l fields (onshore and offshore) are as 
fo llows: 
I . Abuzar Oi lfield 
2. Aghajari Oilfield 
3. Ahvaz-Bangestan Oilfield 
4. Anaran Oilfield 
5. Azadegan Oilfield 
Jl!l Research and Market, Iran's Report 2006 
[http://www.researchnndmarkets.com/reportinfo.asp?report_id=32434 1 &t=d&cat id J 
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6. Bahregan and Hendijan Oilfield 
7. Balal Oilfield 
8. Bibi Hakimeh Oilfield 
9. Binak and Golkhari Oilfields 
10. Caspian Sea Oilfield 
11. Cheshmeh Khosh Oilfield 
12. Darkhovin Oilfield (Onshore and Offshore) 
13. Daroud Oilfield (Onshore and Offshore) 
14. Dashte Abadan Oilfield 
15. Dehloran Oilfield 
16. Farsi Oilfield 
17. Forouzan and Esfandyar Oilfields 
18. Gachsaran Oilfield 
19. Haftgel Oilfield 
20. Hengam Oilfield 
21. Jofair Oilfield 
22. Kabood Oilfield 
23. Karanj Oilfield 
24. Kharg Oilfield 
25. Khesht Oilfield 
26. Khorramabad Oilfield 
27. Kuhmund Oilfield 
28. Lavan A Oilfield 
29. Maleh Kooh Oilfield 
30. Mansouri Oilfield (Asmari Reservoir) 
31. Maroun Oilfield 
32. Masjid e Soleiman Oilfield 
33. Monir Block 
34. Nosrat Oilfield 
35. Nosrat Oilfield 
36. Paydar Oilfield 
37. Pazanan Oilfield 
38. Rage Sefid Oilfield 
39. Saadatabad Oilfield 
40. Salman Oilfield 
41. Sarkan Oilfield 
42. Sarvestan Oilfield 
43. Saveh Block 
44. Shadegan Oilfield 
45. Sirri A Oilfield 
46. Sirri E Oilfield 
47. Soroush and Nowruz Oilfields 
48. South Pars Oil Layer (South Pars Gas Field) 
49. Yadavaran Oilfield 
50. Zagheh Oilfield 
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In order to understand the terms and conditions of buy-back contracts some of the most 
important of them are analysed in a greater dept in the following paragraph. 
6.3 The Most Commercially Influential Oil Projects of Iranian Buy-Back 
In order to fully understand the functioning and comparative advantages of buy-back framework, 
it is necessary to consider, selectively, some of the most important and influential projects in Iran 
that have utilised buy-back. An analysis of their terms and outcomes allows the gauging of the 
attractiveness of buy-back as well as its effectiveness. 
6.3.1 The Bangestan Oil Field Project 
The Bangestan field is located around Ahvaz in Khuzestan province and forms one of the 
country's largest onshore fields, with production at 150,000-170,000 bbl/d and expected to reach 
400,000. On the 18th of March 2005 NIOC concluded a $900 million contract with PIDC390 
which was expected to produce between 70,000 and 120,000 bp/d; unfortunately, the two parties 
rapidly fell into dispute. 
PIDC's managing director, Mostafa Khoi, issued a statement that the contract on the 
development of Ahvaz Bangestan oil field had not been verified and communicated by NIOC. 
In response Ali Akbar Vahidi Alaqa, Managing Director of the Oil Development Engineering 
Company, as one of the parties to the negotiations with Petro Iran told PIN391 that it was not right 
to use the term verification for the Ahvaz Bangestan contract. "The delay in implementation of 
the Bangestan project has no justification. Even after initial signing of the contract and review of 
details, it was decided that the maintenance and production plan should be different from what 
.::x 390 Petf<Wiran DeveJopmei1lCotnpany 
391 Petroleum Industry News Agency. 
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has already been agreed upon. Negotiations are now underway on how to make such changes and 
with the announcement of results, the contract for implementation of the project will be 
completed."392 
a) Buy-back and the incentive for foreign investors 
All oil fields, especially the ageing ones, are suffering a drop in production from their reserves 
every year. Accordingly, the National Iranian Oil Company has concentrated its efforts towards 
redressing this reduction and increasing the daily production capacity of the oil fields. As we 
have seen, the issue concerning the activities of the National Southern Oil Rich Regions 
Company as a firm in charge of developing Ahvaz Bangestan oil field has turned into a bone of 
contention between the two parties to the contract. 
Assessing the competing tenders of overseas investors has become complex, because whilst 
NIOC has continued to offer five year contracts the companies concerned are reluctant to invest 
for such short periods; the work does not seem likely to reach completion in so short a time, and 
to simply invest billions of dollars in another business is far from their standard business 
practice. The result is that all bids have become non-conforming, which makes them extremely 
difficult to compare side by side. For example, NIOC is having issues with comparison of the 
competing submissions by BP, Shell, TotalFinaElf, and Eni. Other than the latter, all the 
companies have submitted offers for the 3 Bangestans, and unfortunately all the tenders are not 
in conformance with the requirements, as their structure contains multiple phases, with projected 
durations of between 15 and 20 years. 
> 392 This is &S direct a translation as possible from an article, published on the Naft Nevis website at 
[http://naftnevis,com/?m=20051 O&page=2 from October 2005 
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Protracted internal discussion at NIOC has failed to suggest a solution. The next stage would be 
deliberations by the Petroleum Engineering and Development Company (a state-affiliated 
company charged with negotiating agreements) with the various candidates. It has been 
suggested that the most likely outcome will be the evolution of a consortium led by the more 
politically acceptable companies. The only real point of comparison, therefore, is the proposed 
additions to production. Overall, 350,000 b/d of increasing output was predicted in relation to 
these deposits. 
Output at the Ahwaz Bangestan operation has decreased to 150,000 bp/d from 250,000, 
Fesharaki states, and this fall (if unaddressed) is likely to continue to 60,000. Were Iran to invest 
in gas reinjection, output may be levelled out at 200,000 bp/d, although this is subject to the 
obvious restrictions of local expertise. 
Fesharaki's view (unlike many other experts) is that Iran will be able maintain its present 
production levels of 3.9 million bp/d; equally, he has called the projections of 5.3 million by 
2010 "impossible" in the current "buy-back" investment climate, even without the US sanctions. 
b) The effect of the rising price of oil 
The sharp escalation in international oil prices following the conclusion of the Ahvaz Bangestan 
oil field development contract meant NIOC became reluctant to countenance any reduction in 
production, so as to maximise the national income. In achieving this aim, NIOC had to choose 
between delegating to either the National South Oil Rich Regions Company or to the Petro Iran 
Development Company which would necessitate a renegotiation of their contract. 
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Choosing the first option seems to be more economical and such a decision would mean the start 
of operation by the National South Oil Rich Regions Company to maintain production level by 
drilling more wells, along with the development efforts of the Petro Iran Company. 
Despite the fact that the output of the Ahvaz Bangestan field will remain high, as will sales (at a 
time of high oil prices), the impact on the contractor company will actually be negative. Because 
of the nature of buy-back contracts, PIDC will receive the capital and surrounding expenses from 
oil sales revenues from these development issues. The company, on the other hand, is denied an 
opportunity to make money by raising its own production. The lower the share of the company 
is in raising the crude output of the oil field, the longer it will take to recoup. 
If the present production levels remain unchanged, however, there will be no output increase and 
the company will therefore be unable to repay the expenses of the project, in which case the buy-
back project will be threatened. The average production capacity of Ahvaz Bangestan as it 
stands is at 150,000- 155,000 bp/d; on the basis ofthe projections proposed by PIDC when the 
contract was signed, NIOC should allow the field's natural decline to continue until the PIDC's 
rejuvenation project is completed. This contract originally allowed PIDC a large margin of error, 
with only 48,000-50,000 barrels of the 220,000 bp/d to be allocated to aims other than repayment 
of expenses. However, NIOC's decision to prevent any fall in production at a time of high oil 
prices has therefore rendered it impossible for PIDC to realise its projected profits. 
c) Outcome ofthe negotiations to be made known in ten days 
In an interview the director ofNIOC's legal department, Dr. Mostafa Zeineddin said the reason 
the contract on development of Ahvaz Bangestan oil field has not officially been announced to 
PIDC was the need for continued assessment of production conditions in the field, with technical 
discussion over possible solutionsto the field output probfem being a centnil area of debate. 
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He reminded that PIDC, is one of the firms affiliated to the NIOC and therefore negotiations 
between these two parties should not be viewed as part of a wider crisis over the execution of 
contracts. Negotiations on terms of the contract will continue for the next week and the outcome 
is expected to be made known within the next ten days. 
Referring to NIOC's fruitless negotiations with several international firms over the past few years 
on implementation of Ahvaz Bangestan development project, he made it clear that this has been 
complicated from the beginning. 
Talks with foreign companies did not bear any fruit because of the priority given to technical 
details and optimal production. 
d) Previous negotiations on Bangestan 
Upon receiving proposals from participants to a tender for development of the Ahvaz Bangestan 
oil field, new information on drilling of wells in the field was provided to the bidders which 
envisioned changes to the previously announced terms. This explained why the proposals made 
by bidders differed from earlier predictions. 
British Petroleum (BP) and Total were the last participants in the tender and were engaged in 
talks with the NIOC until late last year. However, fundamental differences in methods proposed 
by these two companies for development of the oil field made it very difficult to select a 
contractor for execution of the project. The tender was ultimately announced null and void. Later 
on, the Petro Iran Development Company was assigned to increase the daily output of the Ahvaz 
Bangestan oil field from I 00,000-150,000 bp/d to 220,000 bp/d 70 months into its launch at a 
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total cost of 900 million dollars. It is predicted that the implementation of the project within a 
period of 25 years will entail an additional crude production of around one billion barrels. 393 
6.3.2 Japanese Investment in the Azadegan Development 
Azadegan, located in south-eastern Iran, near the Iraq border, is Iran's largest deposit. An 
estimated 26 billion barrels of crude oil makes it the world's largest undeveloped oil reserve. 
Iran extended favoured rights to develop the oilfield to Japan in 2000. After holding extensive 
negotiations, Japan pledged to provide a $3-billion credit to Iran over 3 years and the two 
countries signed a $2-billion agreement in 2004 for development of Azadegan. Inpex394 holds a 
75% stake while NIOC holds the remaining 25% stake.395 
Total joined National Iranian Oil (NIO) and a consortium of Japanese firms led by Inpex in the 
development of Azadegan. The news was leaked by an anonymous source to Dow Jones 
Newswires stating "It's finalized - Total is joining the process with anywhere from a 12% to 15% 
stake in the project."396 
Prior to this news there were reports that Iran had been looking to bring in new firms as the final 
date for inking a contract passed without success. It was reported that Japan was "dragging its 
feet on the project."397 
393 Iran Daily Domestic Economy, 26/09/2006 [http://www.iran-daily.com/1385/2670/html/economy.htm] 
394 lnpex was established in 1966 to promote the development of oil resources in an international context. Inpex is 
actively engaged as a project operator, conducting successful explorations in Indonesia and Australia. 
395 Rigzone; oil and gas industry website, 4th September 2006 
[http:/ /www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a _id=35814] 
)t'c J96jfjjj;/'~ c '~ ' . .. ·.···· • . '. , 
397 Iran Daily Economic Focus, 13/09/2006 [http:l/irandaily.ir/1385/2659/html/focus.htm] 
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(a) American pressure, Japanese oil requirements and the Inpex deal 
The Financial Times (London) claimed that the US was pressuring Japan to cease its petroleum 
dealings with Iran, over concerns about its nuclear program.398 However, virtually all of Japan's 
crude oil is dependant on imports, with, as of 2001, 88.4% of that coming from the Middle 
East.399 This reliance on foreign petroleum makes securing deals on this issue a vital matter, and 
the Japanese government cited this need when Inpex made their deal with NIOC. 
Seifollah Jashnsaz, managing director of National Iranian South Oilfields Company, told ISNA 
that: 
"[t]he development of the field is interesting because the Iranian technicians have carried out 
most of the activities in the field, including exploration studies and research. So far, six wells and 
a I 00-km pipeline have become operational. At the moment, they have the capacity to produce 
6,000 bp/d."400 
He said that NIOC has the capacity to develop the Azadegan oilfield and that Inpex had forecast 
just a five percent ratio of return on the Azadegan oilfield: 
"However, in 40 wells under the direct supervision and control of NISOC, the recovery factor 
stands at around 16 percent. Therefore, the Inpex projection for Azadegan is totally 
unacceptable. In addition, Inpex has not considered gas injection into the oilfield to boost its 
recovery factor, whereas it is necessary to do so."401 
398 Financial Times, 01/07/2003 
[http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=iranian+project+japan&y=O&aje=true&x=O&id=030701002529] 
399 Agency for Natural Resources and Energy: the official website ofthe government of Japan, 26th June 2007 
[http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/policy/oil/fundamental_view.html] 
~- 400lnufDai1:5f"EconomiC'Focus;·t3/09/2006'[tittp:'//iranooiJY:i'fi1Jifs/2659/iltmVfocus]itmJ 
401 Ibid 
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Jashnsnaz further asserted that lnpex's $3 billion outlay was overestimated and that it was 
reasonable to exploit the field with only half that funding: "NISOC has the potential to develop 
Azadegan oilfield on its own and it will be a routine task for its highly skilled technicians, if it 
gets the authorization. The company has had successful experiences of handling oil development 
projects in the past, particularly during the 1980-88 Iraq-imposed war. Iran handed over the 
development of Azadegan to Inpex because of investment shortages.'M2 
It is obvious that both Iran as managers and Japan as contractors would have benefited from the 
Azadegan contract. It would have also allowed domestic Iranian companies an opportunity to 
display themselves at the international level. 
There was also a desire to protect oil reserves for future generations: 
"It is vital to produce oil in an efficient manner without wasting a single drop, which can only 
happen by using modem equipment and the latest methods. However, it is impossible to extract 
100 percent of oil from any given reserve. "403 
According to Jashsnaz, while the oilfield has been divided into 16 blocs it is impossible to 
produce the 5.5 bp/d from all the oilfields by the end of the Fourth National Development Plan 
(2005-1 0) due to a lack of funding. 
"Some argue that to improve our status and influence in OPEC, we need to produce more oil." 
Jashsnaz said.404 
.w2 Ibid 
.wJ NISOC managing director, reported in Iran Daily Economic Focus, 13/09/2006 
> [littP:IIirandiiil)<irll385/2659/htriillfocus:litml · 
404 Iran Daily Economic Focus, 13/09/2006 [http://irandaily.ir/1385/2659/htmllfocus.htm] 
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b) The effect of international pressure 
In October 2006, Inpex agreed with NIOC in principle to cut its concession from 75 percent to 
ten percent. The Kyodo news agency quoted Mehdi Bazargan, Managing director of Petroleum 
Engineering & Development Co., as saying: 
"If, in the future, lnpex solves its domestic problems, it is possible in the event of an agreement 
for Inpex to get back its shares or parts of its shares." but "Inpex has not been able to solve its 
problem with financial institutions, etc., in Japan." 
Kyodo further remarked that Iranian Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh had stated that Inpex 
could regain concession of 75%, subject to further negotiations. 
Inpex's CEO Katsujiro Kida said that the firm would give up its share to National Iranian Oil, 
resulting in the operator's role being transferred to the domestic authorities, with. Inpex instead 
becoming a collaborator.405 
Unlike previous buy-back contracts which lasted just 7-8 years the Azadegan contract had a 
duration oftwice that at 16 years. 
6.3.3 Sanctions and the South Pars Negotiations 
In 2002 an oil layer was found in the South Pars gas field, the world's largest gas field, with 
shared ownership by Qatar and Iran. An eventual output of I 00,000 bp/d406 of crude oil is 
expected from the field. The oil layer holds I 0 billion barrels. Three wells have been drilled and 
the drilling of a forth well began in July 2006. Petropars407 won phases 6-8 of the South Pars 
405 Peyvand Iran's News, 10/09/06 [ http://www.payvand.com/news/06/oct/1089.html] 
406 Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections, 31110/2002 [http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/discover/dix24883.htm] 
407
"Petropars receiveo'it:S'registiiitioif~in-'l99s~·as pera"aecreeofihe'touncll''fotme-Economy, in-reliltiotfto 6uy-
back within the South Pars Field. NICO, a NIOC subsidiary, owns all ofPetropars shares. 
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project and is currently deciding on potential subcontractors. Contracts for South Pars Phases 9-
12, and its oil layer, should be signed soon, although in earlier rounds there was a dearth of 
serious bidders. Mehdi Mir-Moezzi said that Iran will sign deals on the South Pars oil layer by 
March 2004. 
According to Dalton, BP is working with the domestic authorities on its first LNG venture, 
exporting gas from South Pars to Indian and other foreign. BP also participates in Iran's LNG 
consortium. 
Iran's plan to develop South Pars by means of contracts with large firms, resulted in interest by 
Total, Russia's Gazprom and Malaysia's Petronas. 
In January 2005 the New York Sun reported that Halliburton Products & Services Ltd. won the 
contract to develop phases 9 and 10 of the south Pars oil and gas field.408 Owing to an executive 
order banning substantial investment in the Iranian energy sector, Halliburton later quietly pulled 
out ofthe deal.409 
a) The early effect of US sanctions 
Pars Oil & Gas Company (POGC) is in charge of awarding the contracts for the different phases 
of the South Pars development project. Initially US sanctions appeared to inhibit some foreign 
investments in Iran's oil and gas sector. In the three years between the re-imposition of US 
bilateral sanctions in 1995 and the US-E. U. understanding in 1998 about de facto exemption of 
EU companies from US sanctions under ILSA, statements by senior spokesmen for several 
European, Japanese and Australian energy companies suggest that they were deterred from 
undertaking development projects in Iran. This was a period of little Iranian success in attracting 
408The'New Y orkSun, l2/0l/2005'[1ittri:l/www:'i1Ysufl'~com/aiticle/7 550] ·. 
409 Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections, 03/05/2005 [http://www.gasandoil.com/GOC/company/cnm52183.htm] 
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foreign oil and gas investment, but it is impossible to determine the extent to which foreign 
companies, who continued to negotiate with Iran, were deterred by ILSA or were seeking more 
favourable terms. The Total-Lukoil-Petronas contract for South Pars development marked a 
turning point in several respects. It forced a confrontation between the E.U. and US over ILSA in 
which the US backed down. This set a durable precedent and it was a breakthrough in terms 
accorded to foreign companies. It also established the buy-back contract framework as Iran's oil 
and gas development model opening the way for a series of other development contracts. 
b) Negotiations after the South Pars agreement 
Following the initial South Pars contract, which granted very favourable terms to foreign 
investors,410 Iran progressively tightened the terms offered to other developers. As a result new 
foreign investment commitments had slowed markedly by the end of the decade. This pattern 
was an indication of the increasing dispute regarding the desirability of foreign gas and oil 
investment, taking place as a part of the political debate between Iranian "conservatives" and 
"reformists". The effectiveness of US efforts to impede investment in the Iranian energy sector 
was considerable diminished while Iran's internal debate over the role of, and terms for, foreign 
investment became the main impediment. 
c) International aversion to economic sanctions 
The use and effectiveness of economic sanctions have become increasingly controversial in 
recent years. The conclusion of many experts at the December 1998 Overseas Development 
Institute (London) conference on the question of "Can Sanctions Be Smarter?" was that the 
unilateral sanctions, like the US sanctions placed on Iran, do not work due to the modem 
410 Yielding a reported internal rate of return of 16-18 percent. 
248 
economy, which boasts a significant degree of interconnection and integration.411 The US has 
therefore faced serious global pressure, especially from Europe, to re-evaluate its sanctions on 
Tehran. 
The split on the issue of sanctions resulted in Iran being able to attract further foreign funding 
into the petroleum industry. Foreign investors as well as some US companies have chafed at the 
restrictions of the sanctions. 
6.3.4 The Masjed-1-Suleyman Agreement 
Sheer Energy and its partner the Naftgaran Engineering Services Company had succeeded in 
acquiring the rights to exploit the Masjed-I-Suleyman412 (MIS) deposit. Sheer Energy Ltd. is in 
charge of the project holding a 49 percent stake with the 51 percent balance held by the 
Naftgaran Engineering Services Company ofTehran.413 
The contract provisions detail an updated funding of about $88 million USD 414 over a 4 year 
period to carry out a thorough observation of the deposit, including the drilling of wells as well 
as creation of the needed infrastructure, so as to be able to yield 20,000 barrels daily. The work 
is to be begin immediately. 
Sheer Energy will be reimbursed via output sales in the 3 years following the operation's 
conclusion. Recompense for the funding is calculated on the basis of a pre-determined ROR, 
with variations based on the extent that production figures were met or exceeded. The total 
estimated size of the oil pool is 6 billion barrels, although a sixth has already been extracted. 
411 Koenraad Van Brabant, 'Can Sanctions Be Smarter? The Current Debate: Report on a Conference Held in 
London 16-17 December 1998' (May 1999), first accessed 18/06/2007 [www.odihpn.org/documents/sancconf.pdf] 
412 Discovered in 1908-it was thefirstto be found in Iran 
413 Sheer Energy was the first non-Iranian firm since Eni's agreement to be granted exploitation rights over Masjed-
> I~Slileyiliiili: · · , ~- -- " --- · -c --. -- -- -- - - - • 
414 Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections, 13/03/2001 [http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/contract/cox1149l.htm] 
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a) Sheer's investment and increased oil production 
Prior to the Sheer contract production from then NIOC operated pool was around 4,500 barrels 
of oil per day. NIOC's existing operation was not connected to an existing Service Contract. A 
~ consequence of the operation's fulfilment of its goals would be to create a precedent for other 
fields while also boosting the local economy.415 
Following the purchase of the Sheer subsidiary by the Chinese company mentioned above, the 
Joint V~nture ofCNPCI/NESCO NIOC has signed a Contract with National NIOC to re-develop 
the Asmari reservoir of MIS Oil Field with the objective of incremental production of 25,000 
barrels oil per day.416 
6.3.5 Recent Success in Jofair negotiations 
Mehdi Bazargan, The Managing director of PEDEC, noted that during a recent visit by President 
Mahmmoud Ahmadinejad to Belarus, the two nations were enthusiastic to continue negotiations 
on the major development plan (MOP) of the southern Iranian oil field in Jofair region. He added 
that during the presidents of each country agreed to continue talks on the development plan of 
the Jofair oil field to finalise the negotiations in a few months. 
Upon the finalisation of the technical negotiations of the development plain of the Jofair oil field 
a draft contract was forwarded to Belarusneft Company and negotiations are underway. The 
Managing director of PEDEC stated that the contractual negotiations usually take at least three 
months. Bazargan had already told the Petroenergy Information Network that PEDEC had 
finalised technical negotiations on developing the Jofair oil field with a Belarusian company. 
415
.Prayda, 29L(W40Q~,[http://e,nglish,p~v~~.ru{comp/2902/05/29/29.t1-~6.html]. 
416 CNPCI/NESCO MIS Development Project, first accessed 26/06/2007 
[http://www.misproject.com/ProjectDefinition.htm] 
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Mehdi Bazargan added that "the draft agreement intended by the National Iranian Oil Company 
on development of Jofair oil field has been submitted to Belarusneft Company," stating that the 
negotiations would lead to a contract signing on I st July 2007. Continuing, he said that, "[w]e 
have proposed to Belarusneft Company to finalized [sic] negotiations on developing Jofair oil 
field by the end of June, so that, the contract could be signed at the beginning of July. The 
company has accepted our proposal and we should wait and see what happens in practice." 
The official stated that preliminary sessions on the contract have been held and the Belarusian 
Company has been studying the text of the contract for the past few weeks. 
The official stated that after the Jofair oil field contract is finalized, the company can introduce 
its partner for joint investment in the field and NIOC can investigate them. 
Iran and Belarus signed an early agreement on the development of the Jofair oil field late in the 
last Iranian calendar year (ended March 20, 2007) and in his recent visit to Minsk the minister of 
petroleum said, "Belarus is an oil producing [country] and was an energy heartland for the 
former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It seems that the country is capable of developing 
Iranian oilfields."417 . 
Upon completion of development, Jofair oil field is predicted to produce an average of 30,000 
bp/d. 
6.3.6 The New Yadavaran Oil Field 
Yadavaran is an oil field located in Khuzestan, Iran. The field is made up of two former fields, 
Koushk (discovered in 2000) and Hosseinieh (discovered in 2002). The field was renamed as the 
Y adavaran Field after researchers discovered that the two fields were actually connected. It is 
~-----~~ _____ __,_____ ___ ------ ---
417 Belarus News and Analysis, 21/5/2007 [http://www.data.minsk.by/belarusnews/052007] 
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estimated to have reserves of up to 17 billion barrels (2.7 km3) of oil, with 3 billion barrels (0.5 
km3) considered to be recoverable. 
On January 7, 2004, Iran negotiated a $40 billion deal with ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL), giving the 
Indian company a 20% stake in the field. As part of the deal, India agreed to buy 7.5 million 
metric tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Iran per annum for 25 years. 
On October 29, 2004, Iran negotiated a $70 billion deal with Sinopec, giving the Chinese 
company a 51% stake in the field's development. As part of the deal, China agreed to buy I 0 
million metric tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Iran per annum for 25 years. 
On November 22, 2006, Iran's oil minister said that the agreement with Sinopec is probably 
going to be concluded within weeks with the only remaining issue being the rate of return 
Sinopec will get on its investment. The minister would not comment on Iran's offer due to 
confidentiality.418 The remaining share (29%) of the oil field is owned by the National Iranian 
Oil Company. The field is projected to begin production in 2009419 with China agreeing to buy-
back 150,000 bp/d at market price for a period of 25 years after commissioning the field. 
6.3. 7 Italian Involvement in the Darkhovin Oil Field 
Containing 2.5 billion barrels of low sulfur, 39° API crude oil, this onshore field is located in 
south-western Iran, 45 kilometres northeast of the city of Abadan. Italy's Eni has carried out 
technical studies on this field. Eni (60%) is working together with Iran's Naftiran Inter-trade 
Company (NICO) and was the first foreign company to be granted rights to develop an onshore 
field. The development project for Darkhovin included two phases. The first phase was 
completed and included the drilling of 8 new wells and the construction of oil treatment and gas 
iL8iRigzone;-02/04/2007'[http://www.rigzone.com!news7ariicle.asp?ii=id=44623] 
419 Accessed 26/06/2007 [http://www.answers.com/topic/yadavaran-field] 
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injection plants to increase its production. The second phase which is currently underway420 is to 
expand the existing treatment capacity and the construction of new production wells and natural 
gas re-injection. Darkhovin operations began at 50,000 bpl/d in July 2005, with predicted figures 
of 160,000 bbl/d in 2007.421 The project is to last 65 months. 
Eni have also become involved in several projects in Iran in addition to their work in Darkhovin 
and South Pars, among which are the Shiraz and Tabriz Refineries, the Marun-Esfahan oil 
pipeline and the Marun-Esfahan-Rey oil pipeline pumping system, on behalf of the NIOC. They 
were also involved in the Iranian Gas Trunkline II project as well as the petrochemical plant of 
Arak and the Linear Alchyl Benzene plant ofEsfahan. 
6.4 Conclusion 
As we have shown, the constitution of Iran pllices considerable restrictions on the kind of 
contracts that can be made for the development of oil fields. This was the initial problem for Iran 
in attracting foreign investors into their oil fields and one that continues to this day. A 
combination of the 1987 Petroleum law, permitting formation of agreements with foreign 
entities, and the creation of the buy-back contract attempted to overcome the constitutional 
difficulty. The case study indicates some considerable success in this endeavour with numerous 
foreign companies investing in the Iranian oil fields. However, as we have also demonstrated, 
there have been a number of problems with regard to the nature of the buy-back contract and 
internal and external pressure over investment in the Iranian energy industry that has created 
problems when settling terms. 
420 As of 03/07/2007 
. . 
421 
.Oil f\1ag!¢Jlt:,. MiQi!_itry ofQiJ, :K!nvait, date of ace~!): 1:4/6/2_Q06. 
~[httP:7!WWw--.moO.gov.kw/magaZllt-e7erllifldex.aSp?MoTFYeS&Newsii}=354&rT.O(I~&daY=-f3&page=i0] -
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The United States has been at the forefront of attempts to enforce sanctions that would prevent or 
at least severely limit investment in the Iranian energy market. In recent years this has been due 
to misgivings about the Iranian nuclear program and the potential for Iran's development of 
nuclear weapons. Regarding the Inpex deal for development of the Azadegan oil field we saw a 
potential 75-percent share in the field drop to a mere tO-percent share due to considerable 
pressure from the US on the Japanese government who own Inpex. External pressure from the 
US on outside investors has had some considerable negative consequences for investment in 
Iranian oil fields. Conflicts over mine-fields in Azadegan left from the Iraqnran war have also 
been obstacles to agreement. 
However, one should not overstate the effect US sanctions have had. Post World War Two, 
America and Japan have had a particularly close relationship and while US interference may 
have resulted in a reduction of Inpex's share in the field it did not prevent the investment. Given 
Japan's reliance on foreign imports of oil, especially from the Middle-East, and the sheer size 
and potential of the Azadegan field the influence of the US was not enough to deter investment 
from the company. 
Indeed, the size and potential of Iranian on-shore oil fields which are unlikely to become 
exhausted in the near future is a huge incentive for investors on its own. 
It is of course difficult to say with certainty what the true effects of US sanctions were. While the 
US has and continues to put pressure on foreign governments not to invest in Iranian oil fields 
the fact there was an initial period of reluctance to invest in Iran may be related to a desire for 
better terms in company's agreements over the oil fields. 
Dissatisfaction over economic sanctions came to a head around the same time as the success of 
---- - - ------------
the South Pars contract which granted very favourable terms to investors. These events preceded 
254 
growth in investment indicating that either one or both may have been responsible for said 
growth. However, as to precise extent of the effect these events had on the expansion, it is 
uncertain. Statements by senior spokesmen within oil companies and a correlation between US 
pressure and initial failure to attract investment suggest that sanctions were having effect. While 
US sanctions may have initially have had substantial detrimental effects on Iran by inhibiting 
foreign investment, growing international disapproval with the sanctioning system has led to a 
drop in the effectiveness of US efforts. The Halliburton affair highlights conflict within industry 
itself and the policy espoused by Washington. The Total-Lukoil-Petronas contract for the South 
Pars oil field was important in highlighting this international disapproval between the US and 
most ofthe other industrialized nations over sanctions. The conclusion of that deal saw a marked 
rise in investment within the oil industry leading to foreign contracts for development of the 
inland oil fields noted above. The profit-making potential in Iranian oil fields seems to outweigh 
the threat of US disapproval. 
The correlation between the progressive tightening of terms to foreign investors and the drop in 
investment suggests that the external pressures are of limited importance when compared to 
internal factors. Companies who wish to invest in Iran will do so based primarily on the surplus 
they achieve from the contract. 
Internal conflicts between reformists and conservatives within Iran are part of the reason why it 
is so difficult to uncover exact terms of the contracts that have been made for the oil fields. 
, NIOC wishes to avoid excessive scrutiny from the Majlis and other public bodies when 
negotiating and agreeing terms in order to generate investment in the fields. Investors also wish 
to keep their agreements secret from their competitors in order to prevent them being undercut 
by a better offer from a rival. There is little incentive and substantial disincentive to publish 
contract terms. 
255 
The case studies show that despite the potential problems of the buy-back contract combined 
with internal and external pressures, although the external pressures are not as important as one 
might have initially believed, parties are still willing to invest in Iranian oil fields. 
One maJor point of contention between foreign investors and NIOC is in the duration of 
development of the sites for the buy-back contract. Those contracts that have been finalised tend 
to allow for a development period of around five years. The Darkhoven development is expected 
to last approximately 5 years and 5 months and the Masjed-e-Suleyman development is expected 
to take 4 years. Contracts between BP, Shell, TotalFinaEif and others fell through because 
expected duration was between 15 and 20 years and this was considered to be unacceptable. 
While the above issues may act as a deterrent for investors, as shown in the Inpex Azadegan 
deal, nevertheless there is investment in Iran with the majority of problems arising out of 
unfavourable terms in the contracts. Growth and reduction in investment in Iranian oil is effected 
by numerous externalities as well as the buy-back contract. However, the buy-back contract is an 
element of all the agreements. Terms of contracts change as does the political climate in which 
they are made but the buy-back contract is constant. This shows that despite problems that exist 
in the buy-back system it does not prevent investment in Iranian oil fields. It may impede 
investment to a degree by enforcing some unfavourable terms on investors but that will be taken 
into account in the pricing of the contract. As such, while the buy-back contract is not as 
efficient for Iran as an alternative system and is an inappropriate model for development of oil 
·contracts it has nevertheless achieved some considerable success despite considerable 
international and internal pressure along with other difficulties faced. 
•' 
1 Considering the extensive and constantly increasing limitations on foreign investments within 
j 
Iranian petroleum, as well as commercial- deterrents stemming_ from. uncertainty_ due to the 
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sensitive political situation, linked to international demands regarding its nuclear program, it is 
necessary to ,gauge the attractiveness of Iranian buy-back in the context of the international 
model buy-back. A particular source of such pressure stems from the effect of political and 
economic measures instituted by the US and international entities, which must be examined prior 
to reaching the final assessment in this regard. 
Such a comparison then permits a more accurate assessment of the influence that increasing 
international pressure and sanctions would have on Iran's ability to compete within the oil 
market. The existing effects of such international measures are also reviewed within Part Three, 
as they serve as a reliable means of predicting the effectiveness of any future sanctions that may 
be imposed on Iran. As the global oil market consists of interconnected systems, the 
repercussions for the United States economy and companies stemming from existing and 
potential sanctions is analysed; as such considerations are likely to affect the viability of any 
further sanctions. 
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